Problems of Communism

MARCH–APRIL 1975



SOVIET SUCCESSION CONTINGENCIES
Grey Hodnett

Arab Communists
John K. Cooley

The Spanish CP
Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon

Moscow and Bangladesh
Bhabani Sen Gupta

Book Reviews
Arnold Hottinger
Luigi Valsalice
Matthew P. Gallagher
Walker Connor
John A. Armstrong

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Problems of Communism

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MARCH-APRIL 1975 VOL. XXIV

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Cover: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, March 17, 1975, in Budapest. Photo by Ferenc Vigovszki for Interfoto MTI via Eastfoto.

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Succession Contingencies In the Soviet Union

By Grey Hodnett

It is appropriate now, a decade after the ascent of L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin to the offices vacated by an ousted Nikita Khrushchev, to reconsider the problem of succession in the USSR in order to see what lessons can be drawn from what has been—in comparison with the recent experience of other major powers and past Soviet practice—a period of unexpectedly great leadership stability and outward unity. The succession problem is of particular interest in that it poses in concentrated form many of the central issues involved in the study of Soviet politics, including the nature of the connections between the leadership, the political system as a whole, and Soviet society.

Western scholars who have examined the question of succession in the USSR have tended to stress the tight integration of these three elements, although from different perspectives. The predominant view in the past, which Myron Rush has termed the "cyclical theory of Soviet politics" and whose origins may be traced to the totalitarian model, has emphasized integration from the top down through domination.[1] Alternative views have by and large stressed intergration of the elements from the outside in, through functional "imperatives" imposed upon a reactive leadership by an entrenched bureaucracy or by an active industrialized society.[2]

The present article, in contrast, posits that the paths of influence among the three elements are multidirectional, that the delineation of linkages is problematic, and consequently that an approach which directly confronts the "contingencies" of succession may be useful. Such an analytical strategy highlights the "contingent" nature of the factors that may influence a succession—their tendency to be changing continually, though at varying rates, within varying limits. It also presupposes that relevant factors may assume a different character in different successions; that while the values of some factors (*e.g.*, age or experience) may be ranked in probability terms, the rankings are—within limits—subject to alteration; and that interactions among relevant factors link together in "probabilistic" rather than "causal" chains. In short, it treats the succession as a highly complex stochastic process governed by a series of factors—some stable, others dynamic; some taking place within the leadership, others outside it; some quantifiable, most not.[3]

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[1] See Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

[2] See Richard Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1965; Seweryn Bialer, "Soviet Leadership: Some Problems of Continuity, Structure and Cohesion," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1966; Jerome M. Gilison, "New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. 19, July 1967, pp. 563-81.

[3] It is a sobering thought that the most sophisticated contemporary approaches to the predictive "modeling" of stochastic social processes do not begin to come to grips with the kind of complexities involved in the succession problem. For example, see Harrison C. White, *Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.

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The relevance of a "contingency" approach becomes apparent if we ask the question, "Succession to what?" What is the destination toward which "the successor" moves, and when does he "arrive"? In the scholarly literature, the role involved has variously been described as: (a) "supreme ruler," "sovereign power," "personal dictatorship," "limited dictatorship," "dictator"[4]; (b) "monocratic leadership"[5]; (c) "personal rule," "individual rule"[6]; (d) "limited personal rule"[7]; (e) "dominant leader role"[8]; (f) "political boss"[9]; (g) "limited and insecure superiority"[10]; (h) "modified collective leadership"[11]; or "erosion of the collective principle."[12] The variations in these description mirror the substantial differences of opinion among Western analysts (as well as the evolution of the thinking of certain analysts over time) about how much power Khrushchev exercised in comparison with Stalin,[13] but they also attest to an important reality: that the degree of power associated with Khrushchev's role was not something constant but changed through time. This fact poses a major methodological dilemma when one attempts to conceptualize the Leader's role.

Similarly, the assumption—implicit in most of these formulations—that the relationship between the Leader and the rest of the political leadership can adequately be characterized in simple "either/or" terms may well be misleading. Certainly, it is not the sort of picture that Khrushchev himself gave us of his rule.

One is struck, in reading the late Soviet leader's reminiscences about his own role, by the counterpoint between the dominant theme of his own personal power and the supporting theme of participation by "the leadership."[14] If we are to judge by Khrushchev's words, one-man rule and collective leadership were both *simultaneously* part of Soviet political reality not only before but also after his victory over the "anti-party group" in June 1957.

An examination of the post-Khrushchev succession process may help further to clarify the question of the Leader's role and at the same time suggest other contingent features of the succession process.

From Khrushchev to Brezhnev

There are four conceivable circumstances under which a succession may occur: the death of the former leader; his incapacitation through illness; his resignation; or his expulsion from office. Each has different political consequences, and each is possible in the future. Khrushchev, as we know, left by the last route. Indeed, he lost his job when he was out of town. The arrangements for his removal were made conspiratorially, and his own movements and communications were physically constrained.

To accomplish these ends, Khrushchev's opponents—probably a majority of the members of the Communist Party Presidium—had to gain the sup-

[4] Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, pp. 104, 105, 108, 111, 114, 193, 229.

[5] T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," *Survey* (London), January 1964, pp. 187-88.

[6] Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, pp. 141, 148.

[7] Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, p. 10.

[8] Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership: Towards a Self-Stabilizing Oligarchy?" *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1970, p. 169.

[9] Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1972, p. 43.

[10] Bialer, "Soviet Leadership . . . ," p. 16.

[11] Gilison, "New Factors of Stability . . . ," p. 571.

[12] Sidney Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1970, p. 6.

[13] For a judicious evaluation of this debate, see Abraham Brumberg, "The Fall of Khrushchev—Causes and Repercussions," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, Toronto, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, pp. 1-15.

[14] See *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbot, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974. In these memoirs we find, on the one hand, such statements as: "When I say 'we,' I mean myself and the other members of the Presidium—although, of course, as the Chairman I held a post that gave me a voice which was to a certain extent decisive, as long as I had the support of the others" (p. 27); ". . . during my years first as a member, then as head of our country's leadership" (p. 107); ". . . when I was active at the head of the Party and the State" (p. 135); "I was completely within my rights as head of the Soviet Party not to accept the Chinese slogan" (p. 272); "When I was in the leadership, I set both internal and foreign policy to a considerable extent" (p. 344). On the other hand, we find observations such as: "I'd like to stress that the proposals I originally made weren't implemented just on my say-so. I provided the initiative but the decision was approved by the Central Committee" (p. 138); "We discussed the problem in the leadership and concluded that the time had come to demonstrate our trust in other countries . . ." (p. 222); "After consultations within the [Soviet] leadership, I had a talk with Comrade Gomulka about removing our troops from Poland" (p. 226); "Mao asked me whom we were going to appoint as Bulganin's replacement. I replied that the question hadn't been decided yet for sure, but that I thought our comrades were leaning in the direction of Kosygin" (p. 253); "I discussed his request with my comrades (I never received foreign visitors without consulting the leadership first). We decided that I should meet him . . ." (p. 290); "Even though I'd just returned home from Washington, my comrades in the leadership told me I'd have to muster my strength and fly straight to Peking to represent the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in talks with the Chinese leadership" (p. 307); "The document had to be turned around 180 degrees. Since we hadn't discussed the new declaration with the collective leadership, we immediately transmitted the draft to Moscow for examination by the other comrades. . . . We received an answer from Moscow right away; the comrades in the leadership gave their approval to our new position" (pp. 451-52).

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A portion of the Soviet leadership shown at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971: in the front row, from left, M. A. Suslov, L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgorny, and A. N. Kosygin; in the rear, from left, M. G. Solomentsev, F. D. Kulakov, V. V. Shcherbitsky, Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, P. N. Demichev, D. A. Kunaev, and P. M. Masherov.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

port of secret police chief V. Ye. Semichastny and his immediate subordinates in the KGB (*Komitet po Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti*—Committee on State Security), and the acquiescence of the military leadership—assistance which KGB chief I. A. Serov and Marshal G. K. Zhukov had not been willing to render the Presidium majority in 1957.[15] But it is only in this specific sense that physical force played a role in the Brezhnev accession. Neither the KGB nor the army compelled other members of the Presidium to accept the justification for Khrushchev's removal and the nomination of Brezhnev and Kosygin to fill the key posts that he had held, nor did either induce the Central Committee membership to accept the Presidium's explanation and confirm the changes. These were purely political acts.

Under the circumstances of the expulsion, it is important to note, only a portion of the leadership participated in the succession decisions from the outset. This would not necessarily be the case under different conditions—such as the death of an incumbent General Secretary. Then, the views of all the voting members of the Politburo would be crucial.

One cannot characterize an accession, however, by looking merely at the "how"; it is necessary to pay attention to the "*why*" as well. In the case of Khrushchev's removal, those who label it a "coup d'état" tend to minimize this consideration, arguing, for example, that "the removal of Khrushchev was not occasioned by policy issues" but was "designed to restore rule by 'pure' oligarchy."[16] In support of this argument, they adduce such evidence as the disparate character of the opposition to Khrushchev, the nature of the public charges made against him, and the failure of the new regime immediately to institute major changes in his policies. What was at issue, it is contended, was Khrushchev's quest for greater power and "the oligarchy's" desire to recoup

[15] For a report that Serov and Marshal Zhukov, as well as Frol Kozlov, then First Secretary of the Leningrad Province Party Committee, played crucial roles in organizing Central Committee members on Khrushchev's behalf in June 1957, see *Politicheskii dnevnik* (Political Diary), Amsterdam, The Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1972, p. 107.

[16] Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership . . . ," p. 173.

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its former position. But while it may be granted without question that Khrushchev was struggling to retain or even increase his influence within the leadership, this does not explain why he found himself in such a position at that time. One may gain some perspective on this question by reviewing briefly certain policy aspects involved in Khrushchev's rise and fall.

Khrushchev's Policy Failures

Prior to his victory over the "anti-party group," Khrushchev had expanded his role essentially through piecemeal and pragmatic policy measures to meet the urgent problems that Stalin had bequeathed. For instance, Khrushchev had responded to shortfalls in agricultural production with the campaign to sow the Virgin Lands; to discontent of minority nationalities with a relaxation of oppressive controls; to the paralysis of fear with his secret speech to the 20th Party Congress; to hypercentralization with the creation of regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*); to the dead end in foreign policy with overtures to the West, etc. From the standpoint not only of the "anti-party group" but of many other high-level officials, some or all of these policies not only threatened individual careers but were (a) mistaken and (b) unsuccessful. By the spring of 1957, according to one inside source, Khrushchev's policies had "evoked serious doubts among a considerable section of the party and state apparatus."[17] This was the specific context of Khrushchev's attempt to extend his power in the first half of 1957 and of the reaction to his efforts by the majority of the leadership.

The important change after June 1957 was that Khrushchev began to elaborate a more or less coherent and consistent set of policies to which he was committed for the rest of his regime and for which he was accountable. The foundation of this effort was the Seven-Year Plan (a blueprint for economic growth in the years 1959–65), for which the 1961 Party Program provided the ideological superstructure. The Seven-Year Plan was based upon unrealistic assumptions about what was achievable, especially in light of a concurrent increase in US defense spending. As the gap between results and plan targets reached increasingly alarming levels, and as his prestige dropped, Khrushchev strove desperately, through a "catch-up" politics of organizational "solutions," purges, and transgressions against the outermost acceptable limits of personal rule, to extricate himself from failure. But stagnant agricultural output, declining industrial productivity, administrative chaos, erosion of ideological control, an exposed military-strategic posture, and serious strains within the Communist "commonwealth" thwarted his efforts. These were massive policy issues, and they cannot be considered mere background factors or pretexts for Khrushchev's removal. Not only did they contribute to the decision to remove the First Secretary, but they also could not help but define the tasks of the new Leader as visualized by those in the party leadership who chose him.

[17] *Politicheskii dnevnik*, p. 106.

Choice of a Successor

The word "choice" is critical. Analysts sometimes leave the impression that there is no process of choice involved in the "emergence" of a Leader in the Soviet Union.[18] However, it must be emphasized that Brezhnev was chosen for elevation to First Secretary—and hence launched as Leader—by his colleagues; as we have seen, no physical or organizational force came into play, and Brezhnev "clients" in the lower echelons of the hierarchy were in no position to lift him into the Leader's job. At best, their views were one of several factors taken into account by Brezhnev's peers in reaching their decision. In short, there was a choice, and the choice necessarily involved the application of some criteria —certain notions of the role that the First Secretary ought to play and the qualities that he needed to perform this role. In a later section of this article, I will advance detailed, if tentative, judgments about the probable nature of the criteria of selection, but it will suffice for the moment to suggest that in September-October 1964 there was no serious alternative to Brezhnev among the realistically "eligible" full or candidate members of the CPSU Presidium. Even on the basis of such initial sorting criteria as health, posts then occupied, or ethnic origin, Brezhnev distanced the lot. Frol Kozlov suffered from serious heart trouble; G. I. Voronov, D. S. Poliansky,

[18] For example, we read: "In the USSR . . . the new ruler evidently comes to his office not by an orderly transfer of authority but by arrogating power to himself"; and elsewhere, "In the first days of the Khrushchev succession, Brezhnev was able to make himself First Secretary of the Central Committee" (Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, pp. 78, 141).

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A. P. Kirilenko, V. V. Grishin, and L. N. Yefremov held second-rank posts; and N. V. Podgorny had the disadvantage of being Ukrainian. Brezhnev had unrivaled leadership experience in the party apparatus dealing with cadres, industry, agriculture, construction, and the defense sector; he had served in Moscow and in three different national republics; he had acquired significant experience in the conduct of foreign affairs; and he had the sort of conservative political style and instincts that Khrushchev was felt to have lacked so sorely.[19] The situation was not at all comparable to that which existed at Stalin's death, when—in addition to Khrushchev—there had been at least one clear alternative (G. M. Malenkov), with several other less possible but still conceivable candidates in the wings.

While Brezhnev thus benefited from the absence of a suitable alternative candidate for the post of Leader, his accession was accompanied by another important contingency. As T. H. Rigby has noted, at the time of Brezhnev's accession the party leadership seems to have agreed to a "veritable charter of oligarchy" or "implicit compact" involving a commitment to a policy symbolized by the phrase, "stability of cadres."[20] What this entailed, in effect, was the imposition of certain "conditions" upon the freedom of maneuver of the chosen successor. The most important of these was an explicit prohibition against the First Secretary's simultaneously occupying the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Rigby goes on to argue plausibly that it was agreed that seats in the party Presidium and Secretariat and in the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers be doled out "in such a way as to avoid dangerous patterns of overlap" and that patronage be reduced. Another element of the "stability of cadres" policy evidently involved the restoration to their old jobs of many prominent officials victimized in the later Khrushchev years. Turnover at lower administrative levels was to be cut down, and "parachuting" of cadres into local organizations discouraged. In addition, it is clear that there were stipulations that the "collective" was the ultimate authority, that the Presidium membership should regularly participate in decision-making, and that the First Secretary should be accountable to the "collective leadership." Finally, there seems to have been an agreement that a stricter division of labor be enforced between state administrative agencies and party organizations, particularly between the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee apparatus.

As we shall see below, Brezhnev's opportunities to build his own role as Leader were highly conditioned by these specific features of his accession to office. On the list of such contingent conditioning factors one usually finds what is commonly called the "succession struggle." In this regard, it is essential to distinguish between *resistance* to the pretensions and policies of the incumbent Leader and outright *competition* for his post. The rise of Brezhnev has unquestionably been accompanied by repeated manifestations of resistance, which continue to the present day,[21] and there is not the slightest doubt that policy differences have constantly simmered within the leadership.[22] *Competition*, however, is another matter.

The dearth of alternative candidates at the outset produced a succession that appears—on the basis of available evidence—to have been almost "struggle-free" in the competitive sense. As far as I am aware, no evidence has ever been brought forward suggesting actual competition for the appointment to the post of First Secretary in the days preceding the October 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee, particularly on the part of the much-heralded (in the West) "counter-heir," Podgorny. And if A. N. Shelepin became a potential competitor, it was only after his promotion from nonmember to full member of the Presidium in November 1964, when Brezhnev already occupied the first secretaryship. Although much has been written about Shelepin's aspirations to be Leader, hard evidence on this score is difficult to find. A reading of Michel Tatu's authoritative work on the period leaves one uncertain as to whether Shelepin ever mounted a concerted effort to "seize" power in the period running from November 1964, through the dismantling of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in December 1965, to his transfer to the relatively obscure post of Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in Sep-

[19] For a well-balanced biography of Brezhnev, see Paul A. Smith, Jr., "Brezhnev: Ascent to Power," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1971, pp. 576-608.

[20] Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership . . . ," p. 175. A recent Soviet émigré with access to Central Committee circles told the present author that the decision to keep the two posts in separate hands took the form of a closed circular letter issued by the CPSU Central Committee.

[21] For supporting arguments, see Terry McNeill, "Some Reflections on the Soviet Political Leadership," Radio Liberty, *Dispatch* (New York), RL 299/74, Sept. 20, 1974.

[22] See, for example, the remarkably argumentative pleas that S. Trapeznikov made for the funding of Brezhnev's agricultural program in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 9, 1974, pp. 33-50.

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Figure 1: The Soviet Leadership Since 1964—



[1] The CPSU CC Presidium was renamed the Politburo in April 1966, at the 23rd Party Congress.

[2] Membership in these three organs began before October 1964 and/or continued to March 1975 unless otherwise indicated by dates of accession and/or departure. [On April 16, 1975, Shelepin was removed from the Politburo.—Eds.]

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Patterns of Stability and Responsibility



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tember 1967.[23] There have been accounts of rumors to the effect that Shelepin, along with M. A. Suslov and K. T. Mazurov, wrote a letter criticizing Brezhnev's unpublished report at the December 1969 Plenum of the Central Committee—a time identified by others as a difficult one for the party leader.[24] But this seems to be the extent of the evidence available that anyone actively "struggled" for Brezhnev's post.

Seats of Power

One of the basic reasons for the relative absence of a competitive "power struggle" during Brezhnev's incumbency has been, of course, the effect that the "stability of cadres" policy has had on turnover within the Politburo (as the party Presidium has been called since the 23rd CPSU Congress in April 1966). As Figure 1 shows, between November 1964 and April 1971 only two individuals were promoted to full membership in the Politburo (Mazurov and Arvid Pelshe), neither of whom were serious contenders or occupied posts that could be considered launching sites for the Leadership. Thus, the initial conditions under which Brezhnev came to office did much to protect his position.

At the same time, however, these same conditions limited the opportunities for Brezhnev to extend his role. Although there have been rumors and speculation that on several occasions Brezhnev may have attempted to follow Khrushchev's example and establish himself as the head of the government as well as General Secretary of the party,[25] he has not in fact acquired this post. It does appear that he has assumed the role of commander-in-chief of the Soviet armed forces through chairmanship of the Defense Council,[26] but he lost another potential base of personal power when the CPSU Central Committee's RSFSR Bureau, of which he was chairman, was liquidated in 1966.

Equally important have been the limitations that the "stability of cadres" policy has placed upon Brezhnev's ability to eliminate from the top leadership those who have opposed him on policy grounds and to replace them with people of his own choosing. As T. H. Rigby has conclusively demonstrated,[27] the pattern of staffing the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat and the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers is an important factor in any succession, and this pattern may differ from period to period. Compared with the fluid pattern of the Khrushchev years, that of the Brezhnev period has been comparatively stable. Since 1964, the Politburo has always contained at least one non-Brezhnevite member of the Secretariat—Suslov—and at least one non-Brezhnevite member of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers—Kosygin. Not until the 24th Party Congress, in April 1971, did Brezhnev succeed in significantly increasing the number of his secure clients among the full members of the Politburo, and he still by no means enjoyed a majority.[28] Despite the dramatic promotion of Yu. V. Andropov, Marshal A. A. Grechko, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to full membership in the Politburo and the removal of Voronov and P. Ye. Shelest in April 1973, Brezhnev remains—in my opinion—shy of his own majority, although a few more changes could tip the balance.[29] In the Secretariat, Brezhnev may have gained a majority by the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, and almost certainly had it by April 1968.[30] To the moment of writing, however, he has not managed to install his own ideologist in the Secretariat.[31] Brezhnev's earliest "success," perhaps, was achieved where some might least have expected it—in that citadel of "the state," the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. For most of the time since December 1965, Brezhnev has probably had something

[23] See Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, London, Collins, 1969, pp. 503-08. Robert Conquest tells us that "since Tatu wrote, it has been reported in more detail and on better information that a serious effort was made as early as 1965 to put Shelepin in Brezhnev's place and Ustinov in Kosygin's, transferring Brezhnev to the titular role of Head of State—*i.e.*, President of the Supreme Soviet" (*Soviet Analyst* [London], Nov. 14, 1974). No source is cited by Conquest, but the same information appears in "Rumors About Possible Changes in Leadership" in *Politicheskii dnevnik*, p. 50. The same source (pp. 243-44) also notes a report ("It is said . . .") that Shelepin still had pretentions to the position of Leader in the spring of 1967, at the time of the Six-Day War in the Middle East and of Semichastny's removal as Chairman of the KGB.

[24] *Politicheskii dnevnik*, pp. 657-58.

[25] For an account of rumors that Brezhnev may in late 1971 have attempted to gain control of the government through the proposed establishment of a "state council" that he would head, see John Dornberg, *Brezhnev*, London, André Deutsch, 1974, p. 264.

[26] See Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1973, p. 3, and Alain Jacob in *The Guardian* (Manchester), March 2, 1974.

[27] See Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership . . . ."

[28] This assumes that his firm supporters were Kirilenko, F. D. Kulakov, D. A. Kunaev, and V. V. Shcherbitsky.

[29] This assumes that his firm supporters among the 16 full members of the Politburo are Andropov, Grechko, Kirilenko, Kulakov, Kunaev, and Shcherbitsky.

[30] This assumes that his firm supporters were Kirilenko, Kulakov, I. V. Kapitonov, K. F. Katushev, and possibly D. F. Ustinov.

[31] Although P. N. Demichev was removed from the Secretariat at the December 1974 Plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev was apparently unable to force through his own choice as a replacement, and Demichev's post was left unfilled.

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approaching a majority there,[32] although one-man-one-vote is in all likelihood not the operative principle in this body. But it should be noted that he achieved this success by "inheriting" Khrushchev's clients—a phenomenon that might well not repeat itself in the future.[33] (Brezhnev has also made steady progress in promoting old cronies and newer clients to prominent jobs in the territorial party apparatus, the Central Committee apparatus, and the central government bureaucracy;[34] however, the moderate turnover in Central Committee membership at both the 23rd and 24th party congresses—a function of the "stability of cadres" condition placed upon his accession to office—has compelled him to reason with this body rather than to use it as a rubber stamp.[35])

Brezhnev's capacity to extend his influence through structural change has been severely restricted, too. To some extent, the bad example of Khrushchev's "organizational itch" has inhibited use of this strategy, but the leadership's insistence upon a more effective division of labor within its own ranks combined with restoration of the ministerial system and centralized economic management have imposed the most fundamental limitations on this potential source of power. While there is some evidence of top-level conflict over the breadth of the party apparatus' jurisdiction over administration of the state and the economy, too much should not be made of it.[36] The speeches of the Soviet leaders themselves provide much evidence of controversy on other major issues, but they reveal little evidence of conflict along this presumed "party/state" axis of controversy at the top leadership level; and attempts to demonstrate it tend either to overinterpret these speeches or to turn into ingenious but questionable exegeses of the pronouncements of middle-level propagandists. Known attempts to expand the jurisdiction of party organizations either at the center (for example, by accentuating the supervisory powers of primary party organizations in ministries) or at the local level (for instance, by involving the provincial party committees in industrial consolidation or regional planning) should be interpreted as at best marginal in any impact they may have had on Brezhnev's influence.

Policies and Power

Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev at the outset found his power to influence policy matters severely limited by the parameters of the problems inherited from his predecessor. Brezhnev's initial policies were generally more conservative and "consensual" than those of Khrushchev and were largely responses to the disarray left by the latter. Brezhnev promoted the recentralization of industrial administration; he helped engineer a dramatic expansion of Soviet military might; and he lent his weight to a retightening of controls in the fields of culture and nationality affairs. Abroad, his "doctrine" and its application clamped a lid on the potentially explosive situation in Eastern Europe, while the tough policy that he favored toward China probably won support in many quarters. The only area in which he quickly took an innovating lead was agriculture, where he closely identified himself with major efforts to solve the Soviet food problem outlined at the March 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee.

For several years, Brezhnev was able to sustain high levels of spending on both agriculture and defense and to contain pressures from some of his colleagues for greater production of consumer goods. But serious economic difficulties had begun to arise by 1967.[37] The sheer magnitude of the Soviet GNP was not able, for various reasons (including the parasitic character of the defense sector), to overcome the deep-seated structural weaknesses of the

[32] This assumes that his clients have incuded, at least, V. Ye. Dymshits, M. T. Yefremov, I. T. Novikov, Z. N. Nuriev, L. V. Smirnov, N. A. Tikhonov, and possibly V. N. Novikov.

[33] On Brezhnev's inheritance of Khrushchev's clientele, see Bialer, "Soviet Leadership . . . ," p. 7.

[34] See Dornberg, *Brezhnev.*

[35] See Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System . . . ," p. 32. This is not to say that Brezhnev has failed to increase the number of his clients in the Central Committee. On this point, see Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics*, April 1972, pp. 385, 404.

[36] By far the most interesting report of such conflict refers to the *beginning* of the succession period: "It is said that shortly after his *appointment* as Chairman of the [USSR] Council of Ministers, Kosygin raised the question of party organs not interfering directly in administering the economy, but of having all economic leadership be concentrated in the Council of Ministers. He proposed that branch [*i.e.*, economic branch] departments in the CC CPSU, the CC Bureau for the RSFSR, and the CC's of the national Communist parties and the obkoms [provincial party committees] be liquidated. His draft was discussed but not approved. Recently, it seems, he has again raised this question, declaring that he can't 'pull up' the economy under the existing conditions of dual leadership (departments of the party organs and departments of the Council of Ministers)" (*Politicheskii dnevnik*, pp. 50-51). It seems implausible to this observer that a politician as experienced as Kosygin would have advocated such a radical solution as "liquidation" of the party departments, but it is conceivable that frustration might have provoked an indiscretion of this magnitude.

[37] See Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-70*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, Chap. 9.

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Figure 2: Likely Leader Attitudes, 1970–74 [1]

	Issue areas						
	Brezhnev as leader	Détente	Consumption	"Industrializing" agriculture	Use of economic "levers"	Siberian development	Homogenizing nationalities
Politburo members							
Brezhnev	+	+	+	+	–	+	+
Andropov	+	+	+	+	–	+	+
Grechko	+	–	–	?	?	?	+
Grishin	–	–	+	+	+	–	+
Gromyko	+	+	–	+	?	+	+
Kirilenko	+	+	–	+	–	+	+
Kosygin	–	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kulakov	+	+	+	+	+	?	?
Kunaev	+	+	–	+	–	+	–
Mazurov	+	–	+	–	+	–	–
Pelshe	+	–	+	+	–	?	+
Podgorny	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
Poliansky	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Shcherbitsky	+	+	+	+	–	?	+
Shelepin	+	+	+	+	+	?	+
Shelest	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Suslov	+	–	–	+	–	+	+
Voronov	–	+	+	–	+	+	–
Candidate members of Politburo							
Demichev	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Masherov	+	–	+	+	+	–	–
Mzhavanadze	–	?	+	?	?	?	–
Ponomarev	+	+	–	+	?	?	+
Rashidov	+	?	+	+	?	?	+
Romanov	+	+	–	+	+	–	+
Solomentsev	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ustinov	+	–	–	+	+	?	+
Other party secretaries							
Dolgikh	+	+	–	+	–	+	+
Kapitonov	+	+	–	+	?	?	+
Katushev	+	+	–	+	–	?	+

\+ positive
\+ moderately sympathetic
– unsympathetic
? attitude not known

SOURCES: electoral and other speeches of indicated leaders for the years 1970–74.

Soviet economy. These problems came to a head in 1969 with a 2.3 percent rate of increase of GNP (the lowest since 1963), an absolute decline of 4.5 percent in agricultural production, the lowest growth rate of civilian industrial production since World War II, an absolute decline in industrial factor productivity, increased inflationary pressures, food shortages, and an overall decline in the growth rate of per capita consumption.[38] Paradoxically, it was on this weak foundation—so much less promising than that which Khrushchev enjoyed in 1957–58—that Brezhnev was able to expand his role in the collective leadership.

His first move was to lay the blame for the sorry state of the Soviet economy at the door of others and to issue a clarion call for discipline. This he did at the December 1969 Plenum of the Central Committee. The second, more difficult step was to formulate a long-range plan to deal with what were clearly perceived to be the basic problems of the Soviet economy—feeding the population, raising the standard of living at least gradually, assuring an adequate supply of raw materials and energy, maintaining a satisfactory level of military preparedness, and achieving all of this largely through sharply heightened productivity rather than by means of the traditional acceleration of capital and labor inputs.[39] Brezhnev's plan, in oversimplified form, has come to entail a vast effort to "industrialize" agriculture[40]; modest increases in the rate of consumer goods production; heavy emphasis on development of Siberian raw materials and energy resources, with Western financial and technological participation; the "Peace Program," retrospectively said to have been adopted at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, aimed

[1] This chart is an attempt to present the likely attitudes of key Soviet leaders on a variety of political issues. The issue areas examined were defined as follows: *Brezhnev as leader*—personal commitment to Brezhnev as General Secretary; *Détente*—optimistic evaluation of the prospects for long-term security and economic agreements with the major capitalist powers; *Consumption*—priority attached to urban consumer welfare; *"Industrializing" agriculture*—enthusiasm for heavy investment in farm machinery, agricultural chemicalization and fertilizer production, irrigation, farm consolidation, and specialization of production units; *Use of economic "levers"*—attribution of a positive role to price and profit as regulators of managerial behavior; *Siberian development*—enthusiasm for big Siberian development projects; *Homogenizing nationalities*—insistence on homogenization of nationalities and an intolerance toward expression of non-Russian national interests. Coding of leader attitudes was based wherever possible upon aggregating the positions expressed by an individual leader on several discrete indicators related to a given issue. For example, sympathy toward Brezhnev was judged by the frequency of references to Brezhnev, the warmth of references to him, the breadth of activities attributed to him, the implied status of Brezhnev vis-à-vis the Politburo membership, and stress on the collectiveness of party leadership.

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(*inter alia*) at shifting some funds and skilled manpower to civilian production; and a frontal approach to technological innovation and productivity, based on organizational consolidation, directive introduction of new technology, party pressure at the local level, a projected transition to a thoroughly centralized computer-based planning system,[41] and large-scale technology transfer through foreign trade with the capitalist countries.

Although the mixture of elements in Brezhnev's plan was *his* strategy and was not simply "given" by the situation, it was still not entirely fortuitous. Since he was unwilling to release individual initiative in farming by granting autonomy to small work teams, as Voronov advocated, costly investment in agriculture was the necessary alternative. His lack of sympathy for the "economic reform" and its use of indirect economic "levers" such as incentives based on prices and profitability implied an "engineering" approach to industrial problems. If he wished to reduce the arms burden and encourage foreign trade and technological borrowing, he had to move toward some form of détente. But if he maneuvered for détente abroad, he had to protect his flanks domestically with intensified cultural "vigilance." And if he wanted to push costly Siberian development (for security as well as economic reasons), then he was bound to attempt to cut back industrial investment in the western oblasts of the RSFSR and place greater restraints on the economic development of most of the non-Russian union republics, especially the Ukraine.[42] Thus, while it was possible at the beginning of the succession for Brezhnev to pursue policies which caused the least offense to the most influential "demand sectors" of the Soviet elite, in the second phase of Brezhnev's rule this relative harmony has been more difficult to maintain.

Differences between the "logic" of Brezhnev's interrelated positions and that underlying the stances of other members of the leadership, not surprisingly, have given rise to dissonance. Figure 2 suggests, in a tentative initial approximation, the probable complexity—at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership—of what Franklyn Griffiths has called "tendencies of articulation."[43] Looking across the rows, we can spot many "inconsistencies" in the policy profiles of individuals, which in turn are translated into rather different "voting" patterns in most issue areas, as can be seen by comparison of the columns. There is no tidy correspondence between policy positions, on the one hand, and organizational, functional, or even factional (*e.g.*, "Brezhnevite") affiliations. (The "party/state" dichotomy fares particularly poorly.) The individual profiles do "make sense," of course, but only in terms of the range of considerations relevant to each actor.[44] Nevertheless, by capitalizing upon the various "fits" between his own program and the "incongruous" political stances of other top party figures, Brezhnev has gained important sources of leverage in expanding his role since 1969.

The area in which this process has been most visible is détente. There can be little doubt that the "details" of détente have been the focus of acute concern and controversy among the Soviet leaders, with quite different interpretations being placed upon the utility and purpose of the opening to the

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[38] Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 3-4, 21, and Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 381-82. Of course, the weather was exceptionally poor in 1969.

[39] For an analysis of the problems, see Robert W. Campbell *et al.*, "Methodological Problems Comparing the US and USSR Economies," in JEC, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, pp. 122-46.

[40] This is to be achieved through heavy investment in farm machinery, fertilizers, and chemicals; substantial new irrigation and reclamation programs; consolidation of farms; and increased emphasis on "factory farming."

[41] See Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Present Developments in Soviet Planning and Incentives," in JEC, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, pp. 11-38. For recent Soviet discussions, see N. Lebedinsky, "Interaction of Automated Control Systems," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 10, 1974, pp. 13-25, and V. Budavei, B. Råizberg, and O. Yun, "Methodological Principles for Building An Automated System of Plan Calculation," *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 11, 1974, pp. 21-31.

[42] On this much underestimated issue of regional development policy, see V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk, Eds., *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

[43] See Franklyn Griffiths, "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-Making," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 335-77.

[44] To stimulate discussion I would argue that these considerations can be differentiated and to some extent scaled ("other things being equal") roughly as follows: (a) promotion of one's interests as a continuing member of the leadership; (b) promotion of one's factional interests; (c) promotion of functional tasks for which one is responsible; (d) promotion of interests associated with one's general policy sympathies; (e) promotion of sectoral ("party," "governmental," etc.), organizational (departmental, ministerial, etc.), or geographical (province, region, republic) interests; (f) promotion of interests associated with one's past career experiences; (g) promotion of interests arising from one's membership in various age, social background, ethnic, and educational categories. The weightings of these considerations can, of course, change dramatically with circumstances.

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West.[45] Brezhnev has used the diplomacy of détente —particularly summit meetings and negotiations with foreign heads of state—to expand his own role and correspondingly contract that of Kosygin. He has also employed détente as a device to outflank or eliminate his enemies.

The case of the former Ukrainian CP First Secretary, Piotr Ye. Shelest, is instructive. Shelest was vocally opposed to rapprochement with West Germany and the United States, strongly in favor of heavy spending on armaments, and resolutely against placing priority on development of Siberia at the expense of investment in the European part of the USSR (especially the Eastern Ukraine).[46] His position aligned him, variously, with détente skeptics in the Politburo, sectors of military opinion, and numerous RSFSR *obkom* secretaries and other figures in the Central Committee. By turning the charge of nationalist deviation against Shelest, Brezhnev was able—in time—to convert support among some Politburo members for his repressive nationality policy into a reduction in the number of opponents of détente and Siberian development in the Politburo, a net increase of personal supporters in the Politburo, and wholesale expansion of his clientele in the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Similar use of the détente issue presumably afforded Brezhnev the pretext for yet another significant gain—the extraordinary promotion of Andropov, Grechko, and Gromyko to full membership in the Politburo at the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee. This move could only have been justified on grounds of bolstering "national security" in the context of further risk-taking in implementation of the "Peace Program." [47]

Succession Contingencies

The foregoing analysis of Brezhnev's ascent suggests that at a series of points the succession process may be significantly affected by contingencies—factors which are not random, but which nevertheless are also not pre-given by the "nature" of the Soviet leadership or by any general relationship between the leadership and Soviet society. These factors pertain to the prior leader's role performance, to the accession setting, to the accession itself, and to the renegotiation of the Leader's role following accession. Such factors, in turn, form probabilistic chains which go far to explain certain features of a succession.

The fact that Khrushchev was thrown out of office was directly related to his own policy performance and, in turn, directly affected the composition of the group that happened to participate in selecting his successor, the process of selection, and the criteria of selection. The particular cautious but purposeful way in which Khrushchev groomed his "heir" greatly facilitated Brezhnev's smooth accession and contributed to the absence of serious turbulence in the Soviet leadership for at least half a decade. Brezhnev's ascent was also conditioned by Khrushchev's use of organizational power and his cadres policy. Khrushchev's simultaneous occupancy of the CPSU first secretaryship and the premiership, his frequent reorganizations, and his purges set examples it behooved Brezhnev to avoid—thus limiting the tactics available to him. On the other hand, the "compact" to maintain stability of cadres allowed Brezhnev to protect himself from challengers and at the same time capitalize upon having inherited a substantial portion of the former Leader's network of clients (particularly in the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers). The strategy Brezhnev then adopted in dealing with fundamental policy challenges greatly influenced the subsequent course of his succession.

To say that contingencies affect the way in which the Leader's position comes to be occupied is not to say, however, that this process is without bounds or that the bounds are merely those of oligarchical self-protection. Limits are inherent in the relationship between the roles of collective and individual leader-

[45] It would appear, for example, that Grechko is concerned about the military risks of détente; that Suslov tends to see détente in essentially tactical terms, as an element in a broad world-revolutionary strategy; and that Kosygin approaches the question in terms of the long-term practical interests of the Soviet state.

[46] For some of Shelest's speeches, see *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Nov. 15, 1969; March 26 and April 18, 1970; May 19, June 8, Sept. 22, Oct. 29, and Nov. 11, 1971; and May 2, 1972. For what is probably Brezhnev's comment on the Shelest case, see *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1972, p. 17. The official attack on Shelest can be found in *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kiev), No. 4, 1973, pp. 77-82. For a perceptive analysis of the Shelest affair, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Shelest and His Period in the Soviet Ukraine (1963-72): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies*, Oakville, Ont., Mosaic Press, 1975. The conspiratorial removal of Shelest from office, his retention of Politburo membership for a year, despite an intervening Central Committee Plenum, and the sweeping purge of Ukrainian officials suggest (a) how far Brezhnev has been willing to go to extract political mileage from the nationality issue; (b) how apprehensive the leadership was of broad support for Shelest within the Communist Party of the Ukraine; and (c) how much some members of the Politburo must have wanted not to lose Shelest's vote. It has recently been reported that Shelest is under house arrest and his family under KGB surveillance. See *Svoboda, The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, N.J.), Feb. 8, 1975.

[47] For the likely attitudes in some issue areas of the three latest additions to the Politburo membership, see Figure 2.

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

Leonid I. Brezhnev sits at the right hand of First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev as the latter delivers an address to the February 1964 Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee.

—S. Preobrazhensky for TASS via Sovfoto.

ship, and this relationship is a function of the overall structure of the Soviet leadership. It was suggested above (footnote 44) that the behavior of members of the leadership could be understood as the resultant of various motivating considerations. Developing this notion, one might say that these "considerations" are associated with the multiple social positions that each leader occupies and the set of role relationships that he constructs in each position.[48] Through the roles that the members of the leadership perform in each of their positions, they as individuals are linked directly or indirectly to one another and to outside agents in complex networks of relationships. These networks correspond to the division of the leadership into "leaders" of various status (*i.e.*, Leader, inner core,[49] ordinary member, aspirant); special issue-area "teams"[50]; party, governmental, and other sectoral or organizational types[51]; factions; policy advocates, etc.

A peculiarity of the situation we are attempting to describe is its high "multiplexity"—that is, the fact that relationships among pairs of leaders involve multiple roles and are thus multitiered or "many-stranded."[52] Each network of relationships represents a distinct configuration of interactions among leaders and others, or in other words sets the boundaries of possible "groups." In this connection, it should be noted that the social formations to which analysts often refer—Franklyn Griffiths' "tendencies of articulation,"[53] Vernon Aspaturian's "demand sectors,"[54] Sidney Ploss's various conflict groupings,[55] or the widely-used concepts of groups of "apparatchiki," "state leaders," etc.—are actually network-structured fields of political meaning which cut "through" individuals, not clusters of "whole" people. The degree to which networks activate the behavior of individuals in concrete situations is always a contingency subject to empirical investigation.

Each network is also a transactional economy based on exchange, in which power inequalities among the leaders resulting from differential access to "fixed" positional resources ("rights and duties," access to information, etc.) are subject to modification through the transactional process itself. A network is, in effect, a dynamic power structure.[56] In these networks, the Leader tends at the outset to occupy a central location vis-à-vis most other leaders, but his power in a given network nevertheless waxes or wanes depending upon the success of his transactions in (a) this network and (b) other networks. In a "multiplex" context, in short, power relations in one network tend to "carry over" and affect exchange

[48] Each member of the leadership at one and the same time holds the positions of (1) party leader (*i.e.*, member of the Politburo); (2) leader or member of a faction; (3) executant of a functional task; (4) proponent of various policies; (5) affiliate of sectoral, organizational, or geographical groupings; (6) member of a career type; and (7) member of various demographic cohorts.

[49] The inner core now consits of Podgorny, Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko, and, of course, Brezhnev.

[50] On this, see Committee on Government Operations, US Senate, *Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 24-29. It is likely as well that there are first and second "teams." Thus, the current foreign policy first team probably comprises Brezhnev, Grechko, Gromyko, Kosygin, and Podgorny, with Kirilenko and Suslov also involved.

[51] One should distinguish between those officials who exercise general supervision over multiple bureaucracies (*e.g.*, the Chairman and First Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers) and those who, as operative heads of specific bureaucracies, must of necessity involve themselves to a greater extent in advocacy of these bureaucracies' particularistic interests.

[52] For a discussion of this concept, see Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions*, Oxford, England, Blackwell, 1974, pp. 28-32.

[53] See Griffiths, *loc. cit.*

[54] See Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does It Exist?" *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Vol. 26, No. 1, 1972, pp. 1-28.

[55] For a recent statement, see Sidney Ploss, "New Politics in Russia?" *Survey* (London), Autumn 1973, pp. 23-35.

[56] "Differences in power arise out of the transactional process itself, and not only from the prior status of the actors or the resources they control, although these very often are related. These exchange relations and the relative differences in power are thus properties which emerge from sets of transactions. Pursued, this notion leads to a concept of society as a process rather than as a static, self-regulating system. For, if interaction in the sense of exchange between people is continuous, so is the creation of these imbalances of power . . . ." (See Boissevain, *op. cit.*, p. 26.)

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calculations and projections of future opportunities in other networks, including that network which we commonly call the "leadership." It is for this reason, primarily, that patron-client relations are so important to the Leader,[57] and it is in this sense that the overall structure of the leadership limits the roles of collective and individual leadership. Both roles coexist; they are not alternatives. But quite clearly there is an elasticity to their respective scopes, a possibility for expansion or contraction within the limiting overall matrix of networks that structure relations among the leaders. Expansion of the Leader's role takes place not through physical "seizure" of power but through negotiation of the role, conducted—in the post-Stalin era—largely by means of discussion and argumentation.

The Leader as an Institution

The objection to this characterization of the roles of individual and collective leadership, of course, is that the Leader's role still "lacks institutionalization." This notion has been the keystone of most Western analyses of the succession problem.[58] What, specifically, is meant by "lack of institutionalization"? The idea seems to boil down to the following interrelated propositions:

(1) "Institutionalization," by definition, must refer to a fixed role of Leader.

(2) There is no written, statutory provision for such a role in the Soviet system.

(3) Such a role has not become established through customary practice.

(4) The role of Leader is an illegitimate role; it violates both the written demand for "collectiveness of leadership" and the leadership's own manifest commitment to joint power-sharing at the top.

(5) But, there is a functional need for such a role.

(6) The natural human propensity to seek more and more power works to meet the functional need of the system, but political figures can only attain this end through constant covert or overt violence. If there is no recognized role of Leader, there can be no acceptable pathway to it, no security of tenure in it, and no manner of leaving it save by death or "coup d'état."

How well do these propositions hold up?

It is a fact that, aside from the formal establishment of the post of "General Secretary" of the Central Committee at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 (a not insubstantial change), one can find no statutory provision defining the role of Leader in the party and no "constitutional" indication of the relative power of the highest party and government posts. Nevertheless, comparative evidence suggests that the absence of a written specification of the role of Leader is not necessarily a sign of the role's absence or illegitimacy.[59] Furthermore, the Soviet leadership has now had more than twenty year's experience with a shifting blend of oligarchic and "personal" rule. The neat periodization of the post-Stalin era into alternating stretches of oligarchic and one-man rule obscures the fact that a Leader's role existed well before June 1957 (or June 1956),[60] just as it existed in the aftermath of October 1964. And there is now the precedent for attempting to remove an old Leader and appoint his successor through a majority vote of

[57] Too little attention has been paid to explaining why Soviet leaders from Brezhnev down devote such effort to building patron-client networks. An explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the "circular flow of power" (changes at the base lead to changes in the Central Committee; changes in the Central Committee are then used to effect changes in the Politburo) takes one only part way toward clarification of the issue. What is involved in the exchange relationship is not only, or not so often, votes, but demonstration of the Leader's power, vocal support of his policies, reliable execution of his policies, communication of the successfulness of his policies, provision to him of undistorted information, suppression of embarrassing information, inhibition of oppositional communication, etc. These functions of "clientism" point to the fluid quality of political power in the Soviet system.

[58] For example, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (Toronto), November 1960, pp. 587 ff.; Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, pp. 72-82; Howard R. Swearer, *The Politics of Succession in the USSR*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1964, pp. 14-15; Robert Conquest, *Russia After Khrushchev*, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 68-76; and Bialer, "Soviet Leadership . . . ," pp. 27-28. In his recent writings, T. H. Rigby has argued that a certain "institutionalization" of Soviet leadership arrangements may be taking place (see his "The Soviet Politburo: A Comparative Profile, 1951-71," *Soviet Studies*, July 1972, p. 4). A trend toward institutionalization is also perceived by Gilison (*loc. cit.*, p. 578).

[59] What we can say, surely, is that the absence of codification of the role of Leader plus public sanction for "collectivity" at the top provides a political weapon ready at hand for use against individuals who aspire to, or occupy, the Leader's position.

[60] The conventional designation of June 1957 as the end of the Stalin succession reveals how underlying premises and specific assumptions about "institutionalization," motivation, and power have limited our historical imagination and dulled our appreciation of succession contingencies. Why not say that Khrushchev "completed" the succession in June 1956, when he succeeded in driving V. M. Molotov and M. M. Kaganovich from their posts as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, respectively? We do not think of this periodization, one might argue, because we tend to read history backward, treating genuine policy issues of the period and Khrushchev's deficiencies merely as pretexts for a showdown that was bound to come and bound to produce a clear resolution of the "power struggle."

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the Politburo confirmed by the Central Committee.[61]

In talking about the key issue of "legitimacy," it is first essential for us to be clear about the perspective from which we approach it: is it our own, the Soviet public's, or the Soviet leadership's? Second, it is necessary to keep firmly in mind that what we are considering is the subjective consciousness of people, not what is printed in documents. These prescriptions have often been ignored by Western observers, who frequently convey the impression that all Soviet leaders save one are deeply committed in principle to primitive democracy within the leadership, that they profoundly resent as well as fear the "arrogation" of power by any individual, and that they view the extension of power by the top man with moral opprobrium.[62] Is it not possible, however, that in interpreting the available written evidence in this fashion, we are guilty of a measure of ethnocentrism, or at least of overly abstract "gaming" of Politburo relations?[63] An affirmative answer here does not require an invocation of "Russian political culture," helpful though that might be.

We are not dealing, after all, with children of the kibbutz. The members of the Soviet leadership have all had a lifetime's familiarity with authoritarian role relationships and the ambiguities of guided collegiality. They may not like the aspirations of one of their colleagues to become the Leader and may resist his pretensions to extend the role beyond what they consider proper, but still not reject it as such. Being human, they may well assign the role more standing when its incumbent's policies are successful than when these are unsuccessful. Moreover, they do not all have an equal stake in "pure oligarchy." The benefits and costs of a stronger as opposed to a weaker Leader are not symmetrically shared by all the members, especially in an era in which the worst penalty that fate may inflict is to be demoted to a managerial job or pensioned off.

In short, what appears to be involved is not "legitimacy" versus "illegitimacy," but degrees of legitimacy and shifting locations of acceptable boundaries between the role of the Leader and that of his colleagues. Even those Soviet leaders with the most strongly vested interest in collectivity, such as Suslov, are probably no less aware than we are of the "functional need" of the system for a substantial Leader role. It may be recalled that Suslov in June 1957 supported the desirability of someone performing this kind of role and was among those leaders who referred to Brezhnev as "head" of the Politburo in their 1974 election speeches.[64] It has not been the role of Leader that has bothered Suslov in the past, but rather the violation of the limits of the role—that is to say, transgressions of the coexisting role of the "leadership."

Eligibility and the Succession

Having examined the two post-Stalin successions and the relevance of "contingency analysis" to these cases, let us now turn to the question of the succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, no aspect of this or any succession is likely to be more affected by contingencies than the initial selection of the new Leader. And it is important to remember that we are talking not about "chance," but about "chances." While it is impossible to predict the winner in the succession sweepstakes with absolute certainty (the anointed may, after all, drop dead), it is possible to say something about the structure of probabilities involved in the choice of a successor—for not all are equally called to be Leader. The fruitfulness of considering recruitment to political office in terms of a probabilistic "opportunity structure," which influences the dynamics of ambition among possible contenders, has been demonstrated for other systems, and there is reason to suppose it is relevant to the Soviet case as well.[65] The real analytic difficulty, of course, is not the randomness of the process, but

[61] It is true (and important) that the final decision to move against the incumbent Leader is one that must be taken in stealth and that it involves large risks, if not to life, liberty, or pension, at least to one's career. Yet we do not know the extent to which unhappy members of the Politburo are able to communicate the degree of their disaffection with the Leader to one another informally—and the possibility of such "consensus-building," which takes into account opinion within elite circles, must not be underestimated.

[62] The evidence that might be adduced in support of such interpretations includes public statements of party principles (*i.e.*, "documents"), esoteric signs of conflict over leadership prerogatives, and the manifest reluctance of some comrades to bow the symbolic knee to the Leader.

[63] Much of the literature on the succession problem starts with the implicit assumption that the Soviet leadership arena is simply a Hobbesian "state of nature," because it is bereft of the formal attributes of Western liberal constitutionalism, and then extrapolates the "logic" of the situation in terms of the expected behavior of any "actor" placed in such a situation.

[64] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 12, 1974.

[65] For an exposition of this theory, see Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966. For an attempt to apply such an approach to the analysis of Politburo recruitment, see Kenneth N. Ciboski, "Ambition Theory and Candidate Members of the Soviet Politburo," *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, Fla.), Vol. 36, No. 1, February 1974, pp. 172-83.

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Figure 3: Qualifications for a "Full-Term" General Secretary

	Probable	Possible	Improbable
1. Age	50–60 years of age	Under 50 or 60–70	Over 70
2. State of health	Good	Some past serious illness	Declining health
3. Ethnic origin	Russian—highly probable	Belorussian	Ukrainian Other—highly improbable
4. Education	Higher technical education	Non-technical higher ed.	No higher education
5. Politburo status	Full member—highly probable	Candidate member	Not a member
6. Past institutional affiliations	Predominantly but not exclusively party	Mixed party/governmental	Predominantly governmental, or economic management
7. Areas of experience	Significant service as party first secretary in important regions	Some such service	No such service
	Significant service in CPSU CC Secretariat	Brief service in the Secretariat	No such service
	Broad experience with cadres work, industry, and agriculture	Narrower experience with cadres and industry or agriculture	Still narrower experience in a single sector (especially propaganda or foreign affairs)
	Exposure to military and security affairs	Earlier leadership in military or secret police	Recent leadership in military or KGB
	Extensive exposure to foreign affairs	Some exposure	Little exposure
	Experience in nationality affairs	Exposure to the nationality problem	No contact with the nationality problem
	Lengthy Moscow service in all-Union administration	Some such service	No such service
8. Present position	CC senior secretary for organizational affairs, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet	CC sec. for cadres, CC sec. for agric., CC sec. for heavy ind., 1st Dep. Chm. USSR Council of Mins. for agric., 1st Dep. Chm. USSR CM for ind., Chm. RSFSR Council of Ministers	CC sec. for ideology, CC sec. for propaganda, CC sec. for defense ind., CC sec. for Communist bloc relations, 1st Sec. Moscow City Party Com., Chm. A-U Central Trade Union Council, Chm. KGB. All others—highly improbable
9. Support in Politburo	Tolerable to a majority	"Leader" of a faction	Generally isolated
10. Policy stands	Centrist positions on security, resource allocation, and ideological issues	Off-center positions on some issues	Consistently extreme positions
11. Reputation in higher élite circles	"Solid," effective administrator with real leadership qualities	Some eccentric features	Responsible for unsuccessful policies and administrative failure
12. Following	A substantial "tail"—distributed in multiple bureaucracies and sectors	A smaller "tail"—in few bureaucracies and sectors	A still smaller "tail"—in a single bureaucracy or sector
13. Main territorial base	Moscow region, Leningrad, the Donbass, or the Urals	Kharkov, Kiev, Belorussia, or major regions of the RSFSR (*e.g.*, Siberia)	All other areas

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the complexity of the "opportunity structure" which differentiates chances and the necessity of drawing inferences about this structure not only from the two post-1953 cases of succession but also from one's general understanding of Soviet elite politics.[66]

Figure 3 presents schematically my perception of the factors that shape the Soviet succession opportunity structure. Of the many judgments implied in this "paradigm," several in particular should be noted. Implicitly, the paradigm stresses certain "role requirements" of the post of Leader and "role skills" of prospective Leaders—especially with respect to education, past experience, and "reputation." [67] The paradigm also emphasizes "pull" from above (selection) relatively more than "push" from below (factionalism at the Central Committee level). Finally, the paradigm assigns great importance to the "musical chairs" dimension of the opportunity structure—that is, the question of who occupies strategic ground at the moment of accession (*i.e.*, has Politburo status and holds an important position). It should be evident that not all criteria count equally (*e.g.*, experience in nationality affairs is clearly less significant than broad experience in cadres work, industry, and agriculture), and that the weighting of criteria can change. Also, some items by their nature tend automatically to exclude a candidate (*e.g.*, poor health, or non-Slavic nationality), whereas others tend to be cumulative in their impact.

If we apply this paradigm to the present presuccession situation, the most important conclusion that emerges is that timing will in all likelihood be the central strategic contingency in the next succession. The key factors here are the age structure of the present leadership, the pattern of Politburo membership, gaps in the experience of potential contenders, and the positions presently occupied by potential contenders. Figure 4 suggests that at the moment *nobody* is situated to succeed Brezhnev as a "full-term" Leader. Those members of the leadership who occupy the best "jumping-off" spots (Podgorny, Kosygin, and Kirilenko) are all too old. Of those members who occupy "possible" launching sites, some are not on the Politburo at all (I. V. Kapitonov and V. I. Dolgikh); some lack full Politburo membership (M. S. Solomentsev); some have serious deficiencies in their experience (F. D. Kulakov and Dolgikh); and some are of questionable eligibility on ethnic grounds (the Belorussian, Mazurov, who also has not served in the Secretariat). Finally, among those who occupy "improbable" or "highly improbable" posts, some are too old (Suslov[68]); some have experience gaps (D. F. Ustinov, K. F. Katushev, Shelepin, Andropov, and G. V. Romanov); some have probably been contaminated by past or present police connections (Andropov, Shelepin); some have the wrong ethnic background (the Ukrainians Poliansky and Shcherbitsky); and some lack candidate or full membership in the

Andrei P. Kirilenko, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of organizational affairs and a member of the CC's Politburo.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

[66] An examination of recruitment patterns among 1,200 officials in the non-Russian union republics currently being conducted by the author suggests that there is a great deal more order to promotions in the Soviet system than is generally realized.

[67] For an elaboration of this approach, see Bruce Headey, *British Cabinet Ministers: The Roles of Politicians in Executive Office*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1974.

[68] It has been suggested by Robert Conquest that, under certain conditions, Suslov might be chosen as an "honest broker" interim Leader (*Soviet Analyst*, Jan. 16, 1975). While I find this proposition difficult to accept, it is conceivable—as William Zimmerman has observed in a personal communication—that the leadership might look for pliability rather than strength in its nominee.

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F. D. Kulakov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of agriculture and a member of the CC's Politburo.

UPI.

Politburo (Katushev, Romanov).* What this situation indicates is that Brezhnev has yet to set up either "heirs" or "counter-heirs," unless one considers Kirilenko the heir.

The implication of the situation is that if Brezhnev were to leave office at or before the next plenum of the Central Committee (spring or summer 1975), or perhaps even if he departed before the 25th Party Congress (now scheduled for February 1976), a succession of two or more stages would probably follow, with a caretaker serving as Leader. Under these conditions, the likeliest candidate for caretaker in terms of age, health, ethnicity, affiliations, experience, present position, and following would be Kirilenko.

But what if Brezhnev does not leave office in the immediate future? At this point, the possibilities expand dramatically. First, even if Brezhnev stays, the odds—if only for reasons of age or health—strongly favor a rapid changeover now in one or more of the top jumping-off jobs—which will set the game of "musical chairs" going. Each of these jobs has its own structure of access opportunities, compounding the complexities of the succession. We might see, for example, Kirilenko, Mazurov, or V. V. Grishin become Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Mazurov or Solomentsev become Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; or Kulakov, Romanov, or perhaps Grishin become senior secretary for organizational affairs.

Second, the present composition of the Politburo suggests that there will likely be a rapid turnover in a substantial portion of the "selectorate" that chooses Brezhnev's successor. The average age of full members of the Politburo is now 65. Five full members are over 70. And there are clearly "incongruities" in the current line-up of full (*i.e.*, voting) members. Why, for example, should A. Ye. Pelshe, Kunaev, or Poliansky continue to be included, while Solomentsev is excluded?

Third, age-groupings retain their importance. The chances of any member of the middle age-group (Andropov, Mazurov, Solomentsev, Grishin, and Kapitonov) becoming Leader decline substantially with each passing year, and so—perhaps—may their possible ambitions. (All of them in any event should be considered long-shots.)

The Post-Brezhnev Period

By a process of elimination, we are left with seven potential successors, of whom three are improbable: Poliansky—because of his Ukrainian origins and his demotion from the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in February 1973; Shcherbitsky—because of his Ukrainian origins and local Ukrainian base; and Shelepin—because of his experience gaps, past police affiliations, and more or less open flirtation with Russian nationalism.** At present, then, Kulakov, Romanov, Dolgikh, and Katushev would appear to have the best chance ultimately of becoming "full-term" Leader; but each has weaknesses which must be overcome. The following possible changes will therefore be crucial: (1) the transfer of any of the four—Kulakov, Romanov, Dolgikh, or Katushev—to Kirilenko's post as senior CC secretary for organizational affairs, or to the positions held currently

* The precise circumstances surrounding the April 16, 1975, decision of a CPSU Central Committee plenary session to relieve A. N. Shelepin of his Politburo duties "in connection with his request" (Radio Moscow, April 16, 1975) are not yet known.—Eds.

** See previous editors' note.

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Figure 4: Characteristics of Some Members of the Soviet Leadership

	Age on March 1, 1975	Ethnic origin	Politburo status[a]	Past affiliations[b]	Gaps in experience	Present position
Podgorny	72	Ukrainian	F	P—G—E		Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Suslov	72	Russian	F	P	Industry, agriculture	CC secretary for ideology
Kosygin	71	Russian	F	G—E	Secretariat, party regional first secretary	Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers
Kirilenko	69	Russian	F	P		CC senior secretary for organizational affairs
Ustinov	66	Russian	C	G—E	Party regional first secretary, cadres, agriculture, foreign, nationalities	CC secretary for defense industry
Andropov	60	Russian	F	P—G—Y	Party regional first secretary, industry, agriculture	Chairman of KGB
Mazurov	60	Belorussian	F	P—G—Y	Secretariat	First Dep. Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers for industry
Solomentsev	61	Russian	C	P—E		Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers
Grishin	60	Russian	F	T—P	Secretariat	First Secretary of Moscow City Party Committee
Kapitonov	60	Russian		P	Foreign	CC secretary for cadres
Kulakov	57	Russian	F	P—E—G	Cadres, foreign, industry, military	CC secretary for agriculture
Poliansky	57	Ukrainian	F	G—P		USSR Minister of Agriculture
Shcherbitsky	57	Ukrainian	F	G—P	Secretariat, all-Union administration	First Secretary of CC, CP Ukraine
Shelepin*	56	Russian	F	P—K—Y	Party regional first secretary, industry, agriculture	Chairman, All-Union Central Trade Union Council
Romanov	52	Russian	C	P—E	Secretariat, foreign, military, all-Union administration	First Secretary, Leningrad Province Party Committee
Dolgikh	51	Russian		P—E	Cadres, agriculture, military, foreign	CC secretary for heavy industry
Katushev	47	Russian		P—E	Cadres, agriculture, nationalities, all-Union administration	CC secretary for bloc relations

[a] F—full member with voting rights; C—candidate member.

[b] E—economic administration; G—government; K—the KGB (secret police); P—party; T—trade union; Y—Youth League. Career affiliations are listed in reverse chronological order beginning with the most recent major affiliation prior to the present occupation.

* As noted above, Shelepin was relieved of Politburo duties on April 16, 1975.—Eds.

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by Kosygin or Podgorny; (2) the transfer of Kulakov to nonagricultural work, Romanov to a Moscow job, Dolgikh to a broader portfolio, or Katushev to domestic activities; and (3) the promotion of Romanov, Dolgikh, or Katushev to full Politburo membership.

If we accept a probabilistic interpretation of the nature of the succession process, can we say anything about a succession yet to take place? The answer would seem to be a qualified "yes." On the question of who might succeed as a "full-term" leader, there are four likely candidates, who fall into two groups according to their background. The oldest, Kulakov, belongs to that large class of older Soviet officials who have limited higher education and years of experience in party and governmental agricultural administration—attributes which are by no means irrelevant today, but which do not constitute the best credentials for the 1970's and 1980's. Kulakov began his career in the late 1930's on a state farm. From 1960 until November 1964, he served under Khrushchev's aegis as first secretary of one of the key agricultural regions in the Soviet Union—Stavropolskiy Kray. After Brezhnev came to office, Kulakov was brought to the center as head of the Agriculture Department of the Central Committee and was then quickly promoted to secretary for agriculture—a strategically important post from the standpoint of Brezhnev's aims in agriculture. Not surprisingly, Kulakov is reputed to be a member of Brezhnev's inner circle of personal confidants.

The other three—Romanov, Dolgikh, and Katushev—are all postwar graduates of industrial engineering institutes with extensive specialized experience in heavy industry at the enterprise level. Romanov has spent the last 20 years in party jobs, working his way up through the Leningrad organization—presumably as a protégé of Froi Kozlov. Dolgikh's most distinctive attributes are his strong Siberian roots, graduate-level education, and extensive leadership experience at the important Norilsk Mining-Metallurgical Combine. Dolgikh moved directly from the directorship of the Combine to the post of First Secretary of the Party Committee of Krasnoiarskiy Kray in April 1969—the only party (or indeed political) job he ever held before being elevated to the Secretariat. Katushev worked his way up through engineering jobs in the Gorky Automobile Factory and then—with Brezhnev's direct assistance—ascended through the party apparatus to become First Secretary of the Gorky Province Party Committee. Although Katushev lacked any experience in foreign relations, Brezhnev nevertheless brought him to Moscow in April 1968 to take over the East European bloc portfolio from Suslov, and in this capacity Katushev helped carry out the policy that led to the Czechoslovak invasion.

Younger members of the Soviet leadership: from left, V. I. Dolgikh, Secretary of the CPSU CC in charge of heavy industry; K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the CPSU CC in charge of Communist-bloc relations (pictured at the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in August 1969); and G. V. Romanov, candidate member of the CPSU CC Politburo and First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee.

—TASS via Sovfoto (left and right) and Wide World.

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Does it make much difference, however, what sort of person Brezhnev's full-term successor will probably be? The answer, again, is a qualified "yes." A succession does create an opportunity for policy innovation, and the past experience and inclinations of the new leader cannot help but influence his initial choices. Nevertheless, the soundest basis for predicting the short-term effects of a succession is surely an analysis of the policy failures of the preceding regime. In the longer run (if there is one), the context of policymaking will continue to be important, but the successor's political profile will gain in significance as a factor helping to shape the package of programs he puts together to deal with the enduring structural dilemmas of Soviet politics.

There is, finally, the question of the "succession crisis." What the Khrushchev succession shows is that even when one defines the terms restrictively, one cannot speak of "succession crises" as inevitable.[69] Historically, a good case can be made that periods of serious instability have not always synchronized well with the conventional periodization of successions. In terms of relationships within the leadership and of relationships between the leadership, on the one hand, and the political system and the society, on the other hand, the late Stalin and late Khrushchev "presuccession" years were ones of potentially great instability. Nevertheless, to say that systemic instability generated by nonresolution of the succession issue is not inevitable does not mean that it cannot occur. The thrust of the argument in this article is that the likelihood of such a development occurring has declined, "other things being equal"—but other things will not necessarily be equal.

It is perfectly possible, for example, that if Brezhnev stays on for several years, more than one good candidate might become powerfully situated to lay claim to the succession (Kulakov plus Romanov or perhaps Katushev, let us say)—a source of conflict absent from the last succession. If any of the conceivable successors other than Kirilenko, Solomentsev, or Kapitonov emerges as Leader, it seems apparent that he will come to office with a far shorter "tail" of clients than did either Khrushchev or Brezhnev—which could also lead to more struggle as well as to greater emphasis on the "collective" leadership role. Another factor present now that was absent in 1964 is the "cabinet"-like composition of the current Politburo, especially the inclusion of the Minister of Defense and Chairman of the KGB. If Grechko and Andropov represent institutional claims on a share of Politburo power and these claims are pressed (perhaps in different directions), it is perfectly conceivable that the next succession might be far stormier than the last.

The most likely possible source of serious instability in the next succession, however, lies in the superimposition of conflict in the leadership, in the political system as a whole, and in Soviet society. There would appear to be two circumstances under which such an alignment of tensions could come about. The first would be the failure of the rural "industrialization" program to produce the food needed to feed the Soviet population and the failure of current policies (including foreign policies) to maintain tolerable productivity in industry—which, together, would lead to consumer goods shortages and unrest in the major urban centers of the RSFSR. The second would be a breakdown in the regime's capacity to meet the economic and cultural needs of the non-Russian population, the career needs of non-Russian cadres, and the "functional" needs for honest non-Russian voices to be listened to in Politburo deliberations.

It is obvious that any attempt to talk about the manner in which the Brezhnev succession will take place, the personalities involved, and the possible effects of the transfer of power involves many "ifs." These are not, of course, the only aspects of the succession that one might investigate. However, to a considerable degree, analyses based on "totalitarian" or "modern industrial (bureaucratic) society" images of Soviet politics, infused as they are with common "structuralist-functionalist" presuppositions and deterministic tendencies, do not cope very well with such questions because their concern is broader—*i.e.*, to define the "nature" of the political "system." In this article, I have suggested a way of looking at the specific issues of succession that attempts to avoid both the deductive logic and the determinism of familiar models. Instead, the emphasis is upon the interaction of multiple, probabilistic processes, which evolve dynamically through time. My conviction is that these succession contingencies deserve a more deliberate, differentiated consideration in the future than they have received in the past.

[69] A minimal definition of "succession crisis" in the sense in which this (unfortunate) term has been used in the literature would entail systemic instability marked by a bitter competition for supreme power and a qualitative acceleration of power-oriented factional conflict in the leadership, *arising out of the dynamics of the transfer of power itself.*

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The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism

By John K. Cooley

As an alien import, communism has never found a congenial home anywhere in the Arab world. Most strongly nationalist Arab regimes have tended to regard it as a potential threat to their sovereign authority. Even today, the only Arab countries which allow Communist parties to participate legally in politics are Lebanon and Iraq (the latter only since 1973). Yet, as the Arab states of the Middle East, engaged in recurrent conflict with Israel ever since 1948, have looked increasingly to the Soviet Union as a source of military and economic support, and as the USSR in turn has sought to cultivate political ties with some ruling Arab regimes in an area of great strategic importance to itself, the local Communists have been treated somewhat more tolerantly. A few have even been admitted into national-front coalitions or cooperative relations with the ruling parties in certain Arab states. Even so, their role in domestic politics has remained precarious and highly susceptible to fluctuations in the USSR's relations with the Arab regimes. It is this interaction between the political fortunes of the Arab Communists and the ups and downs in the relations between the Arab governments and Moscow that the present article proposes to explore. Since four key Arab countries—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon—illustrate different aspects of this interaction, attention will be focused on these four states as case studies which afford insights that are also applicable, in varying degrees, to other Middle Eastern Arab states.

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The extreme complexity of the interaction between the status of local Communists and the changing temper of governmental relations with the Soviet Union emerges most clearly in the case of Egypt, particularly in the period since the 1952 Egyptian revolution, as a survey of the history of Egyptian communism will demonstrate.

The Case of Egypt

Communism was a foreign import into Egypt just as it was throughout the Arab world. The first small Communist and Socialist groups were formed by Greeks, Italians, and other foreigners in Cairo and Alexandria around 1919, when Egypt was ruled by a monarchy under a British protectorate. These groups recruited a few Egyptian adherents such as Mahmoud Husni al-Arabi of the Egyptian Confederation of Labor, and in 1922 the first cells of the Egyptian Communist Party appeared, concentrating their early activities on demands for eight-hour workdays, the formation of trade unions, collective bargaining, and the redistribution of large estates among the peasants. By 1924, the party was organizing industrial strikes and nationalist anti-British demonstrations, undertakings which eventually caused the authorities to take drastic repressive measures, including the deportation of Greek and Italian Communists. During World War II, Egyptian leftists moved increasingly into teaching, journalism, and other professions. In 1946, a new upsurge of Communist and leftist labor agitation touched off large-scale and violent strikes in the textile mills of the Nile Delta and Cairo regions, again leading to mass arrests. Despite such official repression, however, many of Egypt's most distinguished men of letters, such as the literary critic Louis Awad, the philosopher Abdel Rahman

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Badawi, and novelist Naguib al-Mahfouz, embraced Marxist ideas.

The change of regime in July 1952, when Lt. General Mohammed Naguib and his group of "Free Officers," among them Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, deposed King Farouk and established military rule, brought no immediate change in policy toward local Communists. In August 1952, the junta faced the first major test of its authority in a clash with striking textile workers near Alexandria, which resulted in the arrest of 30 alleged Communists and the execution of two of the strike ringleaders. Later, when Nasser purged Naguib and took power himself in 1954, the vague charge levelled against Naguib was "collaboration with Communists" as well as with the fanatical Muslim Brotherhood, a well-organized and fanatically anti-Communist Islamic group which subsequently made several attempts to assassinate Nasser. Before establishing his leadership position more solidly in the Suez war of 1956—when US and Soviet pressure forced Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw their invasion armies from Egypt—Nasser faced growing opposition from the Brotherhood, the crypto-Fascist *Misr al-Fatat* (Young Egypt) organization, and the clandestine Egyptian Communist Party, all three of which were drawing added strength from the growing numbers of dissatisfied university graduates for whom there were no jobs.

Although Soviet aid to Egypt and involvement in Middle East politics grew after the Suez war, Nasser often found himself in conflict with Moscow over his treatment of local Communists, most notably in the wake of the establishment of the ill-fated 1958–61 union of Egypt and Syria. Following suppression by Baathists and Communists of a pro-Nasser military rebellion in Mosul, Iraq, in 1959, Nasser publicly warned Khrushchev that Soviet intervention on behalf of Arab Communists was "unacceptable." Hundreds of Communists and other opponents of Nasser were thrown into prison camps in the desert.

The ensuing years, especially those of the brief Kennedy administration in the United States, saw a slow improvement in Egypt's relations with the West at the expense of its relations with Moscow. But then the tide turned again about the time of Khrushchev's 1964 visit to Cairo. During this visit, the Soviet leader and Nasser were seen on live television debating the relative merits of "scientific" (*i.e.*, Soviet) and "Arab" socialism, and subsequently, in April 1965, Nasser changed his tactics in dealing with the Egyptian Communists. He arranged that the party, which at this time probably numbered no more than 2,000 active party members, should dissolve itself, and its members were encouraged to join the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's only legal mass political organization, as individuals. Some of those who did were rewarded with medium-level and in a few cases even high-ranking posts in the government.

Notwithstanding his admission of some Communists to governmental positions, Nasser continued to draw a sharp dividing line between the kind of socialism he had in mind for Egypt and Soviet-style communism. As he succinctly put it in 1970, "the Soviet Union is a Communist state, while we are trying to be a socialist state."[1] To be sure, few Arabs and certainly no non-Arab Communist theorist would pretend that Egypt today is actually socialist despite the nationalization of perhaps 80 percent of its industry and business enterprises and the implementation of a limited agrarian reform. However, within the ASU there has long been a small group of Egyptian Marxist transfuges from the Egyptian Communist Party who have dreamed of someday moving Egypt toward genuine "scientific socialism." One of these is Khaled Mohieddine, an erstwhile companion of Nasser in the Free Officers' movement who later became a Communist and is now popularly known in Egypt as "The Red Major."

In the latter part of the 1960's, Mohieddine and a few other individuals publicly urged the formation of a "revolutionary vanguard party" to "constitute the nervous system of the ASU and work inside it to direct the masses."[2] Such a Marxist inner circle evidently did come into being within the ASU, judging from testimony given in the trials of Vice-President Ali Sabry and his supporters, who were arrested in May 1971 just before Anwar Sadat, who had succeeded Nasser as Egyptian President upon the latter's death in September 1970, reconfirmed Egypt's acceptance of the "Rogers plan" looking toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The trials resulted in prison sentences for Sabry and several others, who were convicted of conspiracy to carry out a coup against Sadat. Those imprisoned included Sami Sharaf, a presidential aide, who has since been reported to have been a longtime agent of the Soviet secret service.[3] Perhaps partly to allay suspicions in Moscow that the arrests of Sabry and his associates

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[1] From the author's notes on Nasser's speech of July 23, 1970, as broadcast live by Cairo Radio.

[2] *Al-Talia* (Cairo), July 20, 1966.

[3] See John Barron, *KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Agents*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, for Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1974, pp. 51-53.

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were an offering to the United States to pave the way for closer US-Egyptian relations, Sadat proceeded to enter into the 15-year Soviet-Egyptian solidarity pact, signed in Cairo on May 27, 1971. The pact had little real significance, however, beyond providing a framework for possible resumption of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, which had already begun to falter before the treaty was concluded.

A couple of months later, in July 1971, the unsuccessful Communist attempt to carry out a coup against General Jaafar al-Nimeri's government in the Sudan had far-reaching international repercussions. The swift execution of the Sudanese Communist leaders not only severely damaged the Sudan's relations with the Soviet bloc and produced a consequent rise in US and Chinese influence in that country, but it also set in motion a train of events in Egypt that worsened Cairo's relations with Moscow. Statements by Mohieddine in favor of the Sudanese Communists led to his house arrest, and Dr. Ibrahim Saad al-Din, Director of the Institute of Socialist Studies in Cairo, was also jailed. According to Egyptian Foreign Ministry sources, the Soviet embassy in Cairo applied heavy pressure for Saad al-Din's release, even threatening to hold up Soviet arms deliveries (President Sadat claimed that these were already slowing down anyway).

The ensuing cease-fire in the Egyptian-Israeli "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal was followed by an easing of Egyptian anti-Communist measures. Mohieddine was released from house arrest in August 1971, and several other leading Egyptian Marxists, including Dr. Fuad Morsi and Dr. Ismail Sabry Abdallah were given important government posts. Nevertheless, Sadat's uneasy rapprochement with the Egyptian Left grew more difficult as the armed stalemate with Israel dragged on into 1972, heightening political unrest in Egypt and touching off a wave of anti-Sadat disturbances.

The weakness of the Egyptian Left and the growing strength of the new Egyptian middle class were duly noted in the Soviet media, which continued to picture the ASU as the most promising channel for political work in Egypt. On January 16, 1972, for example, a Moscow Radio commentary observed:

The petty bourgeoisie [in Egypt] has found its way to the life previously enjoyed by the big and medium bourgeoisie. . . . The working class is still small, and its political consciousness needs to be developed. This is why the Arab Socialist Union was created. It is a wide national organization designed to secure the progressive development of Egyptian society and the defense of the people's social and economic gains.

The commentary went on, however, to point to "contradictions that exist in Egyptian society today. Progressive social and economic development clashes with the desire of individual sections of society, if not to turn everything back, then at least to put a brake on these developments. . . ." [4]

Meanwhile, Egyptian-Soviet governmental relations were subject to new strains that would eventually result in a further weakening of the Egyptian Communists and the Left in general. During the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971, Sadat—and, indeed, his leftist supporters as well—were astonished at Moscow's readiness and capacity to airlift supplies to India via Egypt, utilizing the USSR's Egyptian air-base facilities in transit. If the Soviet Union was willing and able to perform such feats on India's behalf, they reasoned, how could Moscow go on encouraging a "no war, no peace" situation between Egypt, also a Soviet treaty ally, and Israel?

In order to pave the way for a new test of Soviet intentions on this vital issue, Sadat in January 1972 installed a new Egyptian government headed by Azziz Sidky, who had developed good relations with the Russians in his earlier capacity as Minister of Industry and, before that, as minister in charge of construction of the Aswan High Dam. This was followed in early February by Sadat's unannounced journey to Moscow in order, as Sadat later disclosed, to discuss a resumption by Egypt of hostilities against Israel and to seek additional Soviet arms. He was unsuccessful on both counts, the Russians evidently being unprepared even to discuss a renewal of Egyptian-Israeli armed conflict.

Reflecting these developments, frictions were beginning to surface between Soviet advisers in Egypt and high-level Egyptian staff officers—a group which, as Soviet commentators often noted, had never shown any sympathy whatever for the Egyptian Left. On March 7, 1972, a TASS report quoted a Soviet military adviser as having told Egyptian Army Chief of Staff General Saad al-Dine Shazly (later relieved by Sadat during the October 1973 war): "You are like a man with two wives who does not know which to choose [the Soviet Union or the United States]." [5] On the Egyptian side, General

[4] As quoted in *USSR and Third World* (London), Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 98.
[5] Quoted in *ibid.*, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 156.

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Ismael Saddek joined with a number of prominent Egyptian elder statesmen, including former Vice-President Abdellatif Baghdadi, in openly petitioning Sadat in April to cut down the Soviet presence in Egypt.[6] Egyptian resentment further intensified in May when Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko visited Cairo and put on a tantalizing display of the superior performance capabilities of the MIG–25 fighter plane, yet failed to offer deliveries of even the MIG–23, let alone the MIG–25.

At this juncture, the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow, during which the leaders of the two superpowers pledged to continue détente, was viewed in Cairo as holding a strong message for Egypt: namely, that the Soviet Union would not arm Egypt to an extent that would enable the latter to undertake an independent offensive war against Israel. As Cairo saw it, Moscow's commitment to détente spelled a prolongation of the state of "no war, no peace" with Israel which Egypt considered intolerable.

Sadat's response two months later was an unexpectedly sharp manifestation of Egyptian frustration. On July 23, 1972, the 20th anniversary of Nasser's "socialist" Free Officers' revolt, he announced the expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt and the restoration of all military base facilities to Egyptian control. While the Egyptian Left remained virtually silent, the move evoked a wave of applause in the army and among the public at large, with whom the Russians were highly unpopular. This enthusiastic public reaction was probably heightened by the fact that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan had visited Sadat on July 6 after meeting with President Nixon in Washington, many Egyptians assuming that Sultan had brought an American promise of a *quid pro quo*.

Though Sadat no doubt hoped for such a *quid pro quo*, this assumption was mistaken, and after waiting in vain all through the summer for some encouragement from Washington, he decided to try to mend his fences with Moscow. In October he sent Prime Minister Sidky to the Soviet capital to seek a resumption of arms shipments, and about a week later he dismissed General Saddek from the Egyptian War Ministry—ostensibly for insubordination in failing to conduct limited operations against Israeli forces in the Canal zone in August, but probably also because of his public anti-Soviet stand, which



Egypt's "Red Major," Khaled Mohieddine (left), pictured with Egyptian President Mohammed Naguib in February 1954.

—Keystone.

had made him *persona non grata* to Moscow. According to many military analysts, it was shortly after this that Egypt received first deliveries of the mobile SAM–6 anti-aircraft missiles which one year later were to take a heavy toll of Israeli planes in the October war.[7] It was apparent, however, that Moscow was still keeping a close rein on arms shipments to Egypt.

By early 1973, in spite of the absence of full Soviet support, Sadat was evidently contemplating undertaking a large-scale trans-Canal attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai, although no one realized this—including the Egyptian Left. In January, a series of violent clashes between the police and student demonstrators caused Sadat to order a brief closing of the universities and to suspend more than 100 journalists and writers from the ASU. Official commentators labeled the latter "the adventurous Left," but those suspended actually ranged from undoubted Marxists such as Michel Kamel and Lutfi al-Kholi to eminent "bourgeois" men of letters such as novelist Naguib al-Mahfouz.

[6] *Cairo Press Review* (Cairo), April 19, 1972 (quoting various Cairo newspapers).

[7] Author's conversations with several military attachés stationed in Cairo.

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Sadat secretly informed his cabinet in late April that he had decided to take Egypt into war, but the Left continued to be kept totally in the dark concerning his intentions.[8] At the beginning of the summer, the editor of the Cairo weekly *Rose al Youssef*, known for its Left-Nasserist views, rhetorically asked the magazine's readers whether the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty still served any useful purpose.[9] This drew an indignant response from Moscow's *New Times*, which compared critics of the treaty to "imperialist and Zionist propagandists." The Soviet journal singled out especially the editor of

a famous Cairo illustrated magazine . . . who makes great efforts to impose on the Egyptians the idea that the Soviet-Egyptian treaty and Soviet-Egyptian friendship have brought the Egyptians little benefit. This journalist is undeterred by the fact that hostility toward the Soviet Union is completely alien to a progressive.[10]

In July, Sadat sent Hafez Ismail, one of his advisers, to Moscow, apparently in another vain effort to secure a step-up of Soviet arms supplies to Egypt. Shortly thereafter, he told the ASU Central Committee that he would draw up an "ideological document" regarding the long-range implications for Egypt of Soviet-American détente, which Egyptian commentators were saying favored the status quo and continued Israeli occupation of Egyptian lands. The contents of this document, as leaked to a few foreign correspondents in Cairo in August, showed that in it Sadat vigorously rejected the idea that Egypt should be made to bear the costs of détente and complained with some bitterness that Moscow's concessions to détente included allowing more Soviet Jews to go to Israel.

At the same time, Soviet-Egyptian friction continued over Sadat's obvious inclination to expand the private sector of the Egyptian economy and over implementation of the Soviet aid program in Egypt. On the anniversary of Egypt's July 1952 revolution, an article in *Pravda* complained that although the private sector's share in Egyptian industrial production was only 20–25 percent, an increase in "rightist" activity was bringing "certain social consequences" alarming to "progressive society."[11] Illiiador Kulev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR's Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, was similarly critical of the situation in the Egyptian agricultural sector, observing that work was going too slowly on 31 state farms and 75 stock farms established with Soviet aid.[12] On September 9, Moscow Radio complained that the Egyptian "peasant masses" had not assumed any real role in implementing agrarian reform and had allowed the "feudalists" and rural bourgeoisie not only to keep their influence but even to press for revision of the agrarian reform law.[13]

Against this background of mutual recrimination and dissatisfaction, Sadat by September 1973 was ready to defy Moscow's wishes and launch his planned new war against Israeli forces in the Sinai. He had secured financial backing from Saudi Arabia, but had discussed his plans in detail only with his most senior military commanders and with President Hafez Assad and Defense Minister General Mustapha Tlass of Syria, which was to mount a simultaneous attack against Israeli forces in Golan. Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had been pressing for instant union with Egypt, had been held at arm's length by Sadat and kept in the dark concerning Egyptian-Syrian plans. As for the Russians, it was only a few days before the start of hostilities that they at last appeared to have gotten positive wind of what was coming. On October 3–4, hundreds of the Soviet advisers and their families who still remained in Egypt and Syria were hastily evacuated.

The war itself, which ended in a UN-sponsored cease-fire before the end of October, brought a further deterioration of Egyptian-Soviet relations as Cairo showed an increasing disposition to look to the West, particularly the United States, for cooperation. At a conference of university students in Alexandria in April 1974, Sadat bluntly voiced his resentment over Moscow's refusal the year before to back Egypt's decision to resort to arms. He told the students, who had questioned the value of loosening Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union in favor of cooperation with the United States, that if it had been left to Moscow, Egypt would never have made its successful crossing of the Suez Canal and scored the military and political gains achieved through the October war. The Russians, he said,

[8] This decision had already been foreshadowed in an interview given by Sadat to American editor Arnaud be Borchgrave and published in *Newsweek* (New York), March 10, 1973. Few, however, believed it.

[9] Issue of June 4-11, 1972.

[10] The *New Times* article was broadcast by Moscow Radio; see *USSR and Third World*, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 325.

[11] Quoted in *ibid.*, Vol. 2, No. 7, p. 388.

[12] British Information Services report on Soviet-Egyptian relations, October 1972.

[13] *Ibid.*

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. . . did not approve of any action other than political or diplomatic action. . . . The Soviet Union's view was against military action. . . . Strategic analysts should have understood that I intended to enter a military battle when I ousted the Soviet experts. The Soviet experts were not fighters. They would not enter the battle with me. In fact, they were banned from going near the Suez Canal. . . . The decision on the battle was made last April. . . . But the USSR persisted in the view that a military battle must be ruled out and that the question must await a peaceful solution.[14]

Meanwhile, Egypt's inclination toward a reorientation of its international policy had already been evidenced by its enlistment of the good offices of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in negotiating the disengagement accords of January 18, 1974, with Israel. Not long thereafter, a visit to Cairo by Chase Manhattan Bank President David Rockfeller suggested that the improved political atmosphere between Cairo and Washington might lead to an influx of private Western capital into Egypt. These developments alarmed both Moscow and its partisans in Egypt, who repeatedly warned Sadat against straying from the socialist path. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko used the occasion of an early March visit to the Helwan iron and steel complex, long a "problem child" of Soviet aid missions in Egypt, to urge upon Cairo the need "to further develop and strengthen the public sector" of the Egyptian economy.[15]

The weakening of Cairo's ties to the USSR soon had repercussions on the Egyptian domestic political front. In August 1974 Sadat touched off wide public debate with a so-called "August paper" proposing a far-reaching reform of the ASU in a direction distinctly disadvantageous to the forces of the pro-Soviet Left.[16] As outlined by Sadat, the reform would broaden the ASU into an "alliance of all the working forces" and make it a forum in which all sectors of the population could air their views in open debate. Not only would membership be open to all—with, however, the specific exception of Sadat's old foes of the "adventurist Left" and "reactionary forces"—but it would no longer even be necessary to belong to the ASU in order to qualify for many government posts or for trade union membership. Sadat made the intent of the reform still more apparent when, in an implicit reference to Ali Sabry and Sabry's followers jailed in 1971, he spoke of the "centers of power" which had sought to impose on the ASU the theory of the one-party state. Transformation of the ASU into a broad and open alliance, he said, would avert what had happened before—the seizure of control by one element, *i.e.*, the leftist "vanguard" of old, which had consequently been able to influence ASU elections and ensure that its partisans obtained key posts.

Sadat's proposals evoked an overwhelmingly favorable domestic response, although there were some exceptions—especially strong opposition coming from the General Federation of Trade Unions, less of a tame organization of pro-Sadat "yes men" than many Western observers realize. Sadat's publicist supporters charged that Communists were promoting opposition to the reform plan in order to prevent a drift back toward multiparty rule, something not seen in Egypt since the days of the pre-1952 Farouk monarchy. These charges gained some apparent substantiation from a summary, published in the Beirut magazine *Al Hawadess* on September 23, of what the magazine claimed were instructions to the Egyptian Communists to obstruct the establishment of old-style "bourgeois" political parties and to provoke a factional clash that would have the net effect of preserving the status quo.

The favorable reception accorded Sadat's reform proposals in Egypt prompted a particularly strong reaction from Moscow, where Arabist commentators saw anti-Communist overtones in the "August paper" and repeated their warnings that there must be no deviation from the "socialist" path charted by Nasser. Moscow Radio joined in the attack with broadcasts in Arabic noting the "class positions" and "reactionary" nature of those advocating the political liberalization of the ASU. One of these broadcasts in mid-September centered its criticism on Ali Amin, editor of the Cairo weekly *Akhbar al Yom* and one of the founding fathers of Egyptian journalism, whom Sadat had brought back from exile imposed by the Nasser regime. Referring to views expressed by Amin on the relative merits of different types of socialism, the broadcast remarked sardonically that "there are some people who try to prove that so-called socialism of the British and Swedish kinds is better than scientific socialism."[17]

This touched off a sharp debate between Amin

[14] Cairo Radio live broadcast, April 4, 1974.
[15] *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 5, 1974.
[16] Private conversations with several leading Egyptian editors.
[17] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), Sept. 17, 1974.

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and Moscow Radio. Writing in *Akhbar al Yom*, Amin acknowledged his aversion to communism "because it suppresses freedom and is a dictatorial system" but advocated legalization of a Communist party in Egypt "so we can bring the Communists from underground into the open air." A legal Communist party, he argued, would be no threat because "Communist parties do not come to power through the people but always through coups"; moreover, legalization would show the world that there were fewer than 40,000 real Communists among Egypt's 37 million people. Amin added that if a legal party newspaper were allowed, its low circulation would underscore the sparseness of the party's following among the general public.[18] Moscow Radio came back on October 2 with its sharpest attack to date on Amin and his associates, accusing them of "disseminating their venomous lies against Communists and the whole Communist movement" and "aiming their daggers against the gains of the Egyptian revolution and the progress of the Arab national liberation movement."[19]

Notwithstanding these evidences of antagonism between Cairo and Moscow, there were nevertheless indications by the end of 1974 that a combination of internal and external forces might be pushing a reluctant Sadat back toward reconciliation with the USSR.

At home, the Egyptian leader found himself under pressure as never before because of mounting inflation and chronic shortages and breakdowns in an economy long neglected in favor of expenditures for war. The gains for agriculture and industry accruing from completion of the Aswan High Dam, the most successful Soviet aid project on the African continent, had failed to keep pace with the needs of a population growing by one million persons a year and scheduled to reach at least 37 million in 1975. Vital foods and other commodities were scarce; roads, railroads, public utilities, and communications were in disrepair.

The economic situation was kindling political unrest. On New Year's Day, 1975, thousands of workers and students violently demonstrated in Cairo in protest against high prices and low wages. Mobs smashed shops and burned cars, recalling the "Black Friday" riots which had preceded the fall of the monarchy in 1952. A delegation of workers from the Helwan iron and steel works attempted a march on the People's Council (parliament) to protest what they felt was Sadat's "undemocratic" method of choosing leaders of the ASU.

Sadat reacted with both carrot and stick. Prime Minister Abdel Azziz Hegazy's cabinet promised "drastic measures to meet the people's requirements"; extra funds, pledged by Saudi Arabia, were allotted to pay for imports of food; and steps were promised to provide more equitable treatment of civil servants and assure strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws. The stick was applied with the arrest of up to 400 persons, including 127 allegedly belonging to an "illegal Communist organization" as well as other known Communists and leftists. Egyptian Information Minister Kamal Abdul Magd hastened to state publicly, however, that "we do not arrest Marxists because they are Marxists" and denied that the government "held this group responsible for what happened,"[20] although *Rose al Youssef* reported on February 10 that the Cairo prosecutor's office was charging some of those arrested with colluding with "foreign powers" (later identified as the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) to "unify the Egyptian Communist organization prior to staging a coup and seizing power."

On the international front as well, Sadat found himself in an increasingly difficult position by spring of 1975. For one thing, disillusionment had been rising in Cairo over the lack of progress achieved through US mediation toward a peace settlement with Israel satisfying Arab demands for the return of territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and this disillusionment was sharply accentuated by the failure of Secretary of State Kissinger's new "peace shuttle" in March 1975. For another, Sadat's shift away from the USSR toward Washington following the October 1973 war had not enabled him to obtain from the United States the strategic arms that he had previously been denied by Moscow (although Egypt had succeeded in making some arms purchases from France and Britain). At the same time, Soviet commentaries were now stressing that Egypt would have to turn back to the path of "scientific socialism"—*i.e.*, cooperation with the USSR—as the only alternative to reliance on the unfulfilled promises of the capitalist West.

In these circumstances, Sadat had reluctantly begun, as early as October 1974, to pin his hopes on Soviet party chief Brezhnev's scheduled visit to Cairo in January 1975 as a means of redressing the

[18] *Akhbar al Yom*, Sept. 21, 1974.

[19] Quoted in British Information Services report, December 1974.

[20] Cairo Radio (in Arabic), Jan. 3, 1975.

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balance.[21] Ill health caused the postponement of Brezhnev's January visit, but a month later Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko went to Cairo to reassert Moscow's interest and involvement in the Mideast peacemaking efforts thus far dominated by US Secretary of State Kissinger. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had resumed some arms deliveries to Egypt after suspending them in October 1973. Cairo, however, still stood on uneasy terms with Moscow, and Sadat continued to insist that the future course of Soviet-Egyptian relations depended on an eventual Brezhnev visit.

Following the failure of Secretary Kissinger's two-week peace effort in March 1975, Sadat made what appeared to be some friendly gestures toward Moscow. First, he called for resumption of the Geneva peace conference, which had opened ceremonially in December 1973 and almost immediately adjourned—thereby confounding many of his Arab critics who had accused him of seeking a separate deal with Israel in order to avoid common Arab action at Geneva or elsewhere. Second, he announced on March 29 Egypt's intention to reopen the Suez Canal on June 5—a move which raised the hopes of the Egyptian public that reconstruction and prosperity could come without total peace, and which also pleased the world's maritime powers, not least the Soviet Union. What effect these moves will have on Soviet-Egyptian relations, and indirectly on the fortunes of the Egyptian Communists, however, remains to be seen.

The Case of Syria

To a greater degree than the Egyptian Communists, the Communists in Syria have managed to separate their fate and fortunes from the ups and downs of Soviet-Arab relations. The roots of communism in Syria (as well as in Lebanon) go back to the French mandate period prior to World War II. As early as the 1920's a few Syrians—including Khaled Bagdash, the "dean" in seniority and experience of all the Communist leaders in Arab countries and at present the Secretary General of the pro-Moscow wing of the party—received training in Moscow. Bagdash, of Kurdish origin, helped organize clandestine trade union activity under the noses of the French authorities in the 1920's, and in 1932 he became the First Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, which had emerged as an offshoot of the older Lebanese Communist Party.

In conjunction with nationalist elements, the Syrian Communists agitated against the mandate throughout the 1930's, especially after France ceded the Alexandretta (Iskenderun) district to Turkey in 1939. During these years, they avoided challenging Syria's big landlords and concentrated on issues essentially nationalistic in character. Their nationalistic agitation resulted in suppression of the party and its newspapers after World War II broke out in 1939, but with the liberation of the territory from the Vichy French authorities by the Free French and British armies in June 1941 and the easing of repressive measures, the Communists resumed their activities in support of "national liberation" from foreign control (though Syria became formally independent in September 1941).

It was in the late 1940's that the local Communists experienced their first severe setback because of their connections with the USSR. What led to the setback was the Palestine question, root and core of the Middle East conflict over the next three decades. In 1947, during the regime of Syrian dictator Adib Shishakli, the Soviet Union voted for the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. Although Arab opposition in the United Nations defeated the partition proposal temporarily, the measure ultimately passed the General Assembly, and when the state of Israel came into being in May 1948, Moscow recognized it immediately. This situation brought a heavy crackdown on the Syrian Communists.

Hence, not until 1955 did the Syrian Communists achieve a clearly definable political victory. This involved the suppression of the powerful quasi-Fascist *Parti Populaire Syrien* (Popular Syrian Party) after the murder of nationalist political leader Adnan Malki.[22]

By that time, of course, Syrian-Soviet relations at the state level had entered a honeymoon phase. Having begun initially in 1954 as trade overtures, Soviet approaches to Syria were already netting Damascus more tangible benefits, such as respectable amounts of Soviet military assistance and arms

[21] See the author's report of an interview with Sadat in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 23, 1974.

[22] The Popular Syrian Party advocated the formation of a "Greater Syria" which would include not only Syria but also Lebanon, Jordan, and Cyprus. It threatened a military takeover in Syria, and in 1962 it made an abortive coup attempt in Lebanon. The Communists made its suppression an article of faith and have disliked all similar pan-Arab parties.

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sales and the dispatch of Soviet military missions. The honeymoon continued in subsequent years as relations between nearly all the Arab governments (except for the doomed regime of Prime Minister Nury al-Said in nearby Iraq) and the West gradually deteriorated.

Nevertheless, Khaled Bagdash remained in exile in Eastern Europe from 1958 until 1966. Although the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party carried out a revolution in Syria in 1963, the local Communists got little satisfaction from it—partly because the Baath profoundly distrusted the Communists and partly because the Iraqi wing of the Baath Party had, during its nine months of power in 1963, ruthlessly crushed the Communists and thus made the latter suspicious of all Baathists. Only in February 1966, when a conspiracy of Baathist officers belonging mostly to the minority Alawite sect overthrew President Amin al-Hafez and the Baathist old guard under Premier Salah al-Bitar, did the Syrian Communists obtain the political freedom that they have enjoyed ever since. (In no other Arab country, it should be underscored, have the local Communists operated for so long a period essentially free of political restraints.)

Under the neo-Baathist regime of 1966, the Communists also won their first cabinet post. The decision to allot the Communists this post, however, was clearly connected with an intensification of ties between Damascus and Moscow. In April 1966, Syrian Premier Youssef Zaouyyen visited Moscow and returned with a Soviet commitment to assist in construction of the long-delayed Euphrates Dam, which was of crucial importance to Syria's water- and hydro-power-hungry agricultural economy, by providing an initial loan of $150 million and Soviet technical experts.

After Hafez al-Assad, Minister of Defense, launched his "corrective movement" and took over the presidency in November 1970 in the wake of Syria's unsuccessful military intervention in support of the Palestine guerrillas' civil war against King Hussein of Jordan, the Communists acquired an additional post in his reshuffled cabinet and eight seats in the 173-seat People's Council (parliament). The two Communist ministers were Youssef Faisal, a party Politburo member, who was named Minister of State, and Omar Sebai, a member of the party's Central Committee, who took over the key portfolio of Minister of Communications.

In May 1971, Assad laid the groundwork for a "National Progressive Front," in which the Communists would have an assured if subordinate role, by setting up a 13-man preparatory committee to plan for its formation. Just prior to conducting a referendum which confirmed him in the presidency in March 1971, he went so far as to advocate eventual transformation of such a front into a single political party,[23] but the Communists rejected this idea. Communist sources explained to this writer at the time that they feared that such a move would result in the Syrian party's formal dissolution (as in Egypt and the Sudan) and its ultimate disappearance.

The close identification of the Syrian Communists with Moscow's line, however, rendered their domestic position tenuous, although the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had not led to the kind of acute or dramatic problems between Damascus and Moscow that it had generated between Cairo and Moscow. Signs of an emerging détente between the USSR and the United States produced even greater disquiet in Syria than in Egypt. This concern was reflected in the refusal of Syria's neo-Baathist regime to go along with Nasser in endorsing US Secretary of State Rogers' Arab-Israeli peace initiative in 1970 (which also had Moscow's blessing). Moreover, President Assad declared on several occasions that he did not accept UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, as the basis for a Middle East political settlement, although he added that he supported Egypt's right to use every means of recovering its lost territory.[24] Following Assad's visit to Moscow in February 1971, Soviet commentators claimed that Syria had withdrawn its opposition to Resolution 242, but this shift was not clear from Assad's own statements for another year.[25]

That the Syrian Communists were beginning to feel the strain of adapting to a Soviet policy line favoring a peaceful political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognition of Israel's right to exist was evident in Bagdash's speech at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971. He deemed it necessary to reassure his colleagues:

The interests of the USSR are inseparable from those of the world Communist movement and of all peoples. There are no contradictions between their genuine

[23] One-party rule had never worked in Syria, and it also bore the stigma of the brief union with Egypt, when Cairo made some efforts to establish the Egyptian ASU in Syria. Assad seems to have broached the idea only once and then dropped it.

[24] *E.g.*, Assad statement on March 8, 1971, the anniversary of the Baathist revolution, broadcast by Damascus Radio.

[25] *Cf.* Assad speech of March 8, 1972, broadcast by Damascus Radio.

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national interests and those of the great socialist state, the USSR. That, indeed, is the objective foundation of true internationalism, and we are confident that harmony and identity of genuine patriotic and international interests is fully possible.[26]

Nor was this the sole issue upon which the Syrian Communists found themselves out of step with the Baathist regime. They, in concert with Moscow, only lukewarmly "supported" the tripartite Arab federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya, formally established in September 1971.[27] (The Russians received this event with something less than enthusiasm because they disliked the visceral anti-communism of Libya's "strong man," Muammar al-Qaddafi.) With respect to the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty, however, the Syrian Communists waxed more effusive, calling it a "serious blow" to the United States and Israel [28]—despite the fact that Assad refused to sign a similar pact with Moscow.

Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972 further intensified the friction. Bagdash conveyed his condemnation of the Egyptian action to the Syrian cabinet and warned the Assad government against taking any similar steps, threatening to withdraw the two Communist members from the cabinet and the party from the National Front if Soviet advisers in Syria were asked to depart.[29] (By this juncture, Soviet experts were involved in nearly 50 industrial and agricultural projects in Syria—indeed, some 1,000 were working on the Euphrates Dam project alone. In addition, several hundred Soviet military advisers were busy training the Syrian armed forces.) Although unappreciative of the Communist pressure, Assad soon gave Bagdash public reassurance. In an interview with a Beirut newspaper, he asserted that Syria still needed the Soviet experts.[30]

The expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt also brought to a head a simmering conflict within the Syrian Communist Party itself. According to available information, a split in the Central Committee had developed over the political platform submitted to the party's Third Congress in December 1971, and an anti-Bagdash, anti-Moscow faction headed by Daniel Nehme, one of Bagdash's old colleagues, had emerged. The fundamental disagreement had concerned the merits of Soviet policy toward the Middle East. At the end of June 1972, *Al-Rayah,* a Beirut newspaper friendy to the old neo-Baathist group ousted by Assad in 1970, had published what was quite probably an authentic critique of the dissident faction's views by a spokesman for the Soviet leadership. First, the critique warned that the Syrian and Egyptian armies were still too weak to face war with Israel:

War will bring fresh catastrophes to progressive Arab regimes . . . we are not against a military solution as such; we are only realistic.

It was wrong, the critique went on, for Syria to go on supporting extremist guerrilla groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),

Khaled Bagdash, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party.

—Camera Press via Pictorial Parade.

[26] *World Marxist Review* (London), June 1971.

[27] Verbal statements by Syrian Communist leaders and their Lebanese supporters.

[28] TASS, June 3, 1971.

[29] Author's personal conversation with a Syrian cabinet minister.

[30] *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), Aug. 5, 1972.

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headed by George Habbash, and to call for liquidation of the Israeli state. The Palestine struggle was "not the axis of the Arab liberation struggle. Its axis is strengthening the progressive democratic regimes and enabling socialism to triumph." The USSR, the statement continued, wished to avoid risking a potentially serious confrontation with the United States, and:

An Arab-Israeli war could lead to an American-Soviet confrontation. We do not conceal that only out of dire necessity would we go to such lengths. . . . You must not imagine that you can inter Israel by war and start up a Palestine state. That is the third world war.[31]

According to the later account of Riad Turk, one of the Central Committee members who opposed Bagdash, these remarks—attributed by some observers to Boris Ponomarev, Moscow's top ideological specialist on the Third World—were the "straw that broke the camel's back." As Turk put it, "we discovered that these remarks called for a general debate, especially because Bagdash began using them against us." [32]

In light of the Soviet setback in Egypt, Moscow evidently concluded that it would be wise to try to reconcile the factions for the time being, lest any internecine quarreling within the Syrian party jeopardize the Soviet position in Syria. Toward the end of July 1972, the Russians succeeded in getting Bagdash and his opponents to send a seven-man delegation from both factions to Moscow. The pro-Moscow, pro-Bagdash members included not only Bagdash himself but also Mourad Malek and Minister of State Youssef Faisal; the supporters of the anti-Moscow rebels were Zaher Abdel Samed, Riad Turk, and Wassef Faisal (all members of the party's Central Committee and Politburo). These individuals then engaged in a "dialogue" under the auspices of the CPSU.

Under strong Soviet pressure, the two factions agreed to cool their dispute for the moment. Bagdash withdrew a statement he had made in April 1972 criticizing the dissidents, and the two factions consented to dissolve all the committees that each had formed separately since April 1972. In addition, a four-member committee was set up to study the causes of the schism. Commenting subsequently on the meetings, Riad Turk acknowledged the "valuable contribution" of the Russians but averred: "We refuse the claim that our Soviet comrades know better about our country's conditions than we do." [33]

From that time until after the October 1973 war, the party kept its internal split carefully under wraps. Its actions, however, did not by any means eliminate the sources of friction between the Soviet and Syrian governments. For example, the USSR's reluctance to supply offensive, as opposed to defensive, weapons to Syria did not sit well with Damascus. Indeed, it is now clear that the Assad government interpreted the Soviet criticism of the Syrian Communist program in June 1972 as an implied warning that the USSR would refuse, as it had in the case of Egypt, to furnish such weapons under existing circumstances, and the Syrians strongly resented what they regarded as insufficient support from Moscow.

The Syrian authorities were also irritated because Moscow failed to live up to its promise to send either President Nikolai Podgorny or Premier Aleksei Kosygin to take part in the ceremonies marking completion of the first stage of the Euphrates Dam project in July 1973. Instead, it dispatched CPSU Poliburo member Andrei Kirilenko, an individual several notches down on the Soviet leadership ladder. This action rankled all the more in Damascus because Kosygin had visited Iraq in April 1972 to help open the North Rumaila oilfield — a project which the USSR had assisted—and Podgorny had presided at ceremonies in Egypt in December 1971 to inaugurate the power stations of the Aswan High Dam.

Indeed, throughout the spring and summer of 1973—a period when Assad, probably without Soviet knowledge, evidently began war preparations in concert with Sadat—there was underlying tension between Moscow and Damascus. It worsened visibly shortly before the outbreak of the October war, although it seems evident today that Western observers at the time exaggerated the degree to which this was true.

The specific occurrence that precipitated the flare-up of Syrian anger was Syria's loss of 13 MIG-19 and MIG-21 fighters in a dogfight with Israeli planes near Latakia, in the wake of an Israeli ambush. This vivid demonstration of Israeli air superiority rubbed raw nerves in Damascus, for Assad and his

[31] Quoted from *Al Rayah* by David Hirst, in *The Guardian* (London), June 28, 1972.

[32] *The Arab World Weekly* (Beirut), Jan. 12, 1974, p. 12.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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military commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Mustapha Tlass, had apparently been trying to get Moscow to provide Syria with the MIG-23 and train Syrian pilots on it. (Moscow eventually agreed to do so, but not until after the October war.) Soon after the air battle, the Syrian government clamped restrictions on the Soviet advisers in Syria, requiring them to have special travel permits for their every move.

To a certain extent, this step probably resulted from a desire on the part of the Syrian government, then almost ready to join with Sadat in undertaking a war against Israel, to keep the Russians in the dark about its plans, but genuine disgruntlement with the Russians was also a factor. For instance, in a stormy interview with Soviet Ambassador Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam accused the Soviet experts of behaving like a "state within a state"—the same charge that Egypt had leveled at its Soviet experts before it ordered their departure. It appears that Khaddam was especially unhappy at the refusal of Soviet missile officers to release to Syrian officers the fuses for the latest SAM anti-aircraft missiles installed around naval facilities that both the Syrians and Russians used at the ports of Latakia and Tartous.

In spite of Khaddam's strong words, however, the Syrians stopped there and did not toss the Russians out of the country. In fact, Soviet nationals and property suffered some losses when the October war broke out shortly thereafter. It is not clear whether Soviet missile crews manned the defenses of Latakia, Tartous, Homs, and other Syrian cities, all of which endured severe punishment in the war, but the Soviet cultural center in Damascus did take a direct hit on October 9 during the only Israeli air raid on the city, with at least one Soviet member of the staff killed and others wounded.[34] Moreover, a Soviet merchant ship, the Ilya Mechnikov, which had arrived at Tartous on October 5 just before the war began, was sunk in a bombardment by Israeli missile boats on October 12.

After the October war, there were further complications in Syrian-Soviet relations, accompanied by a revival of feuding within the Syrian Communist Party. After the Bagdash faction endorsed UN Resolution 338, which called for a Middle East cease-fire and implementation of UN Resolution 242,[35] the anti-Moscow, anti-Bagdash faction in December 1973 convened what it called the "Fourth Party Congress of the Syrian Communist Party." This congress elected its own Central Committee and named Riad Turk "First Secretary"—thus directly challenging Bagdash. Indeed, the declaration issued by the congress was tantamount to an ouster of Bagdash and his followers.[36]

As a result of these developments, Syria now has two separate Communist parties. Bagdash and his group have continued to support the Soviet line and to follow Kremlin instructions. On Israel and Palestine, for example, Bagdash—along with the Russians—has come around to favor separate Arab and Jewish states. As he puts it, he refuses to advocate the "destruction" of Israel since this implies genocide against the Jews as a people. Like Moscow, he took a highly skeptical attitude toward Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to negotiate the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement (concluded in May 1974 after tough bargaining). He maintained, as have numerous Soviet commentators, that peace in the Middle East depends on both big powers, not just one, and that no settlement of the situation can be accomplished without the full participation of the USSR in a reconvened peace conference in Geneva.

With regard to the nature of Arab communism, Bagdash—again in concert with the Russians—holds that "differing conditions" throughout the Arab world require separate Arab Communist parties. To arguments that a united Arab Communist party would help pave the way for overall Arab unity, he replies that the formation of such a party is impossible at present: current conditions do not provide the right climate, and past Arab experiments with "organic unity"—for instance, the Egypt-Syria union of 1958-61, the abortive efforts to establish a Maghreb union of North African states and parties, and the unsuccessful attempts to unite North and South Yemen—have shown that Arab unity cannot be achieved without preconditions.[37]

The anti-Bagdash faction, in contrast, has adopted an independent posture. Like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), it holds that the eradication of the state of Israel does not imply the wiping out of the Jewish people. It declares:

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[34] TASS report, Oct. 12, 1973, in *USSR and Third World*, Vol. 3, No. 7, p. 485.

[35] *The Arab World Weekly*, Jan. 12, 1974, p. 13.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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The Soviets fought the Nazis in World War II, but they were not fighting to destroy the German people. We are fighting Zionism, not Jews.[38]

Because of its dedication to the elimination of the state of Israel, however, it was no more enthusiastic than Bagdash and his supporters about Secretary of State Kissinger's endeavors to bring about a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, and it has seemed equally prepared to support the contention that peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without the involvement of the Soviet Union as well as the United States, and that a Middle East settlement cannot be effected without reopening the Geneva peace conference with the USSR as a full participant. With regard to Arab communism, it advocates the establishment of a single Communist Party for the entire Arab world. Like the ideal that the Baath Party espouses (although the Baathists are actually split into quarreling pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions at the moment), such a party would be divided into "regional" branches but have a central, pan-Arab "Command." The fact that Arab Communists exist and operate within a number of Arab countries, the anti-Bagdash group maintains, is not sufficient justification for keeping separate Communist parties. To the argument that present circumstances do not afford the necessary preconditions for the formation of a unified party, the faction responds in idealistic fashion:

It is not possible to put conditions on the form of Arab unity. If so, why did we support the federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya without preconditions? [39]

It is important to note, however, that this split in the Communist Party has not thus far affected the standing of the Communist members of the government or the nature of Communist representation in the National Progressive Front. Moreover, Bagdash's continued enjoyment of the confidence of the Iraqi leadership was evidenced in March 1975 when he went to Baghdad, with apparent official approval, to make an attempt at mediation after Iraqi-Syrian relations had deteriorated because of ideological quarrels between the rival Baathist factions in Damascus and Baghdad and because of a dispute over the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates River. In these regards, then, the Bagdash faction remains dominant. Probably the explanation of its continued status lies in the undertakings of the USSR since the October 1973 war to ameliorate Soviet relations with the Assad government.

The Case of Iraq

As in Syria, the domestic political fortunes of the Communists in Iraq have risen markedly in recent years. The current Baathist regime of President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Vice-President Saddam Hussein Takriti, who became the regime's real "strong man" in 1971, has coupled an external policy of cultivating closer relations with the Soviet Union with an internal policy of legalizing the Moscow-oriented Iraqi Communist Party. It has, in fact, made the Communists a junior partner of the ruling Baath Socialist Party in a "National Progressive Front" coalition formed in 1973.

Prior to 1971, the Iraqi Communists had experienced the same vicissitudes as their counterparts in the rest of the Arab world. Outlawed by the British-protected Iraqi monarchy in 1934, they remained suppressed until the advent of the left-nationalist regime of Abdul Karim Kassem, which overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed a republic in 1958, bringing a shift in policy. During his five-year rule, Kassem launched Iraq on a pro-Soviet course internationally and admitted leftists, including some Communists, to government positions at home. His violent overthrow in 1963, however, was followed by a sharp reaction as the new Baathist regime of Abdel Salem Arif unleashed a ruthless campaign of repression in which some 3,000 Communists were killed and many others imprisoned—an experience the Communists have never forgotten. Repression continued, though on a lesser scale, under the succeeding Baathist regime, which seized power in still another coup in July 1968. During 1968-70, some 35 leading Communists were killed and numerous others jailed in the course of steps taken by the new regime to suppress political opposition.

The turning point came in 1971 when changes in the leadership resulted in the elevation of Saddam Hussein Takriti to the vice-presidency of the Revolutionary Command Council, Iraq's top ruling body. With President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, the chief of state, serving more as a last remaining link with the traditional Sunni Muslim chiefs of the army than as a strong chief executive, Saddam became

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] Interview with a Lebanese editor close to the Syrian Communist Party.

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the real power in the government as well as in the Baath Party (of which he is nominally Deputy Secretary General). Saddam proceeded to make the forging of closer ties with the USSR the principal aim of the regime's foreign policy—a policy which led to the conclusion in April 1972 of a 15-year Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty, and which has also resulted in an increased flow of Soviet arms aid to Iraq, as well as growing Soviet involvement in the development of Iraq's important oil industry.

These developments in Iraqi-Soviet interstate relations eventually had important repercussions on the domestic status of the Iraqi Communists. With the conclusion of the friendship treaty, Baghdad grew in importance as a focus of Soviet-sponsored international front activities, and during 1972-73 there was a constant stream of visits to the Iraqi capital by Soviet-bloc and fellow-traveling European front groups. One of many examples of these activities was a seminar on the "uses of Arab oil against imperialism," staged in Baghdad in November 1972 jointly by the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the Iraqi National Council for Peace and Solidarity. This last body embraced Baathists, Communists, left-wing elements of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and some mixed "progressive nationalists," including remnants of the old Iraqi Nasserite groups. It proved to be the forerunner of the later-created National Progressive Front, which brought the Iraqi Communists into junior partnership with the Baath.

Only a few months after the first anniversary of the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty, the careful preparatory work of Saddam—actively abetted by such veteran Soviet Third World diplomatists as Boris Ponomarev—bore fruit in the signing, in July 1973, of an agreement setting up the nucleus of the projected National Progressive Front. As conceived by Saddam, the Front was to link the Baath with the Communists and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), representing the vast majority of Iraq's estimated three million Kurds, in a tripartite coalition aimed at permanently consolidating the power of the Baathist regime. The Baath and the Communists both signed the July 1973 agreement (the latter thereby gaining full legal status); however, in spite of urging by Moscow and some KDP leftists, the main leadership of the KDP, dominated by the aging General Mullah Mustapha Barzani, rejected the accord.

The KDP's refusal to join the National Progressive Front was prompted by the total failure of negotiations, begun after the conclusion in March 1970 of a four-year truce agreement aimed at ending nine years of armed Kurdish rebellion against Baghdad, to produce any progress toward the Kurds' goal of a politically autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. More important, however, were the political consequences of the refusal. On the one hand, it dealt a blow to the regime's hopes of consolidating its power by drawing the Kurds into a political coalition with the Baath and the Communists. On the other, it started a chain of events that involved the Communists in a conflict of their own with the main faction of the KDP and led to a damaging setback for Soviet efforts to play a mediatory role in furtherance of Moscow's political objectives in Iraq.

Amidst steadily worsening relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi Communists, many of whose leaders are themselves Kurds, fighting broke out in northern Iraq in November 1973 between Communist militia and Barzani's partisans, with the latter quickly gaining the upper hand. The Communists promptly accused Barzani's supporters and other "reactionary" leaders of the KDP, such as KDP Secretary General Habib Karim, of "slaughtering" Kurdish Communists, and the KDP in turn accused Saddam Hussein's Baathist government of arming the Communists to attack the Kurds. These developments culminated a year of unsettling events in Iraq, which had included frontier clashes with Iran, border troubles with Kuwait, and an abortive coup attempt in July by Baathist Chief of Security Nazem Kassar, in which Iraqi Defense Minister Hamed Chebab had been killed.

With a view to calming the increasingly unstable Iraqi political situation, Moscow dispatched Ponomarev at the head of a strong Soviet delegation—which also included Rostislav Ulianovsky, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department—to Baghdad at the end of November 1973. The delegation met with both Baathist and KDP officials and apparently made a major effort to mediate the Kurdish problem. Ponomarev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Abd al-Baaki signed a "plan for cooperation and struggle in the Arab region" which the Soviet media hailed as having "great significance for all the liberation movements of the world," [40] but the delegation's apparent attempt to promote a rapprochement with the Kurds produced nothing more than a joint Communist-

[40] Quoted in Iraqi News Agency report, Nov. 30, 1973.

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

Aziz Muhammad, right, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, receives the People's Friendship Order from Soviet President N. V. Podgorny in a Moscow ceremony last November.

—V. Sobolev for TASS via Sovfoto.

KDP statement to the effect that it was a good thing that the armed clashes between Kurds and Communists in the north had ended.[41] It appears that Ponomarev and Ulianovsky, before returning to Moscow, paid a secret visit to Barzani's headquarters in northern Iraq to deliver a message from Brezhnev criticizing the Kurdish leader's attitude toward the Iraqi Communists and the regime—again to no avail. Barzani's political adviser, Dr. Mahmoud Osman, told this writer in Kurdistan in March 1974, following the Kurds' resumption of all-out war against Baghdad, that the last visits by Soviet emissaries had been in December 1973 and that "none of these visits had led anywhere."

Although spokesmen for the left wing of the KDP—notably Dara Tewfik, editor of the Kurdish-language Baghdad newspaper *Al-Takhi*—continued to argue that the KDP ought to work out a *modus vivendi* with the Communists and that the heavy Kurdish membership of the Communist Party should support this idea, the renewal of full-scale hostilities between Kurdish and government forces removed all hopes for such maneuvers. By the end of 1974, the war had reached tragic proportions, imposing a heavy drain on Iraqi manpower and oil revenues[42] and threatening an extension of border hostilities with Iran, which continued to supply the Kurds with arms, vehicles, food, medical supplies, and probably money. An all-out Iraqi offensive in September, in which the government forces used the latest Soviet equipment including mountain tanks and large troop-carrying helicopters, failed to cut the Kurds' life-lines to the Iranian border. The arrival of winter snows brought a stalemate in the fighting with Barzani's Pesh Merga forces controlling the frontier areas all the way from Khanaqin, on the Iranian border, to Zakho, near the Turkish and Syrian frontiers.

In the spring of 1975, however, an international maneuver drastically changed the situation. After some secret diplomatic preparations, Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran were brought together at the Algiers oil congress by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria. There, on March 6, they concluded an agreement—formally ratified by the signing of a protocol by the two governments' foreign ministers in Teheran on March 17—whereby Iran agreed to stop all aid to the Kurds in return for Iraqi acceptance of the Iranian interpretation that the Shatt al-Arab river boundary between the two countries ran down the middle of the river bed. Deprived of their Iranian assistance, the Kurds were obliged to end their resistance. Barzani and some of his aides took refuge in Iran just before Iranian forces sealed the border against their former protégés on April 1. A few thousand Pesh Merga fighters and civilians accepted Iraqi offers of an amnesty and surrendered to the Iraqi forces. Many more Kurds chose the path of exile and made their way into Iran, suffering thousands of casualties from freezing, wounds, and disease on the way.

The collapse of the Kurdish revolt and the uneasy Iraqi détente with Iran brought about by the Algiers agreement of March seem to have caught both the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communists by surprise: certainly, there was no early evidence that they had any part in it whatever. In any case, the total collapse of Soviet hopes of using the Kurds as a lever of influence in the politics of Iraq and the

[41] Radio Peace and Progress broadcast from Moscow (in Arabic), Dec. 2, 1973.

[42] Iraqi government sources privately indicated to the author that they estimated the cost of the Kurdish war to the government in 1974 at about 1.5 billion US dollars—equivalent to nearly one-third of Iraq's total oil revenues for that year. Kurdish sources estimated government casualties at 8,000 killed and a much larger number wounded, placing their own losses at only one-fourth those of the government forces.

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Persian Gulf oil region has made the Iraqi Communist Party doubly important in Soviet political strategy—a fact which lends key weight, in Soviet calculations, to the role of Aziz Muhammad, the 50-year-old Kurdish-born Secretary General of the party. Muhammad was first elected Secretary General in 1964, during the period of Communist persecution in Iraq following the Baathist coup of 1963, when the party was reorganized around a nucleus of exiles in Eastern Europe. Following the first Baathist overtures for a reconciliation with the Communists, he returned from exile in early 1969 and was reelected Secretary General at the party's Second Congress, held in Iraq in September 1970. Muhammad, who travels and writes in the Communist world under the party name of Nazim Ali, led the Iraqi Communist delegations to the World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in 1969 and the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, and he had his first meeting with Brezhnev in November 1973 following an extensive tour of Eastern Europe.

It has fallen to Muhammad to assert the firmly pro-Soviet stand of his party, as he did, for example, in a communiqué issued jointly with Bulgarian Communist leaders in Sofia in August 1974. With regard to the ongoing Sino-Soviet conflict, the communiqué declared:

The obstinate actions of the present Chinese leaders against the unity of action of the revolutionary forces, their anti-Sovietism, [and] their alliance with the forces of imperialism strike a serious blow at the work of peace and socialism. . . . The two parties expressed their will to struggle against all attempts to revise the proven principles of Marxism-Leninism.[43]

Muhammad is personally identified with the national front policy in Iraq—a policy also actively pushed by Moscow, whose preference for Baathist-led "national progressive fronts" in both Syria and Iraq seems to reflect a realistic recognition of the scant possibility of the local Communists' achieving political power for themselves alone. Thus, the failure to draw the KDP into the Iraqi National Progressive Front and the ensuing new war with the Kurds have dealt severe setbacks both to Muhammad's personal leadership and to Soviet policy in Iraq. Nevertheless, there have been no indications thus far of changes in Soviet policy and Soviet-Iraqi governmental relations that might affect the present favored position of the Iraqi Communists as junior partners of the Baath in the ruling coalition.

Even so, the partnership is hardly one that rests on a firm and lasting foundation. Kurdish observers contend that the Communists, now enjoying fully legal status for the first time in four decades, will not long be content with their minority status in the National Progressive Front, which has earned them only three out of 16 cabinet seats. These observers recall that Muhammad, even when he signed the July 1973 agreement establishing the Front, declared that "our ambitions, we the Communists, do not stop at the limits of this militant document, nor at the limit of coalition relations between our two parties." [44]

For its part, too, the Baath remains extremely wary of the Communists' intentions. Indeed, this wariness was expressed at the very start of the two parties' uneasy honeymoon, when the Baathist newspaper *Al Thawra*—in a warning reminiscent of Egyptian fears of a leftist "vanguard party" within the ASU—stressed that "the rules of action within the Front, especially the role of each party, must be firmly respected in all fields and under all conditions." Noting that there had in the past been "secessionist" elements in the Communist party that opposed the Baath, the journal went on to say:

We hope that the Communist comrades will exert special, concentrated efforts to ensure that such elements do not bring their old outlooks and actions with them into the party, thereby forming an element of disturbance within the Front or helping to blow up the Front under some pretext. . . . The Communist comrades must avoid acting in a manner which would show them as having come to fill an existing vacuum, or to remove others from positions the Communists believe belong to them. In our opinion, the Communists must take extreme care to act as allies and friends who love their Baathist and other comrades.[45]

One of the immediate consequences of the defeat of the Kurdish revolt has been a renewal of the old strains between the rival Baathist clans in power in Baghdad and Damascus, with Iraq renewing its charges—originally dating back to 1962, when Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, with Soviet financial aid, all

[43] Agence France Presse report from Sofia, Aug. 7, 1974.

[44] For Muhammad's statement, see *The Baghdad Observer*, July 13, 1973.

[45] *Al Thawra* (Baghdad), quoted by Iraqi News Agency, Aug. 2, 1973.

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began work on power and irrigation dams on the Euphrates River—that Syria was withholding needed water from Iraq. The water shortage in Iraq following the completion of new stages of Syria's Tabqa Dam was genuine. So was the Soviet Union's embarrassment, because Moscow had sought for years, without success, to bring about Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish accords on sharing the water of the Euphrates. It appeared to many observers that Baghdad, freed of the terrible burden of the Kurdish war, might now turn its full fury against President Assad of Syria and the Syrian Baath.

This possibility has not been ignored in Syria. During the congress of the Syrian Baath in Damascus in early April, at least 200 Syrians including Marawan Hamoui, head of the Syrian Arab News Agency, were arrested on suspicion of plotting in favor of Iraq. One of the volunteer peacemakers, as noted earlier, was Syrian Communist leader Khaled Bagdash, who went to Baghdad in mid-April, with Moscow's apparent blessing, to try to mediate the conflicts between the rival Baathist regimes.

It remains to be seen whether the Kurdish collapse and Iraq's renewed political conflict with Syria will weld the loose-seamed Baathist-Communist coalition in Baghdad any more tightly together. Growing Iraqi interest in Western offers of trade and technology, already evidenced by a sharp rise in trade with Western countries, is clearly a matter of some concern to Moscow, but whatever effects, if any, this may have on Soviet-Iraqi governmental relations and the internal political situation in Iraq still lie in the future.

The Case of Lebanon

In many ways, the experience of the Lebanese Communist Party—notwithstanding the fact that it operates with freedom in the only Arab parliamentary democracy left in the Middle East—mirrors many of the problems that the Communists have faced in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. However, the political fortunes of the party have been less affected than those of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Communists by trends in Soviet international policy and in Soviet-Lebanese governmental relations than they have by political currents in the Arab world generally and by purely internal political developments.

Founded in 1924 under the French post-World War I mandate, the party first went under the name of the Lebanese People's Party but was reconstituted in 1930 as the Lebanese Communist Party, drawing its membership from both Lebanon and Syria. Both before and after Lebanon's acquisition of independence in 1943, the party was outlawed under most Lebanese regimes until August 1970. At that time, the intellectual *guru* of Lebanese leftists, Kamal Jumblatt—who, in a typically Lebanese paradox, is currently chief of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and at the same time one of the country's largest landowners—was Minister of Interior. He granted government recognition to the Lebanese Communist Party, making it the only legal Communist party organization, at that time, in any Arab country.

The party's principal leaders, most of them old-timers, are Nicola Shawi, the Secretary General; Georges Hawi, generally regarded as the No. 2 party leader; and three other key figures—Youssef al-Helou, Muhammed al-Aris, and Artine Madoyan. Al-Helou edits the party weekly, *Al-Akhbar*; al-Aris is the most influential Communist in Lebanon's trade union federation, a restive element in a society built to some extent on *laissez-faire* capitalism and a live-and-let-live balance among the country's multifarious Muslim and Christian sects; and Madoyan was once leader of the small Armenian Communist faction in Lebanon before its merger into the Communist Party.

For the most part, at least until the last few years, the Lebanese Communists have had no major quarrels with Soviet policies. Shawi and Hawi attended the 24th CPSU Congress in Moscow in March-April 1971, praised the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty of May of that year, and took a clearly pro-Soviet stand in Moscow's ongoing ideological conflict with Peking. The Lebanese party, like the Syrian and Egyptian Communists, also shared Moscow's coolness toward the projected tripartite Arab federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya in 1971, and later, during and after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, most Lebanese Communists were critical of Egyptian President Sadat's moves away from Moscow toward rapprochement with Washington and of the Egyptian idea—often expressed by Muhammed Hassanein Heikal, former editor of *Al-Ahram,* and other Egyptian spokesmen—of "neutralizing" the United States.

Since about 1971, however, the chief—and perhaps only—impact of Soviet Mideast policy on Lebanese communism has been to promote a splintering of the party ranks into "left isolationist" and "right deviationist" factions, with the former accusing the latter of "placing Arab reaction within the ranks of

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the progressive forces," and the "rightists" charging the "leftists" with "adventurism."[46] One of the first significant anti-Moscow groups to appear on the scene in 1971 was the "League of Lebanese Socialists," which actually was mainly the political wing of the Palestinian guerrilla group calling itself the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) and headed by Nayef Hawatme, one of the most politically articulate and active of the Palestinian leaders. The appearance of this group was followed soon afterward by the emergence of another splinter, the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), a Maoist group hostile to Moscow. Later still came the Arab Communist Organization, a more radical Maoist-terrorist group which was responsible for a number of attacks on American installations and property in Lebanon and Syria during 1973–74.

These "left deviationist" tendencies in Lebanese Communist ranks spurred the orthodox party leadership to try to rally local and international support. At the end of 1972, a seminar on "the relationship between the USSR and the Arab Liberation Movement" was hosted by the Lebanese party in Beirut and was attended by a sizable Soviet delegation, by Baathists from Lebanon and Iraq, by representatives of the Iraqi and Syrian Communist Parties, by assorted Nasserites and socialists, and by delegates from the Eritrean Liberation Front. Despite this effort, another pro-Chinese group calling itself the Union of Marxist-Leninist Cells in Lebanon and led by a party old-timer, Jamil Shatila, broke away from the party for a brief period in early 1973. However, its members soon returned to the orthodox party fold after Shatila, according to a Moscow Radio broadcast on April 9, publicly announced the dissolution of the union and charged the Chinese with having tried to sow dissension in Communist ranks not only in Lebanon but also in the Sudan.[47]

Starting in the period 1970–72, as the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement loomed and as the United States restored diplomatic relations first with the Sudan and then with Egypt, the Soviet Union sought to bolster its own Middle East position vis-à-vis the Chinese by working toward improved relations with such radical Arab states as Algeria and South Yemen. The orthodox Lebanese Communists appeared to approve of these efforts, probably

Nicola Shawi, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lebanon.

—Camera Press via Pictorial Parade.

because they shared, to some extent, Soviet fears of growing Chinese influence in the Palestinian movement and with radical-Marxist Arab regimes such as that in South Yemen.

From time to time, Moscow found it necessary to address sharp rebukes to pro-Egyptian elements among the Lebanese Communists—such as those around the magazine *Sawt al-Urubah* (The Voice of Arabism)—for accusing the USSR and the United States of wanting to freeze the "no war, no peace" situation in the Middle East. At the same time, the USSR showed its partiality toward the orthodox party leadership: for example, in July 1973, following the inauguration of the Euphrates Dam in neighboring Syria, a Soviet delegation visited Beirut and awarded the People's Friendship Order to Shawi.

Generally speaking, the orthodox Lebanese Communists have, with some reluctance, accepted Moscow's policy in favor of a peaceful Arab-Israeli politi-

[46] *Al Nida* (Beirut), June 20, 1971.

[47] Moscow Radio broadcast of April 9, 1973, in *USSR and Third World*, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 254.

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cal settlement involving Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist within its pre-1967 frontiers. Their writings show that they also went along with Moscow's early hostility toward the Palestinian guerrilla movement. This issue, moreover, has now been largely removed as a potential source of conflict as a result of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat's several recent visits to Moscow and Soviet endorsement of the idea of a separate Palestinian "entity" or state. Since the shift in the Soviet attitude, both Moscow and the Lebanese Communists have greatly improved their ties with Palestinian movements and voiced support for Al-Fatah, the largest guerrilla component of the PLO, as well as for the small Communist-led guerrilla group, *Al-Ansar* (The Partisans), which the anti-Communist PLO leadership never admitted to membership in that organization.

Despite the growing fragmentation of the extreme Left in Lebanon, its overall position has improved since 1970 as the result of developments both in the Arab world at large and in Lebanon itself. With respect to the former, one can discern three important influences. First, the death of Nasser in 1970 removed from the scene unquestionably the greatest hero and myth-figure of the Lebanese Left. In his name, the Muslim lower-middle classes of Beirut and Tripoli had followed their local political bosses into such adventures as the civil war of 1958 and had supported the Palestinian presence in Lebanon (at the time when this presence still had Nasser's imprimatur). With Nasser's demise, the Nasserite movement in both Lebanon and Syria split into two main orientations. The "rightest" elements, who stressed the importance of Islamic principles rather than the character of US or Soviet policy, looked either to Sadat or, more typically, to Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi for inspiration. In some Muslim quarters of Beirut and Tripoli, pictures of the young Libyan leader began to replace the fading portraits of Nasser. Qaddafi, for his part, promoted this growing adulation by spending Libyan oil money generously to acquire the allegiance of journalists and newspapers in Beirut. The more radical Nasserites, particularly among the older generation in Lebanon, tended to voice anxiety about the fate of Nasser's social reforms in an Egypt which was once again encouraging private capitalism and welcoming private investment from the West, and to drift leftward with accusations that Sadat had "betrayed" Nasser's "revolution."

Second, the improvement of relations among the "progressive" Arab states facilitated greater cooperation among the elements of the Lebanese Left generally. For example, the Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement that ensued upon President Assad's takeover of power in Syria in November 1970 had repercussions on the attitudes of the left-nationalist groups in Lebanon. Similarly, the temporary amelioration of relations between Syria and Iraq following Assad's accession to power in 1970 had a clear impact on the outlooks of the old left-Nasserite factions and the Baathists in Lebanon. This was particularly evident in the way they worked together during the student disturbances at the American University of Beirut, the Beirut Arab University, and many secondary schools in Lebanon in 1971–73.

Third, the formation of "national front" governments in Syria and Iraq including both the Baathists and the Communists—in conjunction with the earlier absorption of Egyptian Communists by the ruling Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, made it easier for the Communists, the Baathists, and the Nasserites in Lebanon to collaborate. Again, this was apparent in their behavior during the outbreaks of student unrest in 1971–73. It has also been manifest in their actions in connection with the ward and tribal violence that has especially troubled the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. In effect, the Syrian, Iraqi, and Egyptian regimes, increasingly preoccupied with their own internal problems, have allowed the Lebanese groups that follow their lead much greater license to maneuver than was the case previously.

On the micro-scene of purely internal Lebanese politics, the Lebanese Communists have actively sought political allies, and they have made progress toward cooperation with certain groups. For instance, they have worked increasingly closely with Kamal Jumblatt, who legalized the party when he was Interior Minister and who has powerful allies among Lebanon's wealthiest and most influential families and clans. They have also apparently "normalized" their relations with some nonterrorist, non-Soviet-oriented groups like the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon, which has refused to take any position with respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict but has in the past criticized the policies and strategies of both the USSR and the Lebanese Communists. Since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, they have even made friendly overtures to the mainly underground Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM), the political parent of the radical-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of old ANM militant

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George Habbash. (Even before then, the Lebanese party had joined other elements of the Lebanese Left in supporting the Palestinian guerrillas during the Lebanese army's weeklong clash with the Palestinians in the wake of an Israeli attack on Palestinian leaders in Beirut in April 1973, in which several of the Palestinians and others were killed.)

It should also be noted, on the other hand, that the Lebanese Communists did not join a leftist coalition of pro-Iraq Lebanese Baathists, Trotskyites, Maoists, and even a remnant of the old *Parti Populaire Syrien,* which united with a large fraction of the Palestinian movement and the governments of Iraq and Libya in a "rejection front" after Egypt and Israel signed a disengagement accord in January 1974 in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. This "front" opposed the idea of a negotiated political settlement with Israel, as advocated by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and supported by both the Soviet Union and the United States.

In general, the Lebanese Left has in recent months moved away from international issues such as the Palestinian cause—despite the deterioration of the overall situation in the Middle East and the danger of a new Arab-Israeli war. Instead, it has concentrated on "bread-and-butter" issues, such as the runaway inflation afflicting Lebanon's free-enterprise economy, the need to modernize the sectarian system of Lebanese politics, political nepotism, and corruption.

The Future

From these four case studies, one can draw at least three broad conclusions. To begin with, friendly relations between the USSR and the governments of specific Arab countries have tended to bring the Communists in the latter lands visible gains in stature and position. At the same time, they have imposed inhibitions and restrictions on the activities of the local Communists in ways that have made the Communists exceedingly vulnerable to the caprices of the Arab regimes at all times and notably when Soviet-Arab relations have cooled. This situation has produced tension and discord among the local Communists and led to the fragmentation of Communist ranks in most places, the ultimate result being a weakening of the Communists as a political force.

What, then, are the prospects for Communists in the Arab world? To attempt to answer this question, one must bear in mind that, as our four cases studies have shown, the Arab world today contains three types of Communists, not just one. All three are present to a greater or lesser degree in the other key Arab states that we have not explicitly examined here—for example, Algeria, the Sudan, and South Yemen (which is important because its ruling party, the National Liberation Front, has established one of the most authentically radical regimes in the world).

The first type is traditional, orthodox, and Moscow-oriented. Good illustrations would be the Bagdash Communists in Syria and the Iraqi Communist Party. While these two groups have recently acquired a small share of ruling power, the influence of Communists of their general persuasion has never been substantial in most Arab countries and has by and large declined over the years since Egypt's expulsion of Soviet military advisers in 1972. Such Communists are literally nonexistent in countries—like Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the wealthy oil states of the Persian Gulf—where the constitutions and the regimes have an especially strong Islamic flavor. In "progressive" states such as Syria and Iraq, they now find themselves under some degree of challenge from nationalist-minded Communist elements (*e.g.,* the Riad Turk group in Syria). And in Egypt particularly, they have to compete with a younger New Left among the students and with the fanatical Islamic radicals of the Right (such as the pro-Libyan Muslim fanatics who attacked the Cairo military technical academy in April 1974 in an effort to spark a coup against Sadat).

The second type of Communists might have been called "Maoist" ten years ago, when the People's Re-

CORRECTIONS

In Raymond L. Garthoff's article, "SALT and the Soviet Military," published in the January-February 1975 issue, the Editors wish to correct the following errors:

P. 31, col. 2, line 7: "standing SLBM buildup" should read "steady SLBM buildup."

P. 32, col. 1, line 17 from bottom: "were not without" should read "were met without."

P. 32, col. 2, line 12 from bottom: "SS-19's and SS-18's" should read: "SS-17's, SS-19's, and SS-18's."

P. 36, col. 1, line 22: "planning meetings" should read "plenary meetings."

Also, in the picture caption on p. 28, Konstantin A. Trusov should have been identified as Lt. General instead of Colonel General.

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public of China seemed to be inspiring all those revolutionaries who opposed the Soviet line, but in 1975 they have a more parochial, local look. Communists of this sort—of which the group implicated in an anti-Nasser plot in Egypt in 1965, just before Nasser dissolved the Egyptian Communist Party, affords a good example—evince more concern with the eradication of what they view as abusive local capitalism than with foreign issues, including even the conflict with Israel. In general, such Communists seem to have increased in number in recent years, though their ranks remain thin and their influence slight.

The third type of Communists are of the armed terrorist variety. Perhaps the best illustration is the Arab Communist Organization, whose main activities have been terrorist attacks against symbols of the established order or the Western presence (*e.g.*, American banks, British supermarkets, and the American University of Beirut). Thus far, such Communists have had no great impact in the Arab world, though they could constitute a threat to existing Arab governments in some period of high stress and anti-Western feeling—such as another Arab-Israeli war or a renewed oil embargo against the West—by carrying on sabotage operations or individual acts of terrorism, perhaps in temporary alliance with the Palestinian resistance movements.

With the rise of Arab oil and financial power and the emergence of non-Communist local elements determined to make the Arabs a world economic and political force, the positions of all three kinds of Communists, never strong anyway, have visibly deteriorated, and this trend seems likely to continue in the immediate future. In the more affluent states like Kuwait, where annual per capita income now exceeds that in the United States, communism in any form has no ideological appeal at all. In countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, whose rulers are known for their visceral anti-communism, Islam, which serves as a state ideology as well as a religion, remains a formidable barrier. In "progressive" states like Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, "Arab socialism" has turned out to be a pragmatic version of state capitalism—*i.e.*, industrialization is carried out under various mixes of private and government ownership. Only in South Yemen, which prior to its attainment of independence from Great Britain in 1967 was one of the poorest countries and had one of the most feudal social structures in the entire Arab world, do Communists at the moment appear to enjoy fertile soil for the propagation of their ideas.

It should be pointed out, however, that the prospects for the three sorts of Arab Communists might improve in the event of another major conflict in the Middle East—either a war between Israel and the Arabs or an "oil" war in the Persian Gulf (especially a conflagration acting out one of the scenarios that Western interventionists concerned about the possibility of the "strangulation" of the Western industrial countries have visualized), or both. For instance, there are signs that a fifth Arab-Israeli round of hostilities, if it comes, would prove more savage, though perhaps not longer, than the last four have been, and just as politically inconclusive. It would also probably see major damage inflicted on Western interests and those Arab elements most involved with these interests—particularly if the Arabs were to impose an oil embargo or employ their huge financial holdings as a weapon against the West. This could in turn bring about the collapse of regimes like those of Sadat, Assad, and the Iraqi Baath, as well as of the monarchies of the Arab oil countries, and thus lead to a more widespread radicalization of Arab society. While Moscow would not necessarily gain influence under these circumstances—particularly should the USSR again fail to save the Arabs from military defeat—the local Communists might well benefit significantly from such a development. Even so, however, the Communists seem likely to remain, at best, a highly variable integer in the arcane algebra of power in the Arab world and—with the rise of the Arab states as a consequential new bloc in the international arena—of global power.

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Spanish Communism in the 1970's

By Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon

The serious illness which struck Francisco Franco last summer and the uncertainty surrounding his succession have underlined the increasing political instability in Spain during recent months. Not only has the jockeying for power among various groups within the ruling elite now begun in earnest, but, to complicate matters, the opposition to Franco's 35-year-old rule has continued to grow and has become bolder. One element of this opposition—the *Partido Comunista de España* (Spanish Communist Party—PCE)—deserves particular attention. Operating illegally since 1939 and for much of that time having more members outside Spain than within,[1] the PCE has built its political base around the unofficial trade union movement known as the *Comisiones Obreras* (Workers' Commissions), and since the late 1960's it has emerged as the best-organized opposition force, one that will probably play a significant role in post-Franco Spain.

The PCE's commitment to broad coalition politics in the struggle against Franco and its "pluralist" vision of socialist society have no doubt helped it to put across the image of a force committed to "democratic" change in the Spain of tomorrow.[2] But if the Spanish Communists have been accepted by many opponents of Franco's regime as legitimate partners, the most important reason for that acceptance has been the independent (and at times highly critical) posture that the PCE has assumed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union since August 1968. This independent stance, which represents quite a shift from the traditional subservience and unconditional obedience associated with the Spanish Party, led the PCE to the brink of a total rupture of relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and caused serious strains within its own ranks.

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The Origins of the Rift

Although it would be appropriate to date the PCE's adoption of an independent position from the party's criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is nonetheless clear that Spanish Communist reactions to that summer's events were the result of a complex process which had its roots in the 1950's. A detailed examination of the interplay between internal and international factors in that process is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to note that the shift from an unconditional pro-

[1] Estimates of PCE membership strength vary. In a Dec. 17, 1970, interview with *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt), party Secretary General Santiago Carillo claimed 100,000 members. At a press conference in Paris last June, he declared: "The US State Department, in a memorandum intended for high-ranking US officials, attributes to the Communist Party 30,000 members. This figure is far short of the mark. A newsman mentioned the figure of 150,000. The answer is much closer to the latter figure than the former." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report, Western Europe,* June 3, 1974, p. O1. *The New York Times* (Nov. 17, 1974) attributes 12,000 members to the PCE. The broad discrepancy is partly explainable, of course, by more or less restrictive definitions of what constitutes membership, but *The New York Times* figure is likely nearer the mark than the party estimate.

[2] The PCE has repeatedly stressed its intention to construct a "pluralist" socialist society. What it has left ambiguous is the role an opposition may play in this "pluralist" context. A close reading of PCE documents indicates, however, that an opposition, if tolerated, will have its activities carefully circumscribed. On this last point, see, among others, Santiago Carrillo, *Nuevos Enfoques a Problemas de Hoy* (New Approaches to Problems of Today), Paris, Editions Sociales, 1967; and *Libertad y Socialismo* (Liberty and Socialism), Paris, Editions Sociales, 1971. Also of interest is an article by Juan Diz entitled "Political Liberties and Socialism," *Alkarrilketa* (Paris), Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 13-15, which opposes the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 but supports that of Hungary in 1956.

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Soviet stance was heavily influenced not only by the leadership's conscious efforts to make the PCE acceptable to other opposition forces but also by the personality and generational clashes that shook the party in the 1950's.

By the mid-1960's, a change in the PCE's orientation had become discernible. The Spanish Communist leadership moved to strengthen its ties with the independent-minded Communist parties of Italy and Romania, and in early 1966 no less a figure than the Secretary General of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, criticized Soviet violations of the norms of socialist legality in the case of Yuli Daniel and Andrei Siniavski.[3] Just as important in the long run were the steps taken by the Spanish leader in two books—*Después de Franco, Qué?* (After Franco, What?—1965) and *Nuevos Enfoques a Problemas de Hoy* (New Approaches to Problems of Today—1967)—to disassociate the PCE (appropriately enough with lengthy quotations from Lenin's works) from what was "purely Russian in the Soviet revolution": the repression of political liberties and the implantation of a single-party state.[4]

The "Prague Spring," which began with the removal of Antonin Novotny as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968, gave the PCE leadership an unprecedented opportunity to emphasize the differences between its conception of socialism and that of Moscow. The Spanish Communists supported the democratization of Czechoslovak society, believing that the renovating dynamism of Czechoslovak communism offered a chance to recover what Santiago Carrillo called the "ideological offensive."[5] Shortly after the new Prague regime's "Action Program" appeared in April 1968, Santiago Alvarez, a member of the PCE Executive Committee, not only expressed hearty approval for the reforms but went so far as to identify Dubcek's Czechoslovakia as "the type of socialist society which, given our concrete conditions and experiences, we think we must have in Spain."[6]

Given this perspective, the PCE leadership no doubt followed with growing concern Soviet efforts to restrict the scope of the Czech reforms over the summer of 1968. Certainly, the PCE publicly supported French Communist attempts to defuse the burgeoning conflict when five members of the Warsaw Pact sent a letter to the Czechoslovak Central Committee in mid-July implicitly threatening military intervention if events were not brought under control.[7]

The invasion found Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibárruri, the PCE president, on vacation near Moscow. The next morning, these two, along with Luigi Longo, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and Giancarlo Pajetta, a PCI Politburo member, met with Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Soviet Politburo. During the conversation, Suslov reportedly turned to Carrillo and remarked with ill-disguised curtness that the latter's objections to the intervention carried little weight: "After all, you represent only a small party."[8] On August 23, *Radio España Independiente*, the Spanish Communist radio transmitter (which was at the time apparently situated in Czechoslovakia but was subsequently moved to Romania) broadcast the PCE's official condemnation of the invasion, although a majority of the Executive Committee evidently did not gather and approve a formal declaration until the beginning of September.[9]

That the PCE, a small and clandestine party, dared challenge the CPSU so openly over Czechoslovakia was noteworthy. What is more significant, however, is that the PCE has not backed down from this challenge at all, preferring instead to deepen many of its initial criticisms. In this regard, it stands in marked contrast, for example, to the *Partido Comunista Portûgues* (Portuguese Communist Party), which described the intervention as "dictated by the overriding necessity of the defense of the socialist regime in the entire socialist community and of the peace of Europe."[10]

[3] Fernando Claudín, "The Split in the Spanish Communist Party," *New Left Review* (London), No. 71, November-December 1971, p. 76. A slightly abridged version appeared in *Il Manifesto* (Rome), December 1970, pp. 61-72.

[4] See especially *Nuevos Enfoques a Problemas de Hoy*, pp. 140-65. The quotation may be found on p. 140.

[5] Santiago Carrillo, "The Struggle for Socialism Today," *Nuestra Bandera* (Brussels), Supplement No. 58, June 1968, p. 41.

[6] *Mundo Obrero* (Paris), No. 11, May 1, 1968. This extract is from a lengthier quotation in Claudín, *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

[7] See FBIS, *op. cit.*, July 23, 1968, p. XI, for a commentary broadcast by the PCE radio station, *Radio España Independiente* (Radio Free Spain), July 21, 1968.

[8] *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 23, 1970. This incident is recounted in a lengthy article by K. S. Karol.

[9] *L'Humanité* (Paris), Sept. 7, 1968, reprinted the text of the declaration, stating that the PCE Executive Committee had approved it on Aug. 28, 1968. But a pamphlet written by Enrique Líster, then a member of the Executive Committee, casts doubt on this assertion, claiming that a majority of the Executive Committee did not convene until Sept. 6, 1968. See *Basta!* (Enough!), Paris, n.d. The decision to condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia was seemingly taken by only five or six members of the PCE's highest policymaking body.

[10] Radio Free Portugal broadcast of Sept. 25, 1968, in FBIS, *op. cit.*, Sept. 27, 1968, p. X2.

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In mid-September 1968, the Central Committee of the PCE met (probably somewhere in France), and over the objections of Eduardo García, secretary for organizational matters, and Agustin Gómez, who was responsible for the party's affairs in the Basque provinces (Euzkadi), it voted overwhelmingly (65 to 5) to ratify the Executive Committee's statement condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[11] But it is doubtful that at this juncture anti-Soviet sentiment in the Central Committee was actually that strong, and even more doubtful that it represented the feelings of the rank and file. As an editorial published in the party newspaper *Mundo Obrero* and broadcast into Spain over *Radio España Independiente* in late 1968 admitted, the party was having difficulty convincing both "old and some young" members of the correctness of its policy with regard to the Soviet intervention.[12] This was hardly surprising in view of the long history of unconditional support for the USSR on the part, especially, of the older rank-and-file members of the PCE. Their prolonged clandestine status and isolation from other Spanish political forces had served to preserve the tendency to identify the actions of the Soviet Union with the best interests of the international Communist movement.

Growth of Internal Dissension

Despite his support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, García was allowed to retain the post of PCE Organizational Secretary until April 1969, when he was compelled to resign from the Central Committee. A month later, Agustin Gómez was, in turn, ousted. These developments were not announced by *Radio España Independiente* until the end of July,[13] and they were not reported by *Mundo Obrero* until October.[14] The inordinate length of time that it took the party to convey the news formally to its organizations suggests that some behind-the-scenes maneuvering must have been taking place.[15] By mid-December, García had, at any rate, moved to a position of open factionalism, drafting an Open Letter and circulating it among Spanish Communist émigrés in the USSR.[16] To the Carrillo leadership, this was the last straw, and it responded by convening a Central Committee meeting in late December 1969 which voted to expel García and Gómez for their "factional activity."

Several members of the Central Committee, among them Enrique Líster, opposed this decision. That Líster, a noted veteran of the Spanish Civil War and one of the most prominent figures in the PCE, was moving toward a clear oppositionist stance

Enrique Líster, currently leader of a dissident faction of the Spanish Communist Party, pictured in July 1938 when he was a colonel commanding Loyalist troops in the Guadalajara region during the Spanish Civil War.

—Wide World.

[11] Guy Hermet, *Los Comunistas en España* (The Communists in Spain), Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1972, p. 75. The text of the Central Committee resolution was broadcast by *Radio España Independiente* on Oct. 14, 1968. See FBIS, *op. cit.*, Oct. 16, 1968, pp. X1-2.

[12] FBIS, *op. cit.*, Jan. 3, 1969, p. X2.

[13] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1969, p. X1.

[14] *Mundo Obrero*, No. 17, Oct. 7, 1969.

[15] Enrique Líster has revealed, in the wake of his expulsion from the PCE, that delegations from the party's Central Committee conferred with Eduardo García on several occasions between April and October, the last time just as the issue of *Mundo Obrero* containing the announcement of his resignation was being distributed. See *Basta!*, p. 64.

[16] Claudín, *loc. cit.*, p. 90.

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was revealing, for he would not in all likelihood have done so unless he had received some assurances of support from the Russians, with whom he had been in close contact since 1968.[17] He had, it should be pointed out, voted with the majority favoring the PCE's original condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; moreover, although sympathetic to García and Gómez, he had not begun to oppose Carrillo openly until mid-1969. But during the latter part of 1969, his dissatisfaction with Carrillo's leadership had deepened, and in January 1970 he characterized Carrillo's management of party affairs as a "caricature of democratic centralism." [18] Thereafter, he was excluded from most Executive Committee activities, although his formal separation from the PCE's highest body did not come until May.

Líster was ousted from the Central Committee at a special meeting in September 1970. Aware of the weakness of his position (especially after Carrillo had enlarged the PCE's ruling body by coopting 29 new members), Líster and two of his supporters—Jose Bárzana, who was in charge of the PCE's financial affairs, and Celestino Uriarte, leader of the PCE in the Basque provinces—stalked out shortly after the meeting began.[19] Two other members of the Central Committee—Jésus Sáiz and Luis Balaguer, leaders of the PCE organization in the USSR, who had not yet arrived at the meeting—joined them later. The party leadership reacted to this new challenge with none of the indecision which had characterized its handling of the García-Gómez affair. It expelled Líster and his four companions, accusing the Civil War veteran of "total duplicity" in his dealings with the leadership. An unsigned article in *Mundo Obrero* reminded Líster that he had originally voted to accept García's resignation as well as to expel Gómez. It also maintained that Líster's words and actions exuded what it called the "repugnant smell of Beria," and it described his faction's position as "devoid of any political ideas and consisting of slander and insults." [20]

Immediately after his expulsion, Líster joined forces with García and Gómez. The first issue of their newspaper, which appeared a few weeks later (using the same name as the regular party journal but with the *Mundo Obrero* printed in red rather than black), accused Carrillo of "opportunist deviations of the right and of the left" as well as of "systematic violations of democratic centralism." [21]

The support that Carrillo received from "La Pasionaria"—as the 79-year-old president of the party, Dolores Ibárruri, is known—played no small part in his ability to blunt the dissident challenge. Increasingly shunted aside by the new leaders emerging in the late 1950's, Ibárruri nonetheless remained the foremost living link with the PCE's historic past and a valuable asset to whichever group could win her support. Her role at the September 1970 plenum, as the official *Mundo Obrero* willingly conceded, was "decisive" in quashing the Líster revolt.[22]

The CPSU and the Spanish Challenge

The Soviet decision to endorse the challenge to Carrillo's leadership[23] should not be seen as simple retaliation against Spanish Communist criticism of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia—after all, most European Communist parties had voiced similar disapproval. It was more a reflection of Moscow's concern over the PCE's determined efforts in the years after 1968 to devise a theoretical framework within which the party could justify a position of autonomy and independence.

For example, an article written by Santiago Carrillo and published in the PCE theoretical journal

[17] Lister, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[19] Hermet, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[20] *Mundo Obrero*, No. 15, Sept. 30, 1970. It would be wrong to presume from the relative ease with which Carrillo handled Líster's challenge that the latter enjoyed no significant support within the party. The mere fact that Carrillo had decided to coopt new members for the Central Committee suggests that the pro-Soviet, or what might perhaps better be labeled the anti-Carrillo, forces were not as powerless as the various votes taken after the invasion of Czechoslovakia might seem to indicate.

The distinction between an "anti-Carrillo" and a "pro-Soviet" position is not unimportant, for as subsequent events were to demonstrate, not all the dissidents could be classified as die-hard "pro-Soviets." Much of Líster's support—if we assume that such support did in fact exist—may have come from Communists who objected to Carrillo's leadership, not so much because he criticized the Soviet Union but because they felt that his doctrinal "softness" was out of place in a militant "Bolshevik" party. In contrast, García and his followers may have been more concerned with correcting what they perceived as Carrillo's erroneous course than with effecting a radical change in leadership. So long as the CPSU openly encouraged anti-Carrillo activity, however, the dissidents did not have to distinguish between these two aspects of their critique and could unite.

[21] *Mundo Obrero* (dissident—Paris), No. 1, September 1970.

[22] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 19, Nov. 27, 1970.

[23] There is, of course, no evidence available to substantiate the charge that García and/or Líster received direct subsidies from the Soviet Union. However, both Spanish and Italian sources have indirectly made the point, and it seems reasonable to suppose that García and/or Líster did in fact benefit from such subsidies. See *Hora de Madrid* (Madrid), Supplement No. 3, June 1971, and *Rinascita* (Rome), Vol. 27, March 20, 1970, p. 30.

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Nuestra Bandera in the fall of 1968 sought to explain not only the military intervention in Czechoslovakia but also the Sino-Soviet conflict in terms of Marxist theory. Carrillo noted the existence of something akin to a "cold war" among the socialist countries, and he laid the blame for this and other problems dividing Communists at the door of ruling Communist parties, which, he declared, were influenced, as often as not, by "reasons of state" rather than by proletarian internationalism. While admitting the duty of every Communist to defend the accomplishments of the "socialist community," he insisted that under no circumstances should nonruling Communist parties become "satellites of one or another socialist state." Blind allegiance would not help to overcome the international Communist movement's "present difficulties." What was required was not a "directing center or a common discipline" but recognition of the need for each Communist party to elaborate its strategy independently—that is, "to reaffirm its national personality." [24]

Dolores Ibárruri, President of the Spanish Communist Party, pictured at a June 1974 party rally in Geneva, Switzerland.

—Keystone.

Carrillo's article, like his speech to the June 1969 Moscow Conference of Communist parties,[25] only suggested the origins of the "present difficulties." He left to others the task of making that fundamental point explicit.

With that purpose apparently in mind, *Nuestra Bandera* in 1970 published two articles, one by Juan Diz of the PCE's Executive Committee, the other by Ernest Martí of its Central Committee.[26] Both authors attributed the stagnation and crisis of the international Communist movement to the "monolithic and authoritarian tradition" inherited from Stalin. Stalin's "despotic authoritarianism," they argued, had affected not only the Soviet party but all other Communist parties, which in the post-Lenin period had become little more than "executive organs" repeating and assenting to the dogma which emanated from above. While many other parties had arrived at a similar conclusion in the years after 1956, seldom had their official spokesmen been as blunt in stating it.

Competition for Backing

To buttress its position in the face of the combined international-intraparty challenge confronting it, the Carrillo leadership moved to broaden the PCE's base of support within the world Communist movement. In 1969 and 1970, party representatives met with delegations from no fewer than nine countries, including Cuba, Japan, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. To a lesser or greater degree, all these parties shared one characteristic: they, like the PCE, were interested in increasing the margin of their independence from Moscow. But while the Spanish Communists received limited endorsements from at least most of these foreign Communist parties, only the maverick parties of Italy and Romania truly gave the PCE substantial backing.

[24] "More Contemporary Problems of Socialism," *Nuestra Bandera*, No. 59, Third Trimester 1968, pp. 41-53, in Santiago Carrillo, *Problemas del Socialismo* (Problems of Socialism), Paris, Colección Ebro, 1969.

[25] *Scintela* (Bucharest), June 15, 1969.

[26] See Ernest Martí, "Ideological Problems and the Cultural Front," *Nuesta Bandera*, No. 64, Second Trimester 1970, as translated in FBIS, *op. cit.*, Aug. 27, 1970, pp. X1-4, and Sept. 3, 1970, pp. X1-4; Juan Diz, "The Anti-dogmatic Struggle," *Nuesta Bandera*, No. 65, Third Trimester 1970, pp. 73-81. Excerpts of Martí's article may be found in *Le Monde*, Nov. 4, 1970.

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The relations of the Spanish Communists with their Italian counterparts, always close, grew closer after 1968. When open dissident activity broke out in the PCE, the Italian Communists left no doubt as to where their sympathies lay. A few days after the expulsion of the first pro-Soviet Spanish faction (the one led by García and Gómez), a PCE delegation headed by Santiago Carrillo visited Rome. Shortly thereafter, *Rinascita,* the PCI's political weekly, published an article by Central Committee member Renato Sandri endorsing Carrillo's handling of the split.[27] In October 1970, a few weeks after Líster's expulsion, the PCI rendered a similar show of support. [28]

Subsequently, the Italians went a good deal further than this. In one notable case, the PCI enlisted the assistance of Vittorio Vidali (also known as Carlos Contreras), Political Commissar of the famous Fifth Regiment during the Spanish Civil War. In June 1971, Vidali wrote Líster an open letter (published in the official *Mundo Obrero)* in which he declared that the dissident activity "objectively served the class enemy." [29] Much to Líster's distress,[30] Vidali later in the same year went to Cuba and took a very active role in defending Carrillo against the dissidents' effort to win support among the Spanish Communist émigrés there.

Not surprisingly, the PCE's other staunch ally proved to be the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). *Scinteia*, the PCR daily, published the entire text of Santiago Carrillo's speech to the June 1969 Moscow conference, an honor also accorded only to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer.[31] In December 1970, it also republished a blistering *Mundo Obrero* critique of Líster's activities.[32]

Meanwhile, the struggle between the regular party organization and the dissident group was moving into high gear. The dissidents, striving to overcome their well-publicized (though perhaps not well-deserved) image as nothing more than a Soviet pressure group, embarked on a course aimed at wresting international recognition from the official

Spanish Communist chief Santiago Carrillo meets with Keng Piao of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee during an October 1971 visit to Peking.

—Photo from *Mundo Obrero* (Paris), Dec. 10, 1971.

party. To do this, they first needed to "authenticate" themselves, and the best way to accomplish that end was to convene an "official" party congress. This congress, held in April 1971, formally ousted Carrillo and his supporters and elected a new Central Committee.

Next, in May 1971, Líster attempted to use his position as an incumbent member of the Presidency of the World Peace Council (WPC) to gain entrance for the dissidents to a World Peace Congress scheduled for Budapest. Acting in concert with Líster, the pro-Soviet organizers of the affair offered to seat the regular PCE delegation, led by Spanish poet Rafael Alberti, a Lenin Peace Prize laureate, as joint representatives of Spain along with delegates from the dissident group. Alberti refused the offer and withdrew his delegation from the Assembly. This bold step met with partial success: although Líster kept his seat on the WPC Presidency, the new World Peace Council posts allocated to Spain did not go to members of either delegation.[33]

Another facet of dissident activity involved émigré

[27] "Recent Vicissitudes of the Spanish CP," *Rinascita,* Vol. 27, Feb. 6, 1970, pp. 10-11.

[28] *Ibid.,* Vol. 27, Oct. 23, 1970, pp. 23-24.

[29] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 14, July 15, 1971.

[30] See his report to the dissident group's Fourth Central Committee Plenum in *Nuestra Bandera* (dissident—Paris), April 1972, pp. 68-69.

[31] *Scinteia,* June 15, 1969.

[32] *Ibid.,* Dec. 8, 1970.

[33] *Mundo Obrero* (dissident), No. 15, June 1-15, 1971.

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Spanish Communist groups in the USSR, Eastern and Western Europe, and Latin America. Although the pro-Soviet faction obtained some backing from Spanish exiles in the Soviet Union and in France, the regular party organization still retained the allegiance of the great majority there. It was in the Spanish Communist groups in Cuba and Mexico that the Líster-García organization found the greatest sympathy and came closest to wresting control from the regular party. The Spanish Communist émigré organization in Mexico, for example, held its Ninth Conference in May 1972, and at the conclusion of the conference it approved a political resolution which accused Carrillo of "opportunism." [34] Despite encouragement from supporters of the dissident faction, however, the conference did not decide to sever all ties with the regular party. (The dissidents' inability to persuade the émigrés in Mexico to join their ranks, it should be noted, was symptomatic of a serious defect in their strategy. Even those persons predisposed to agree with the substance of the dissidents' criticisms of Carrillo saw in their challenge too great a threat to the "unity" of Spanish communism and feared that a bitter, prolonged intramural struggle would only result in the PCE's self-elimination from the Spanish political process.)

In the wake of the World Peace Congress in May 1971, the regular PCE organization responded to the efforts of the dissidents (and their Soviet backers) on a broad front. Meeting in Belgrade shortly after the congress, the party's Executive Committee declined an invitation to attend the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS).[35] This decision coincided with the publication of an article entitled "On the Use of Marxist Method" by PCE ideologist and international affairs expert Manual Azcárate. Formally a critique of a document adopted at the Czechoslovak party's December 1970 Central Committee meeting, the article represented, in fact, no less than a direct challenge to all Soviet justifications for the August 1968 invasion. "Was socialism in danger?" Azcárate asked rhetorically. "To say yes," he asserted, "is not only to laugh at truth but also to insult socialism." [36]

In June 1971, the PCE followed up these verbal thrusts with a demonstration of the party's mass following. It organized a huge rally, held at Montreuil Park in Paris, which was attended by some 50,000 people, mostly Spanish immigrants.[37]

A month and a half later, not long after a Spanish delegation headed by Santiago Carrillo had arrived in Romania, the PCE made its boldest move, releasing in Bucharest a statement reporting that it had had "positive results" in its efforts to reestablish relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[38] In October, the Italian Communist newspaper *l'Unità* announced the presence in Peking of a Spanish Communist delegation.[39] At its head was Santiago Carrillo. He was accompanied by Gregorio López Raimundo, Secretary General of the *Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya* (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia—PSUC), the Catalonian branch of the PCE; Santiago Alvarez, Secretary General of the Galician Communist Party (PCG); Koldo Exteberri, Secretary General of the Basque Communist Party; and Ester Blanco—all members of the Executive Committee.

This visit marked the first time that a nonruling Communist party had resumed relations with Peking after severing them in the heat of the Sino-Soviet polemics in the early 1960's. Although it concluded without producing a joint communiqué, and although the Spanish delegation did not manage to meet with any more important figure than Keng Piao, head of the CCP's Central Committee section on relations with foreign Communist parties, Carrillo was more than willing to accept the partial snub, for the trip itself captured, as no other symbolic undertaking could have, the independent and major role the PCE had assumed in the international Communist movement. Specifically, it tied in neatly with Spanish Communist efforts to develop a "new" unity in the movement which would not be based on proletarian internationalism *qua* unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union. A *Mundo Obrero* article in early December 1971 reiterated the party's position:

There must be no guiding party or ruling center. No party has the right to impose its views on another or to interfere. Each party has its own form and methods of action which are different from someone else's.

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[34] *Ibid.*, No. 43, Oct. 1-15, 1972.

[35] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 12, June 15, 1971.

[36] For the contents of the article, see FBIS, *op. cit.*, May 28, 1971, pp. X1-2; June 4, 1971, pp. X1-2, and June 14, 1971, pp. X1-2. See also Kevin Devlin's "Spanish Communist Leader on the Lessons of Czechoslovakia," Radio Free Europe *Research*, No. 1760, April 5, 1973.

[37] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 13, June 26, 1971.

[38] *Scinteia*, Aug. 7, 1971. It was appropriate that the announcement should be made in Bucharest, for there is every reason to believe that Romanian President Ceausescu, who had recently visited Peking (in June 1971), had helped to bring about the formal reconciliation between the two parties.

[39] Report in *Le Monde*, Oct. 1-2, 1971.

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There are general principles we regard as essential to arrive at a new unity—a unity of diversity of the Communist movement and of anti-imperialist forces.[40]

The Official Eighth Congress

The spectacular "foreign policy" triumphs of which Carrillo might boast, however, could not negate one aspect of the dissident critique of his leadership: that no party congress had been held in more than seven years. To remedy this situation, the official Spanish Communist Party finally convened its own version of an Eighth Congress in October 1972. The 104 delegates present elected a 118-member Central Committee,[41] a 24-member Executive Committee,[42] and a seven-man Secretariat. Santiago Carrillo delivered the main report in the Central Committee's name. Essentially a reiteration of well-known features of the PCE's position, it coupled a call for solidarity with all 14 socialist countries with an appeal for a new unity of the international movement based on "respect for the independence of each party . . . [and] non-interference, *in word as well as in fact*, in internal affairs." [43]

The Congress also approved an 11-point political resolution. Its key elements were:

(1) solidarity with Vietnam (and not unconditional acceptance of CPSU positions) was "today the touchstone of proletarian internationalism";

(2) the conquest of political liberties in Spain was the party's principal immediate objective, and its attainment would cause the downfall of the Franco government;

(3) the PCE was inalterably opposed to Spanish membership in the European Economic Community given the present regime in Spain; but in the post-Franco era this would change, and the PCE looked forward to cooperation with other leftist forces to create a "socialist" Europe;

(4) all opposition forces should unite around a minimum temporary program (*Pacto Para La Libertad*), to include a provisional government, amnesty, political liberties, and elections to a constitutional legislature;

(5) party cadres should increase their political work among the more than one million Spanish immigrant workers in Western Europe; and

(6) the PCE's vision of a socialist Spain included respect for fundamental political liberties, plurality of parties, freedom of information and criticism, freedom of artistic and intellectual creation, and the renunciation of any attempt at imposing an official philosophy.[44]

The congress received fraternal messages from 37 parties, including the CPSU. (Of those which neglected to send greetings, the most important were the Czechoslovak, Albanian, and Chinese parties.) While the message from the pro-Soviet ruling parties were circumspect and by no means warm, they did at least acknowledge the PCE to be a legitimate expression of the Communist movement in Spain.

This concession so exacerbated differences within the dissident group that its ranks split in late 1972. The group's Central Committee met in January 1973 and voted to dismiss Eduardo García, Agustín Gómez, and Alvaro Galiana from their posts on the Executive Committee. The Líster faction, victors in the internal dogfight, criticized García and his followers for setting a "dogmatic-sectarian" policy whose objective, they claimed, was to turn the dissidents into a pressure group for the USSR. García, who continued to publish his own version of the party newspaper *Mundo Obrero*, in turn charged Líster with anti-Sovietism. Both accusations were patently absurd; nevertheless, they reflected the different notions each leader had of the role that the dissidents should play. García conceived that role as a catalyst to activate a broader movement to correct the Carrillo leadership's deviations, while

[40] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 23, Dec. 10, 1971.

[41] The previous Central Committee, numbering 110 members, is listed in *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 19, Nov. 27, 1970. However, the names of the members of the Central Committee elected in 1972 have never been published.

[42] The party has never published a list of the 24 members elected in October 1972, but one can identify at least most of them from references in official party publications. The following enumeration includes not only those individuals elected at the Eighth Congress but also those promoted (presumably by the Secretariat) in the two and a half years that have elapsed since that gathering: S. Alvarez, M. Azcárate, E. Blanco, M. Carmon Alonso, S. Carrillo, J. Calanda, M. Delicado, J. Diz, K. Exteberri, H. Fernández Inguanzo (arrested in May 1969), I. Gallego, J. Gómez, J. Ma. González Jerez, D. Ibárruri, A. López, G. López Raimundo, L.-L. Lebato Espronceda (tried and sentenced in 1971), V. Martín García, F. Melchor, R. Mondezona, A. Mije, R. Oroneta, J. Pereira Riquelme, M. Perez, E. Quiros, F. Romero Marin (arrested in April 1974), and V. Suárez. On this list, it should be noted, are two members of the previous Executive Committee who were in jail in October 1974 but were presumably reelected by the congress.

[43] *VIII Congreso del PCE* (Eighth Congress of the PCE), Bucharest, 1972, p. 16. Emphasis added.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 327-39.

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Líster (the documents his group published after the split confirm this) was against such a *passive* role and sought to fashion his own revolutionary, orthodox party in much the same manner that pro-Soviet Communists had "bolshevized" the old-time Socialist parties in the early 1920's.

Líster and his supporters (perhaps numbering only several hundred now) went on to convene an Extraordinary Congress in late June 1973 and changed the group's name to the *Partido Comunista Obrero Español* (Spanish Communist Workers' Party —PCOE). Reduced to relative impotence abroad, the PCOE decided to eschew émigré politics and concentrate its efforts on the struggle in Spain.[45] More recently, in one of those ironic twists of Communist politics, the PCOE has been considering an alliance with the *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico* (Revolutionary Patriotic and Antifascist Front), an umbrella organization formally founded in January 1974 and dominated by the Maoist-oriented *Partido Comunista de España Marxista-Leninista* (Communist Party of Spain—Marxist-Leninist).

The PCE in 1974

Thus, the PCE by the onset of 1974 had apparently weathered the worst of the dissidents' challenge to its legitimacy—a judgment seemingly confirmed in January by the willingness of the Brussels Conference of West European Communist parties to seat a PCE delegation as the representative of Spain.[46] But then, less than three weeks after the end of the conference, a highly polemical, anonymous article attacking the Spanish Communists appeared in the Soviet journal *Partiinaia zhizn* (Party Life). This article singled out four aspects of a report by Manuel Azcárate to a September 1973 Central Committee Plenum of the PCE for harsh criticism: (1) what it called "his incorrect and absurd thesis that there [were] contradictions between the state interests of the socialist countries and the interests of the revolutionary movement"; (2) his invectives against the Soviet socialist system, which, according to the piece, amounted to "spreading all manner of lies about the absence of democracy in the USSR"; (3) his outlook on the "problem of autonomy and equality of rights of the fraternal parties," which, the article declared, "includes not one ounce of proletarian interationalism"; and (4) his call—"which reeks with nationalism"—for a democratic and socialist Europe. What seemed particularly offensive about this last point was that such a Europe would evidently have "no ties whatever to the present socialist community." [47]

While the *Partiinaia zhizn* synopsis was a distortion of the Azcárate report, it by no means misrepresented the PCE's position on a number of issues. Most specifically, it accurately gauged the intent behind the PCE's call for a European model of socialism. The party had afforded insights into this (albeit in somewhat vague terms) on other occasions. Azcárate had, for example, alluded to a "common vision" among European Communist parties in his speech at the Eighth PCE Congress;[48] similarly, the PCE's Program Manifesto, released in October 1973, noted the "regional context" of the struggle for socialism in Spain and called for "coordination of the struggle for a democratic and socialist Europe." [49]

Just what Moscow's motives were in approving the publication of the article in *Partiinaia zhizn* is difficult to assess. The assessment becomes even more complicated when one looks at the joint CPSU-PCE communiqué issued in Moscow in October 1974 at the end of talks between the two parties.[50] The Spanish delegation was led by Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibárruri and also included Ignacio Gallego, Manuel Azcárate (whose report had triggered the polemic), Gregorio López Raimundo, and Federico Melchor. It had talks with a Soviet delegation headed by Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev. As the communiqué makes amply clear, the PCE repre-

[45] See Líster's speech to the PCOE's Second Central Committee Plenum in *Nuestra Bandera* (dissident-Líster—Paris), April 1974, pp. 3-35.

[46] The PCE had hoped that this meeting would help the various parties develop some sort of common platform on regional problems. See Santiago Carrillo, *Hacia el Post-Franquismo* (Toward Post-Francoism), Paris, Editions de la Librairie du Globe, 1974, p. 106. At the conclusion of the gathering, however, substantial differences remained between the parties, especially on the question of what attitude to adopt toward the European Economic Community.

[47] For the version broadcast by Radio Moscow, see FBIS, *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, Feb. 16, 1974, pp. A1-10. Azcárate's report may be found in *Nuestra Bandera* (regular), No. 72, 1973, pp. 15-30. For particularly valuable discussions of the Soviet article, see Kevin Devlin's "Soviet Attack on Spanish CP," Radio Free Europe *Research*, No. 2008, Feb. 27, 1974, and "Spanish CP Stands Firm Against Soviet Attack," *ibid.*, No. 2046, April 11, 1974.

[48] *VIII Congreso del PCE*, p. 202.

[49] *Programa Manifesto del PCE* (Program Manifesto of the PCE), 1973, p. 10.

[50] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 16, 1974. For an English-language version of the text, see FBIS, *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, Oct. 17, 1974, pp. E1-3.

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A July 1974 press conference of the Spanish Communist Party in Paris: to the left, Secretary General Santiago Carrillo; to the right, Central Committee member Manuel Azcárate, the party's chief ideologist and international affairs expert.

—Wide World.

sentatives' journey to Moscow was no pilgrimage to Canossa. For while the Russians made a major concession in implicitly disowning the splinter Spanish group and promising "to promote by every means an improvement in relations and mutual trust, even when different points of view exist on certain questions," there were no major concessions by the PCE. Only with respect to the Soviet policy of détente did the PCE alter its position. Whereas in previous years the Spanish Communists had criticized peaceful coexistence because it seemed to imply maintenance of the European status quo,[51] in the October communiqué the PCE agreed that the policy "not only [did] not restrain the class struggle and the activities of Communist parties in the capitalist countries but on the contrary created conditions more favorable for their development." [52] Yet caution is necessary even here, for the change may have had more to do with a subtle shift in Kremlin policy toward Europe than with a change of heart on the part of the PCE.

In any case, this chain of events poses a major question. If *Partiinaia zhizn* in February 1974 had accused Manuel Azcárate (and by implication the Spanish Communist leadership) of "siding with the declared enemies of the Soviet socialist system," [53] why in October did a Soviet delegation sign a joint

[51] See, for instance, *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 20, Dec. 7, 1972.

[52] See citation in footnote 50.

[53] FBIS, *Daily Report, Soviet Union,* Feb. 16, 1974, p. A5.

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communiqué with the same leadership group in a "spirit of sincerity and mutual understanding"? [54] What happened in the months after the *Partiinaia zhizn* article appeared that could have induced the Soviets to institute such a sharp reversal in policy toward the PCE?

There were in all probability two basic reasons for the turnabout. The first has to do with developments in Portugal. In April 1974, the Portuguese military overthrew the ultraconservative regime of Marcello Caetano in less than 24 hours. The rapidity with which the coup was accomplished and, more important, the apparent emergence of the Portuguese Communist Party as the strongest single political force in the country seemed to confirm something that Santiago Carrillo had been saying all along to the Russians: that the Iberian peninsula had potentially the most revolutionary situation in all of Europe, that the overthrow of the Spanish and Portuguese regimes would create very favorable conditions for the "democratic and progressive" forces of other European countries.

No less important was the evident deterioration of the Franco government's ability to rule. Two characteristics of the Spanish political situation stood out. First was the bitter conflict within the government (and more specifically within "Francoism") between "aperturistas" and "ultras." The "aperturistas" believe that the democratization of Spanish society within the context of the political structure inherited from Franco is not only possible but necessary—that it is, in fact, the only way of avoiding disastrous social and political conflict. In contrast, the "ultras," representative of the most conservative trend in Spanish politics, see the slightest deviation from pristine Falangism as a betrayal of the ideals for which Franco fought during the Civil War.

The conflict between the two groups, simmering for many years, became acute in 1974. After Admiral Carrero Blanco's assassination in December 1973, his successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, attempted to carry forward a program of limited reform (how limited is a matter of dispute) to include the establishment of "national political associations." [55] The overthrow of the government in neighboring Portugal in April gave his vociferous "ultra" critics (the most prominent of whom are José Antonio Girón, Blas Piñar, and the group called *Fuerza Nueva* [New Force]) an opportunity to point to events in that country as confirmation of what would happen in Spain if Franco did not snuff out all attempts at liberalization.[56] Franco's illness last summer exacerbated these tensions and ultimately resulted in the dismissal in October of Pío Cabanillas, the Minister of Information, and the subsequent resignation of Antonio Barrera de Irimo, the Minister of Finance.[57]

The second characteristic, particularly evident in the second half of the year, was the growth of opposition activity. As has already been mentioned, the PCE has a key role in this opposition. For years, the immediate objective of the Spanish Communists had been to bring about the overthrow of the Franco government through a broad alliance designed to include all opponents of the regime, regardless of social or political background. Santiago Carrillo was quite forthright on this point in an interview with *L'Humanité* in 1970. He declared: [The party will join] with no matter what Spanish political group, even with those who fought us in the past and with groups who will undoubtedly fight us in the future." [58] As the PCE saw things, the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of political liberties would be a relatively peaceful process: that is, it would take place not through a classic armed uprising but through a well-coordinated general strike (*huelga nacional)* which would paralyze the country.[59] The Spanish Communists did not expect the armed forces to play an active role in this undertaking. In fact, the fundamental thrust of their policy toward the military was to try to ensure its neutrality (defined as disengagement from the government).[60] Neutrality, of course, would have a potent anti-Franco dimension and thus would have the most serious domestic repercussions—as the PCE knew quite well.

Prior to 1974, however, Spanish Communist efforts to build a broad coalition of the forces opposed to Franco's regime had had little success.[61] But the growing government crisis created a more favorable environment for such efforts, and in July

[54] *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1974, p. E3.

[55] *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1974.

[56] *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Sept. 27, 1974.

[57] *The New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1974.

[58] *L'Humanité*, Dec. 3, 1970.

[59] See Carrillo's speech to the Eighth PCE Congress, in *Hacia la Libertad* (Toward Liberty), Paris, Editions Sociales, 1972, pp. 48-52.

[60] *VIII Congreso*, p. 234. For a recent reiteration of the PCE line on this issue, see Santiago Carrillo's July 1974 speech in Switzerland, published in *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 13, July 13, 1974.

[61] The only significant exception had been the creation in November 1971 of the Catalonian Assembly—a development that may be attributed as much to regionalism as to the skill of the Catalonia branch of the PCE.

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1974 Santiago Carrillo and Rafael Calvo Serer, the former editor of the newspaper *Madrid,* announced the creation of a *Junta Democrática* (Democratic Junta). Described by the PCE as a "temporary convergence of the working class and neocapitalist forces," [62] the *Junta* included various opposition parties and personalities—among them Calvo Serer, himself a prominent liberal monarchist and member of Opus Dei;[63] the *Partido Carlista* (the Carlist Party, made up of supporters of the pretender to the throne, Don Javier de Borbón Parma [since deceased] and his son, Carlos Hugo); the *Partido Socialista Popular* (the Popular Socialist Party, a small and as yet uninfluential group led by Enrique Tierno Galvan and Raúl Morodo). These elements had adopted a 12-point program which included the establishment of a provisional government, a general amnesty, legalization of all political parties, and separation of church and state.[64]

Conspicuously absent from the *Junta* were the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party—PSOE) and various Christian Democratic groups. Their representatives had entered into discussions with PCE leaders concerning participation in the *Junta* but had withdrawn shortly before its formation was announced.

The PSOE, after a period of marked decline beginning in the late 1940's, has grown rapidly in the last few years and constitutes the most significant Socialist group in Spain.[65] It will probably be the PCE's principal rival on the left. However, there is internal tension within the PSOE between the older members intuitively distrustful of the PCE and the younger cadres who, while cognizant of the great rivalry between the two parties, nonetheless see the PCE as the PSOE's natural ally in the struggle for socialism in Spain. An indication of this tension came last summer. After a Reuters news dispatch had reported the creation of a *Congreso Democrático* (Democratic Congress)—with purported Socialist and Christian Democratic participation—as a left-of-center alternative to the PCE's *Junta,* the PSOE leadership met and rejected involvement in the proposed alliance.[66]

Spanish Christian Democracy, another important opposition component, at present lacks the organizational strength of the parties of the Left and stands little chance of acquiring the preponderant political and social role in the post-Franco era that its Italian counterpart has had throughout most of the post-World War II period. In fact, the ideological diversity so evident among various Christian Democratic factions in Spain and the steady growth of Marxist influence among Catholic workers, intellectuals, and priests will almost surely prevent the emergence of a single, anti-Communist Catholic party. The importance of such an outcome to the PCE's long-term strategy is demonstrated by Santiago Carrillo's statement in November 1970 that socialism would come to Spain with a crucifix in one hand and a hammer and sickle in the other.[67]

Prospects

It is quite likely, then, that Moscow believes that Spain has entered a transitional period with respect to its political structure and that fundamental alterations in the present structure may occur in the not too distant future. Wishing to enhance their capacity to influence events in a major West European country, the Russians have therefore decided to swallow their distaste for the PCE's independent line—at least for the time being—and thus to effect the reconciliation made public in October 1974.

Evidently underlying the Soviet action is an assumption that the PCE possesses sufficient resources to have a key impact on the evolving situation in Spain. Does such an assumption seem valid?

There can be no doubt that the PCE enjoys significant domestic assets, especially because of its work in the Workers' Commissions, which appeared on the Spanish labor scene in the late 1950's and early 1960's. After an initial (and unsuccessful) attempt to harness this movement to the party, the PCE leadership reversed its course and instructed its militants to work as elements within the *Comisiones.* As a consequence, the PCE had by the late 1960's become one of the key forces in the illegal labor

[62] *L'Unità* (Rome), Sept. 6, 1974.

[63] Opus Dei is a secular-religious group founded in 1929 by the Aragonese priest José María Escrivá de Balaguer. It became especially influential in Spain after 1956, but its importance has declined since a ministerial change in the summer of 1973. Calvo Serer, a former secretary to Prince Juan Carlos, has been a prominent personality in the Order.

[64] See *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 14, July 31, 1974.

[65] It should be noted in this connection that delegates at the PSOE's Thirteenth Congress in October 1974 called for the formation of a federated party which would embrace the regional Socialist groups in Catalonia, Valencia, and Galicia. See *El Socialista* (Toulouse), No. 29, Oct. 15-31, 1974.

[66] *Mundo Obrero* (regular), No. 16, Sept. 18, 1974.

[67] *Le Monde,* Nov. 4, 1970.

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

This illustration calling on Spanish workers to go on "strike" (huelga) *accompanied a March 15, 1973, article on Workers' Commissions published in* Mundo Obrero, *the Paris-based journal of the regular Spanish Communist Party.*

movement, a position that was buttressed by an increasingly close collaboration between left-wing Catholics and Communists.

Other groups, however, have clout in the Spanish labor movement too. There is, for example, the *Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores* (Revolutionary Organization of Workers), which is very strong both in Madrid and Navarre. Three additional trade union bodies compete with the PCE from outside the *Comisiones,* and while it is fair to say that none is national in scope, each has a significant following in certain regions: the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (the General Union of Workers—the trade union branch of the PSOE) in northern Spain and in Madrid; the *Unión Sindical Obrera* (The Syndicalist Labor Union) in the Basque country; and the *Oposición Sindical Obrera* (Syndicalist Labor Opposition) in Madrid as well as in Valencia.

Furthermore, it is important not to overestimate the PCE's political strength. Much of it stems from the current weakness of the political Center in Spain, and this state of affairs could change if such people as Fraga Iribarne, José María de Areilza, and Pío Cabanillas manage to organize independent and "moderate" political associations.[68] That, in turn, depends on whether the most conservative Spanish elements succeed in preventing the Arias government from carrying out any political liberalization. So far, the "ultras" have been able to do so. Yet, recent developments tend to indicate that their power to maintain the status quo may be waning: in early March, Arias Navarro reshuffled his cabinet and ousted five ministers, including José Utera Molina, cabinet representative of the official state party, the National Movement, and Arias Navarro's most prominent critic within the government.

In addition, the military continues to retain its status as the most powerful force in Spanish society. Should the existing regime find itself increasingly isolated, the military might be tempted to intervene, and while a coup under the aegis of nationalist, left-wing elements cannot be ruled out—especially in the wake of events in Portugal last April—a putsch under quite different auspices appears more likely. Rightist groups do, after all, remain strong in the military establishment. The installation of rightist military government could, of course, prove highly damaging to the interests of the PCE.

[68] Iribarne, currently Spain's ambassador to Great Britain, served as Franco's Minister of Tourism and Information from 1962 to 1969 and has been especially active in the last few months in trying to found a broad, centrist political association. Also prominent in these efforts has been de Areilza, a well-known Spanish diplomat who has been ambassador to the United States (1954-60) and France (1960-64). Cabanillas, Minister of Tourism and Information from January 1974 to the following October, is one of the most popular Spanish personalities. See the poll published in *Informaciones* (Madrid), Jan. 20, 1975.

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Moscow and Bangladesh

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

In March 1974, the last two of eleven Soviet minesweepers which had been engaged in harbor-clearing operations in the shipping channel of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar left the waters of Bangladesh. The ships were part of a 20-unit fleet sent by the Soviet Union two years earlier, at the request of the new People's Republic of Bangladesh, to clear ports in the strategic Bay of Bengal of the mines and sunken ships left in the wake of the Republic's tumultuous birth in 1971. In two years, the Soviet fleet had salvaged 17 vessels, ranging from a 15,000-ton freighter to small coastal ships and barges—and what is more, it had carried out the entire operation free of charge. Yet, when the last of the Soviet ships left four months ahead of schedule, the Bangladesh government seemed more relieved at their departure than grateful for their services, while Soviet representatives were reportedly in a state of some aggravation. According to Calcutta's leading newspaper, *The Statesman,* some Bangladesh officials had begun to feel "rather uncomfortable" about the "prolonged presence" of the Soviet force, surmising that it might be one reason for China's continued refusal to recognize the new republic and maintaining that the Russians were using Chittagong as a " 'foothold' for keeping watch on the Indian Ocean." As for the Soviet view, the paper added:

The Russians . . . seem to feel unhappy that their good work in making Chittagong and Cox's Bazar ports safe and operational has not been much appreciated by the Bengalis. Soviet diplomats have informally regretted that some Bangladesh officials and politicians have been rather "unkindly." . . . Their disillusion, they say, is because they have done the salvage and minesweeping work . . . free of [considerable] cost, for which all they have earned is a bad name.[1]

The respective attitudes reportedly entertained in this instance are illustrative of a perceptible reserve in recent relations between Moscow and Dacca—a trend which at first glance may seem surprising in view of the USSR's crucial supportive role in the events leading to Bangladesh's independence and its early moves to befriend and assist the struggling new South Asian state. Against the complex backdrop of all the factors and forces which have affected big-, medium-, and small-power relationships in the subcontinent, however, the shift in the attitudes of both regimes is more understandable. The present paper will attempt to explain this shift in terms of the broader geopolitical considerations that have brought it about.

The Events of 1971

Soviet strategies in South Asia over the two decades up to 1970 have been explored in some depth in recent issues of this journal and need not be recapitulated here.[2] The springboard for the present discussion is Moscow's efforts during the

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[1] *The Statesman Weekly* (Calcutta), March 23, 1974.

[2] See William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972; and S. P. Seth, "Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives," *ibid.,* March-April 1974.

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1960's to achieve a more "balanced" role vis-à-vis the South Asian powers—specifically, to improve its relations with Pakistan while maintaining its long-standing friendship with India. A highlight of those efforts was Moscow's success in inducing Rawalpindi and New Delhi to suspend fighting over Kashmir in 1965 and to reach at least a temporary settlement of their differences at a conference convened in the Soviet city of Tashkent, with the USSR acting as mediator. Subsequently, Moscow negotiated an arms agreement with Pakistan. While the Soviet authorities failed in efforts to promote an Asian collective security system (an idea opposed by Pakistan and politely sidetracked by India) and were also rebuffed by Pakistan in a 1968 initiative to encourage regional economic cooperation, their quest for better relations with all of South Asia continued through 1970. This course was interrupted, however, by the traumatic events that overtook the subcontinent in 1971, starting with the outbreak of civil war in what was then East Pakistan in March and climaxing in another war between the Indians and the Pakistanis in December.

The civil war was the culmination of the long struggle of the Bengalis in Pakistan's eastern province—physically separated from the rest of the state by India's territory—to achieve political autonomy within a federal system and thus escape the traditional domination of West Pakistan.[3] The war was precipitated by the decision of former Pakistan President Yahya Khan to use military force to crush the Bengali movement and its political leadership, the Awami League, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which in turn declared East Pakistan's independence on March 26. In the ensuing conflict, hundreds of thousands of Bengalis were killed, and millions more took flight to India. Rahman himself was arrested and interned in West Pakistan.

Faced with the influx of some 7-10 million refugees, and fearful of the consequent threat to India's political stability and economic resources, New Delhi sought to enlist outside help in bringing pressure to bear on Yahya Khan to come to terms with the Bengalis. Moscow, fearing the consequences of chaos in the subcontinent, made the somewhat



Part of a Soviet task force, sent at the request of the government of Bangladesh, engaged in clearing mines and sunken ships from the harbor of Chittagong.

—Wittek for ADN-Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

extraordinary decision to issue a public message to Yahya Khan in early April 1971, urging him to halt the "bloodshed and repression" in East Pakistan and calling on him to reach a political settlement with the Awami League.[4] This act of intervention in what Pakistan regarded as its own internal affair established a limited convergence of Moscow's and New Delhi's immediate strategic interests. Allowing the Awami League to set up a government-in-exile on Indian territory, New Delhi committed itself to the creation of a "Bangladesh" (literally, Bengal nation) either within or without the state of Pakistan. For some months, this was also Moscow's objective.

From the Soviet point of view, there probably would have been advantages to a settlement between Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman establishing an

[3] United Pakistan, embracing territories primarily to the northwest but also to the northeast of India, was formally constituted as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, upon gaining independence from Great Britain. By 1970, the Bengalis in the eastern province comprised about 55 percent of the total population of Pakistan, although they occupied well below half of its territory and were treated virtually as a colony by the regime in the West.

[4] For the text of the Soviet message signed by Nikolai Podgorny (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) and for other Soviet pronouncements during the 1971 crisis, see "The Soviet Union and the Struggle of the Bangladesh People," *Soviet Review* (Moscow), Supplement, Jan. 18, 1972.

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autonomous Bengali province within a still united Pakistan. Such a settlement would have changed political alignments in the country, since the Awami League had won a solid majority of seats in the Pakistan National Assembly in the elections of December 1970 and was in a position to set up a government with a Bengali prime minister. Such an appointment would undoubtedly have led to a coalition of the League and the political leaders of the "have-not" provinces of the West, and thus to the isolation of the predominantly Punjabi military-bureaucratic power complex that had ruled Pakistan for 20 years and had tied the country into the United States' alliance system.[5] A political shift of this sort would no doubt have produced a regime responsive, at the least, to economic cooperation with India and more disposed to collaborate with the USSR.

Only when the prospects for such developments appeared doomed did the Soviet authorities agree to back Indian military action against the Pakistanis. Even after the signing of a 20-year Indo-Soviet pact of friendship and cooperation in August, accompanied by shipments of arms to India, there were signs that Moscow would have preferred to avoid an Indo-Pakistan confrontation. Not until September, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Moscow, did the Soviet authorities apparently agree to sanction Indian military intervention in East Pakistan should it become necessary.[6] By late fall the die was cast: increasing Indian military pressure along the borders of East Bengal caused the Pakistanis to retaliate with air and ground attacks in western and northern India, prompting New Delhi in turn to launch a full-scale operation against Pakistani troops in the east. In this situation Moscow stood firmly behind its Indian ally, three times vetoing a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, as well as supplying the necessary military hardware for a quick victory. On December 16 the Pakistani army was forced to surrender, and the independence of the People's Republic of Bangladesh became a *de facto* reality.[7]

Soviet Theory and Strategy

Moscow's support of the Indian intervention in Pakistan constituted a momentous decision for the Soviet leadership. It committed the USSR to the dismemberment of a sovereign state and to a radical redrawing of the political map of the South Asian subcontinent. India's intervention was different from other such actions in the past in that it was made not on behalf of a government in power but on behalf of a revolutionary force opposing the "legitimate" regime; it was also the first intervention undertaken by a medium-level power to meet with success.[8]

In the Soviet view, it was important to provide a theoretical justification for Moscow's support of India: the result was a modification of Soviet doctrine to defend the Bengali insurgency as a struggle for "national liberation," which, in Soviet theory, is as legitimate as class struggle. A recent formulation of this notion from a Soviet military source states:

Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, for liberation from exploitation and from national oppression or in de-

[5] India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Bangladesh Documents*, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 237-77. The minority party leaders rallied around the Awami League in March, directing their fire mainly at Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the largest party in the West and the one with the firmest base in the Punjab. They rejected Bhutto's concept of "two Pakistans," for they feared that the PPP would impose a Punjabi domination of the smaller provinces and strongly opposed the revival of "One Unit," the administrative integration of the four West Pakistani provinces that Ayub Khan had instituted earlier. See *Dawn* (Karachi), March 16, 1971. For the negotiating position of the minority parties, see *ibid.*, March 21 and 23, 1971, and *Morning News* (Karachi), March 25, 1971.

For a comprehensive account of the events of 1971, see the writer's chapter, "The Subcontinent," in William Griffith, Ed., *When the Great Powers Realign*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, publication scheduled for the fall of 1975.

[6] Reporting evidently on the basis of an official briefing, Dev Murarka summed up the results of Mrs. Gandhi's conversations with the Soviet leaders in this fashion: "In the first place the Soviet side has stopped the impression of ambiguity [on the Pakistan issue], which it did before Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow. In the second place, the Soviet side, in spite of its known and strongly expressed preference for peace, has accepted the idea that, if unavoidable, India can take very firm steps in East Bengal without being concerned about Soviet support at any level—political, economic or otherwise." See "Two-Fold Gains for India," *Western Times* (Ahmedabad), Oct. 16, 1971.

[7] Concerning the events on the subcontinent in 1971, the most useful analysis written from the Indian point of view is probably Mohammed Ayub and K. Subrahmanyan, *The Liberation War*, New Delhi, S. Chang & Co., 1972, pp. 156 ff. For a revealing and perceptive Pakistani account of the events, see G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan: Emergence of Bangladesh*, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, forthcoming. Among the most incisive analyses by American scholars, see Norman D. Palmer, "The New Order in South Asia," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1972, and "South Asia and the Great Powers," *ibid.*, Fall 1973; and Barnds, *loc. cit.*

[8] It should also be noted that the upheaval in East Pakistan imposed an enormous burden of economic and social responsibility on India, a medium-rank power with serious problems of its own—a situation which again has no parallel in recent history.

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fense of its state sovereignty against an aggressive attack, is a just war. . . . The main types of war rarely emerge in "pure" form; several types often intertwine and one type changes into another. . . . National liberation wars of oppressed peoples against colonialists may go hand in hand with civil war against internal reactionary forces.[9]

The notion that the Bengali rebellion was a struggle for national liberation justifying outside intervention startled and disturbed many Third World governments with divisive national or ethnic problems of their own. In public statements, Soviet spokesmen seemed to make an effort to quiet such fears, claiming that other countries had been misled (by the Americans and the Chinese, *inter alia)* about the situation in Pakistan and alluding to the extreme nature of the geographic and ethnic absurdities that had characterized united Pakistan.[10] At the same time, the Soviet position was clearly intended to serve notice that Moscow had the capability as well as the will to intervene in Third World conflicts on behalf of forces of national liberation and "progressive social changes."

While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Soviet references to the justness of Bangladesh's cause—indeed, the Soviets had for years expressed sympathy for the Bengalis' aspirations—it is also clear that theoretical considerations were probably the least important factor involved in Moscow's decision to support India's intervention in Pakistan.

The overriding impetus behind Moscow's course was, most certainly, the Soviet perception of the realignment of world forces brought about by the diplomatic and political breakthrough achieved in 1971 between the United States and the People's Republic of China. In Soviet eyes, this breakthrough posed an enormous threat, strengthening the PRC's hand vis-à-vis the USSR and also enhancing the

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, is welcomed by Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev during a March 1972 visit to Moscow.

—V. Musselian for TASS via Sovfoto.

United States' ability to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict in strategic maneuvering. The immediate consequence was to enhance India's importance to the Soviet Union and the USSR's importance to India.[11] Since the mid-1950's, the basic aim of Moscow's pro-Indian policy had been to strengthen the country as an Asian counterweight to China; by the winter of 1971, with US President Richard Nixon in effect offering China a "legitimate sphere of influence" in Asia, it became all the more necessary to ensure that India—now treaty-bound to Moscow—emerge as the primary power in South Asia, and

[9] *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army: A Soviet View,* Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972, pp. 70 and 88; republished in the United States under the auspices of the US Air Force.

[10] The apprehensions of the Third World countries were reflected in the voting in the UN General Assembly on an Argentine resolution of Dec. 7, 1971, calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to their own territories: 104 nations voted for the resolution and only 10 against, eight of them Communist countries. For a Soviet statement blaming the "unwarranted fears" of such nations on "American diplomacy," see Alexander Baryshev, *For Peace and International Security,* Moscow, Novosti Press, 1973, p. 64. The Soviets also took strong issue with the Chinese, who—predictably—debunked the "national liberation" theory and scored New Delhi and Moscow for interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. For a summary statement of the Chinese view, see *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 31, 1972.

[11] To quote an Indian source at the time: "Of all the powers, the Soviet Union must be the most anxious and worried over the Sino-US thaw, [for] the Soviets have not many friends in Asia. The complementarity of Soviet and Indian interests is also clear. Moscow would probably welcome a better and more meaningful dialogue with India and many other countries of the world. India can utilize this opportunity for a franker and healthier relationship to mutual advantage." V. P. Dutt, "Sino-US Relations and India," *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), July 31, 1971. See also Sisir Gupta, "The Great Powers and the Subcontinent," *Journal* (New Delhi, Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses), April 1972; and K. Subrahmanyan, "Power Growing Out of the Barrel of a Gun," *Tribune* (Ambala), July 27, 1971.

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to diminish the regional role of Pakistan. An independent Bangladesh separated from Pakistan, closely linked to India, and hence disposed to be an ally against a hostile China constituted a political asset of no mean consequence to Moscow.

For the Soviets, then, the importance of Bangladesh lay mainly in its impact on the balance of political power in the subcontinent. It is against this background that the course of Moscow's policies since the events of 1971 can best be understood. In the wake of the December war, the overriding objectives of Soviet diplomacy and strategy in South Asia became: (1) to restore stability in the context of a new balance of power based on Indian primacy; (2) toward this end, to promote normalization of relations among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; and (3) to minimize the opportunities for either the US or the PRC to play a part in such a process of normalization. These objectives imposed on Moscow the formidable task of helping the new Bangladesh nation onto its feet while simultaneously endeavoring to mend fences with Pakistan—without, in the process, hurting India's interests or sensibilities.



A Soviet-made 100-ton crane pictured at the site of the Ghorasal thermal power station near Dacca in September 1969. The USSR has continued to aid in this major project since Bangladesh became independent.

—V. Vavilov for TASS via Sovfoto.

Moscow's Relations with Dacca

The USSR's supportive role in the early months of Bangladesh's independence was expressed through a number of initiatives. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize the new nation as a sovereign republic, issuing a formal statement of diplomatic recognition on January 24, 1972,[12] just 12 days after Mujibur Rahman—newly released from prison by the Pakistani authorities and returned to Dacca—assumed the prime ministership of Bangladesh. Some two weeks later, on February 6, *Pravda* announced that Rahman had been invited to pay an official visit to Moscow. On February 7, the Soviet airline Aeroflot inaugurated a weekly Moscow-Dacca service, the first scheduled international route into Bangladesh. By March, the Soviet embassy in Dacca had a staff of 90, many of them fluent in the Bengali language. In the same month a 100-million-rupee ($12 million) trade deal was concluded, involving the exchange of Soviet materials and equipment for traditional exports of the area. Subsequent trade-and-aid negotiations resulted in a three-year pact guaranteeing yearly trade worth $435 million and a modest Soviet commitment to provide the equivalent of $39 million to finance projects in the state sector of the Bangladesh economy. In the next few months, the Soviet regime gave Dacca some aircraft for domestic flights, some helicopters, a small fleet of transport planes, and a squadron of MIG fighter planes; it also agreed to train pilots for the Bangladesh air force.[13] Finally, the Russians offered limited help in the fields of irrigation, flood control, oil exploration, and communications, and they showed particular interest in completing the Ghorasal power project near Dacca, which they had begun four years be-

[12] Interestingly enough, on the same day Peking withdrew its diplomatic staff from Dacca.

[13] *The Asian* (Hong Kong), March 12, 1972; *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), Jan. 24, 1972. See also Sunanda Dutta-Ray, "Sheikh Mujib Returns to Crisis in Dacca," *Daily Star* (Beirut), Sept. 19, 1972.

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fore. Bangladesh also signed trade agreements with Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Almost from the first, however, it was clear that the Soviet authorities had no wish to assume a major role in the affairs of Bangladesh. They politely turned down an Indian suggestion in December 1971 that they sign a treaty of peace and friendship with the newborn nation; instead they presumably promoted and later publicly welcomed a 20-year treaty concluded between Bangladesh and India. The terms of this treaty were arranged between Mujibur Rahman and Mrs. Gandhi during a four-day meeting of the two prime ministers in New Delhi in February 1972. Interestingly enough, however, the treaty was not announced until March, after Rahman returned from his state visit to Moscow.[14]

A joint communiqué issued after Rahman's conversations with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin lauded the USSR's "active and consistent support of the people of Bangladesh in their just struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland"—a struggle that had "revealed the true friends and foes of the People's Republic of Bangladesh as a new independent state" (an oblique reference, in the case of "foes," to China and the United States). The statement also spoke of the two governments' resolve to expand and deepen areas of economic, cultural, and political collaboration; identified areas in which the Soviets would help Bangladesh in "nation-building"; and provided for future contacts between political parties, youth organizations, and trade unions of the two countries. But the main importance of the communiqué clearly lay in its emphasis on the need for a rapid normalization of relations among and between the nations of the subcontinent, to be achieved through negotiations by the states directly concerned. An appeal was made to all "peace-loving countries" to "display vigilance and administer a determined rebuff to all attempts at outside interference" in the affairs of South Asia—a clear expression of Moscow's anxiety, shared in 1972 by both India and Bangladesh, to prevent China and the United States from playing a major role in the affairs of the subcontinent.[15]

What specific factors prompted the Soviet Union to adopt a low profile in the life of the new Bengali nation, leaving the leading role to be played by India? The geopolitical calculations that underlay Moscow's policies must certainly have been influenced, in the first instance, by certain economic and political considerations related to the internal situation in Bangladesh.

Internal Factors in Bangladesh

On the economic side, while initial Soviet trade and aid unquestionably provided a material boost to the new state, it quickly became clear that Moscow—confronted as it was by pressing demands from North Vietnam, its Arab clients, India, and others—was not prepared to invest large resources in Bangladesh. The problems faced by that nation were so enormous and its immediate and long-term needs with respect to relief and assistance so pervasive that, in order to play a significant role in "building" Bangladesh, the Soviets would have had to transfer a massive quantity of material, equipment, and technical personnel to the new state—a course which they apparently were not prepared to pursue.[16] Since its initial grants and gifts of 1972, the Soviet government has made no significant new aid commitments to Bangladesh. (It did, however, join other nations in sending emergency aid—specifically, 200,000 tons of wheat—in August 1973, when the country was faced with conditions of near famine in widespread areas.[17]) Trade—as opposed to aid—has continued at a fairly vigorous rate, but it still has not lived up to mutual expectations. A protocol signed in December 1973 provided for a 45-percent increase in the planned exchange of goods during 1974 over the level of 1973; however, actual trade fell short of that goal. There were rea-

[14] The India-Bangladesh peace and friendship treaty is modeled largely on the Indo-Soviet treaty of Aug. 9, 1971. For the text of the Dacca-Delhi accord, see the *Times of India* (New Delhi), March 20, 1972. For a perceptive commentary, see Girilal Jain, "The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty," *ibid.*, March 21, 1972.

[15] For a text of the joint declaration, see *Pravda* (Moscow), March 5, 1972.

[16] One measure of the critical conditions in Bangladesh is the poverty of its people. To quote from the government's annual plan of 1972: "Conventionally measured income per head stood at about Taka 450 (US $37.50) per year . . . at current prices in 1969-70, the most recent normal year. . . . The average income of the poorest 20 percent of the population during the same period was Taka 158 (US $20.00). . . . Nearly half of the population have serious deficiency in caloric intake. . . . Annual per capita consumption of clothing is less than 7.5 yards equivalent of coarse cloth, which means for the vast number of the poor little more than . . . a loin cloth or two. . . . Nowhere in the world is there anything like so much poverty shared by so many squeezed into so little a land area. . . ." Quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Dec. 16, 1972.

[17] See the text of a Radio Moscow broadcast in English, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report, Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Aug. 7, 1973.

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sons on both sides for this state of affairs: Bangladesh could not deliver goods in which the Russians were interested, and deliveries of Soviet capital goods were frequently delayed—partly because the output of Russian factories lagged behind schedule, but more often because Bangladesh was not ready to construct planned industrial units.[18]

On the political side, Moscow's broader geopolitical strategy precluded an obtrusive Soviet presence in the new republic. In the first place, India, having after all liberated Bangladesh, regarded its fledgling neighbor as its natural and legitimate sphere of influence, and the USSR was quite willing to indulge India's assertion of strategic sway over the country. Moreover, the rationale of Indian intervention had been the possibility that the development of a radical situation in East Pakistan would endanger the entire eastern flank of India—especially Calcutta, economically the industrial hub of northern India and politically the capital of the most radical of Indian states.

The Russians therefore suggested a political model for Bangladesh essentially similar to that which they advocated for India—that is, political collaboration between the "progressive" elements of the national bourgeoisie and the "democratic forces" (a euphemism for Communists and their allies) for the construction of a "state of national democracy."[19] The main problem was that the Awami League was not really a political party but a poorly-organized political movement, a loose and flabby coalition of a deeply-entrenched landed gentry and a relatively small urban middle class. Some 70 percent of the legislators who had been elected to the Pakistan national assembly and the East Pakistan provincial legislature on the Awami League ticket in December 1970 were erstwhile "basic democrats" of the Ayub Khan period (1958-69).[20] Mujibur Rahman himself was a moderate nationalist who had been driven to an extreme nationalist position by the avalanche of events. Given a free choice, he would probably have been satisfied with a largely autonomous Bangladesh within Pakistan; however, the determination of the Bhutto-Yahya Khan combination to deny the Awami League the fruits of its massive electoral victory, plus the volatile pressure of the students and youth of Dacca, had forced him to demand independence in the fateful days of March 1971.[21] As the leader of the new nation, Rahman proclaimed socialism as one of the country's four guiding principles, but this socialism was at best that of the British Labor Party and the Indian National Congress.[22] His regime stood for gradual, incremental change, not for rapid, radical social transformation. While it started with a sweeping nationalization program, the institutions and industries affected—banking, insurance, the jute plants, and so on—had all been under West Pakistani ownership; furthermore, it attached relatively little importance to land reform on the ground that no big landlords supposedly existed in Bangladesh.[23]

If the Awami League was not a cohesive, purposeful political party, the "democratic forces" in Bangladesh were rudimentary. The Bangladesh Communist Party (BCP) had been banned for 20 years, and in 1971 it boasted only a skeletal, underground urban organization, although the Communist Party of India (CPI) had tried to give military training to newly-recruited youthful cadres of the BCP in the latter half of 1971 because both groups were eager for the BCP to play a significant role in partisan warfare against the Pakistani army. More active and prominent was the BCP's front body, the pro-Moscow National Awami Party faction (NAP-M) led by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed.

Prior to Bangladesh's acquisition of independence, the CPI, presumably with Moscow's approval, had urged the Indian-based Awami League leaders to form a coordinating committee with the BCP as

[18] Interview with officials of the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Trade in December 1974.

[19] For an elaboration of the Soviet development model for India, see this author's "India's Rival Communist Models," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1973, pp. 1-15.

[20] During the Ayub Khan period, the "basic democrats" constituted the electoral college for the election of the President and members of the National Assembly. Most of them were big or middle landlords and former local leaders of the Muslim League.

[21] During the political crisis of March 1971, Rahman was in effect cast in the role of defender of the unity of Pakistan—albeit with an autonomous Bangladesh—and Bhutto in that of splitter of the country. The prospect of East Pakistan's ruling over the whole of Pakistan by virtue of its numerical strength became a nightmare for Bhutto. Confirmation of this point comes from interviews with several Bangladesh leaders who had discussions with Bhutto in December 1970 and March 1971. An eminent Bangladesh barrister who tried to mediate between Rahman and Bhutto also told the author of a conversation he had with the Pakistani leader in January 1971 during the course of which Bhutto remarked with bold candor: "This geographical absurdity of Pakistan must be ended."

[22] The other three guiding principles were nationalism, democracy, and secularism.

[23] The Awami League election program included a promise of land reforms, but there has thus far been no distribution of land to the landless peasants, who make up some 20 percent of the population of Bangladesh.

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a forerunner of a coalition after "liberation." While leaders of the Bangladesh government-in-exile had rejected the proposal in that form, they had agreed to set up a cabinet-level consultative committee representing a broader spectrum of groups, including the BCP and the NAP-M; however, when Rahman returned triumphantly from solitary confinement in Pakistan and took over command of the government in Dacca, he refused to accord the BCP and the NAP-M even an informal association with the government. Moreover, the Awami League press failed to recognize any role of the Communists in the "liberation struggle." The CPI and the Soviet mass media, in contrast, tried to boost the image of the BCP by circulating highly inflated accounts of its exploits during the liberation war.[24]

In the ensuing months, both the BCP and the NAP-M became critical of the government for its nonradical policies and its acceptance of American aid.[25] But when elections to choose a new 300-member National Assembly were scheduled for March 1973, the two organizations approached the Awami League with the prospect of a united "democratic" front. Turned down by the AL, each group fielded its own candidates—but neither won a single seat in the election. The Awami League swept the polls, capturing all but eight seats in the assembly. Calling the election results "an impressive victory for the major forces in the national liberation movement," Moscow Radio—in a formidable stretch of the imagination—described the NAP-M as the "runner-up" in the race, although its total vote was just over one-tenth of that polled by the AL.[26]

In August 1973, a delegation of the BCP went to Moscow to confer with leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. It was agreed that the BCP and the NAP-M would now concentrate their efforts on achieving the unity of "democratic and national-patriotic forces."[27] In subsequent weeks, the two groups again approached the Awami League to propose the formation of a "popular united front" among the party organizations, though outside the government. This time, Mujibur Rahman—beset by vitriolic criticism from a motley of pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistani elements—accepted the proposal and himself inaugurated the front in October. In reporting this development, *Pravda* observed:

The long and difficult struggle for freedom and independence convinced the people of Bangladesh that only the united actions of all national-patriotic forces made it possible to achieve national independence. The two-year period of independent developments [since] has shown that this unity is also necessary now, at the important stage of building a peace-loving, democratic, independent state. That is why the broad, progressive public in Bangladesh considers the creation of a united front of the three parties to be an important step on the road to strengthening the independence and social gains of the young republic.[28]

Since its inception in 1973, the united front has had little impact or influence on the politics of the Rahman government, but the BCP itself has taken advantage of its link with the ruling party, however tenuous, to rapidly expand its membership and organizational sweep. By December 1974, it had more than 30,000 card-carrying members; it had extended its organizational structure to most of the towns of Bangladesh; and it had set up a peasant front, called the *kisan sabha,* in four districts.[29] Nevertheless, it should be noted that this growth in strength had come at the expense of the loss of the party's revolutionary image among the urban youth of Dacca. They now saw the party as a tail of the Awami League, which—because of widespread corruption and administrative inefficiency as well as the mounting crisis in the economy—had become highly unpopular with the general populace.

At the same time, the leadership of the BCP grew increasingly aware of the dangers inherent in too much of an identification with the Awami League and of the opportunities that the Bangladesh situation offered for the pursuit of a more radical course than it was following. In the latter regard, it was significant that on the third anniversary of the birth of the republic in December 1974 the national flag fluttered over only a few houses

[24] *New Age* (New Delhi), organ of the CPI, claimed on April 11, 1971, that the Bangladesh Communist Party had emerged as a leader of the freedom struggle. The same line was elaborated in I. Shchedrov, "The Story of Bangladesh Communists," *Pravda,* Jan. 24, 1972.

[25] See *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Dec. 23, 1972, and Jan. 15, 1973.

[26] Radio Moscow broadcast in English, FBIS, *op. cit.,* March 8, 1973. The Awami League received nearly 14 million votes and the NAP-M 1.5 million votes in the election. See *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 26, 1973.

[27] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 19, 1973.

[28] *Pravda,* Oct. 23, 1973.

[29] Interview with Moni Singh, the Chairman of the BCP, in December 1974.

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in Dacca. There was a deep pall of gloom, a sense of anguished frustration—not just because most commodities were beyond the reach of the common man and the city authorities were burying some 200 "unclaimed bodies" every week, but mainly because the government seemed to have lost a sense of direction. The economy had virtually ground to a halt, the treasury was practically empty, relations with India were anything but warm, law and order was at a breaking point in much of the country, and factional infighting appeared to have robbed the Awami League of the dynamism it had possessed during the freedom struggle and in the first year of the regime. In response to these difficulties, Mujibur Rahman was known to be contemplating a presidential system of government.

Consequently, the BCP—evidently with Soviet approval—came out in December 1974 with a new political model for Bangladesh. As Moni Singh, the leader of the BCP, explained this model to the author in the course of an hour-long interview, it was designed to generate political momentum for radical social change, vigorous mobilization of resources, increased production, and equitable distribution of national output. The model prescribed a presidential system of government. Under it, the President would appoint a cabinet of "progressive, efficient, and honest" persons drawn from the democratic parties. While there would still be a national assembly, it would have only limited power, and the cabinet would not be responsible to it. Speaking about the model, Moni Singh asserted:

Bangladesh has neither a strong capitalist class nor a class of big landlords. This makes it a very different society from that of India. We therefore need not live in a parliamentary system, which can only lead to stratification of the classes and which, in effect, legitimizes exploitation of the poor by the rich. The parliamentary system cannot but be a major roadblock to significant social change. What we need is an effective, efficient, honest, and ideologically sound government, a government of progressive and democratic forces under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Asked why he believed that Rahman would adopt such a political model and what the Communists would do if he did not, Mongi Singh replied:

We strongly believe that the force of circumstances will compel the Sheikh to adopt our model. The economic and political problems of Bangladesh cannot be solved through the parliamentary system. We have told him that if he adopted our model, we would do our best to make it a success. If he rejects it, we will fight for it, whatever the consequences.

Moni Singh admitted that the BCP and its allies were still not strong enough to force a major political showdown in Bangladesh, but he argued that "our strength is growing in the districts, among the workers and peasants and the middle classes."

The capitalist powers, Moni Singh continued, were neither willing nor able to lift Bangladesh out of its economic travails. However, he said, there are the socialist countries, which will give us all the help we need if we follow the correct political line and are able to mobilize our own resources to the maximum." Formulations in the BCP's Bengali weekly during the latter half of 1974 leave little doubt that the party expected the Soviet bloc to underwrite the development needs of Bangladesh



Moni Singh, Chairman of the Bangladesh Communist Party and member of the Central Coordination Committee set up by the Government of Bangladesh in autumn 1973.

—Sunil Kumar Dutt for Camera Press via Pictorial Parade.

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if Mujibur Rahman adopted the political model that the party advocated.[30]

Within a month of the author's interview with Moni Singh, however, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman dashed the hopes the BCP had placed in him. He suspended the constitution along with its fundamental rights, dissolved the national assembly, and assumed dictatorial power to deal with the political and economic emergency; yet the cabinet that he appointed consisted entirely of Awami League members. It was, in fact, the old cabinet with minor changes.

This was a rebuff not only to the BCP and the NAP-M, but also indirectly to Moscow. The BCP, nonetheless, continues to support Rahman's leadership, probably hoping that its model is not a dead issue but will still be adoptable whenever Rahman realizes—as it believes he must—that he cannot make the economy move without fundamental structural changes in the government.[31]

The Broader Focus

Besides the internal factors in Bangladesh that stood in the way of a deep Soviet commitment to the country, there were external considerations of substantial importance. During 1972-74, Soviet authorities undoubtedly calculated that a major effort on their part to subsidize the new state would impede an improvement in the USSR's relations with Pakistan. The staggering blow of Pakistan's defeat by India had toppled Yahya Khan from the presidency and led to the installation of a new, moderately "socialist" civilian government in Islamabad (the capital city since the 1960's) under the premiership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the Pakistan People's Party. As noted earlier, Moscow's overriding aim by 1972 was to promote a normalization of relations among India and the new governments in Pakistan and Bangladesh that would result in a stable balance of power in the region, with India enjoying primacy. The essential prerequisite of such a balance was rapid normalization of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh relations.

While this became the top Soviet diplomatic objective in South Asia, Moscow did not offer to mediate among the three neighbors, probably because it realized that such an offer would not prove acceptable to India and Pakistan. Instead, the Russians urged continuing Indian initiatives and publicly gave equal credit to both India and Pakistan for each measure that the three countries took toward normalization.[32]

An assertion of Indian primacy in the subcontinent, of course, required that New Delhi wrest diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh from Bhutto, but this is exactly what the Pakistani president refused to yield. Although the new Pakistani government tacitly recognized the reality of the loss of Pakistan's eastern province, Bhutto, in deference to public opinion in his demoralized and unsettled land, refused for some two years to extend diplomatic recognition to Dacca and in fact, with Peking's help, managed to keep Bangladesh out of the United Nations.

Nor did Bhutto evince any desire to be deferential to India. His first trip out of the country, very early in his administration, was a visit to Peking to demonstrate his intention to maintain Pakistan's close relationship with the People's Republic of China. At the same time, he kept channels open to the United States, while withdrawing Pakistan from the British Commonwealth in January 1972 (and some months later from SEATO). He did visit Moscow in early 1972, but he made it clear there that he would not be persuaded or pressured into attending a Soviet-sponsored conference such as the *tour de force* that Moscow had engineered at Tashkent in 1965.

Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did, however, agree to hold a bilateral conference at Simla in India in late June 1972, where settlement was reached on a number of their outstanding differences. The main problem that defied solution concerned the fate of some 93,000 Pakistanis (mostly military but some civilians) taken prisoner

[30] These formulations emerged with increasing clarity in *Ekata* (Unity), the weekly organ of the BCP. The writer has also learned from reliable sources that the BCP leadership had relatively easy access to officials in the Soviet embassy but no contact at all with the Indian High Commission.

[31] While *Ekata* did not uncritically welcome the sweeping political measures that Rahman adopted, it did express confidence in his leadership and persistently touted the BCP's own political model. See the issues during January and February 1975.

[32] See V. Nakariakov's commentary on the Simla agreement in *Izvestia*, July 6, 1972, and Arkadi Maslennikov's "With the Aim of Normalization," *Pravda*, June 3, 1972. Speaking at the 15th Soviet Trade Union Congress, Leonid Brezhnev emphasized the importance of Indo-Soviet friendship, but he hastened to add that "at the same time we are also for good relations with Pakistan; no contradictions in interests divide us from that country." See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 24, No. 12, pp. 1-9. Implicit in Brezhnev's formulation was a refusal to identify the USSR with the contradictions between Pakistan and India—a nuance that hardly escaped the notice of India's strategic planners.

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during the December war and incarcerated in India, some of whom the Rahman government wanted to try as war criminals and all of whom Dacca and New Delhi proposed to hold pending Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. As a result, the Bhutto government likewise delayed the repatriation of 150-200,000 Bengalis resident in West Pakistan at the time of war. For the next year and a half, the thrust of Soviet policy was to nudge India and Bangladesh toward compromise and toward a return of the Pakistani prisoners without retaliatory trials, while at the same time continuing to urge Islamabad's formal recognition of Bangladesh.

During 1973 Pakistan's ability to withstand Indo-Soviet pressures increased as a result of a number of developments: the Arab-Israeli war, which focused Moscow's attention on the Middle East as the most crucial area of concern; the spectacular rise of world petroleum prices, which severely undermined India's already troubled economic situation; the huge upsurge in the wealth and military power of both Iran (a champion of Pakistan's territorial integrity along its troubled northern borders) and Saudi Arabia (a traditional friend of Pakistan). All these factors contributed to a relative improvement of the position of the Bhutto government both in the subcontinent and at least temporarily within Pakistan.

It was from the platform of Islamic solidarity that Bhutto finally, at the urging of several of the Arab leaders, agreed to what he had so long refused: in February 1974, at an Islamic conference convened in Lahore, he announced Pakistan's recognition of the sovereign state of Bangladesh.[33] This opened the door to an eventual solution of the prisoner problem and to Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations by the fall of the year.

The events of 1973 and since have caused a subtle shift in the relationships between the USSR and the countries of South Asia. The stronger position of the Bhutto government has enhanced Pakistan's importance to the USSR, and both governments have continued—very cautiously—to cultivate better relations. Obviously, however, Moscow does not have enough leverage to bend Bhutto to a posture of cooperation. This situation seems to have created, for the first time since 1971, a shade of difference between Soviet and Indian perspectives on Pakistan.

Thus, when Pakistan announced its recognition of Bangladesh, the event was welcomed more warmly in the Soviet Union than in India.[34] In New Delhi's view, the right thing had happened in the wrong way. The fact that the Indian government had played no part in obtaining the recognition of Dacca long urged on Bhutto was no doubt frustrating. Moreover, the Indians were confronted by the scenario of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister of secular Bangladesh, attending the Islamic conference in Pakistan and speaking warmly of that country after his return to Dacca.[35]

Soviet and Indian perceptions of the Lahore conference itself also differed. The Soviets commended the conference for its anti-imperialist stance, its hostility toward Israel, and its support of a Palestinian homeland; Moscow Radio also publicized passages of an address by Rahman in which he urged closer cooperation between the Islamic nations and the socialist bloc.[36] In contrast, the predominant reaction of the Indian press and public was to treat the Lahore meeting as a pan-Islamic assemblage resulting in a further strengthening of Pakistan's relations with the oil-rich Arab kingdoms. While the government played down the Islamic content of the gathering, its apprehension was apparent in its advance admonition that Indo-Pakistan issues such as Kashmir should not be discussed by the conferees.[37]

Since Lahore, many Indians have begun to ask whether Pakistan might succeed in forming a common front with Bangladesh against India. While this prospect remains quite remote (as indicated by Bhutto's largely unproductive visit to Dacca in the spring of 1974), Bangladesh is now, at least theo-

[33] Bhutto was thus able to reassure his countrymen that he was conferring recognition on Bangladesh in deference to the wishes of the Islamic fraternity and not under pressure from India and the USSR. Moreover, by doing things in this fashion, he made an effective gesture to the Islamic sentiments of the Bangladesh people.

[34] For the Soviet reaction, see Radio Moscow Peace and Progress broadcasts in English to Asia, FBIS, *op. cit.*, Feb. 23 and Feb. 27, 1974. For India's reaction, see *The Statesman Weekly*, Feb. 23 and March 2, 1974.

[35] See Kuldip Mayar's interview with Mujibur Rahman in *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Feb. 28, 1974. Mayar wrote: "The Sheikh, who gave me an exclusive one-hour interview, was quite indulgent toward Pakistan, particularly Mr. Bhutto. This was in sharp contrast to his observations during an interview with me in the middle of 1972, when he mentioned Rawalpindi [the former capital] only to bemoan the barbarities committed against his people."

[36] For the Soviet perception of the Lahore Islamic conference, see Radio Moscow in English, FBIS, *op. cit.*, Feb. 25, 1974; and *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1974.

[37] *The Times of India*, Feb. 23-26, 1974.

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retically, in a position to improve its relations with Pakistan through direct contacts, without having to depend on the normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations. It is another of the ironies of the situation that after his return to Dacca from the Lahore conference, Mujibur Rahman offered to assume the role of mediator in the disputes and differences between Pakistan and India "in order to bring them closer to one another." [38]

Postures and Prospects

To return to the point where this paper began, what effect have all the interacting developments described above had on the attitudes of the USSR and Bangladesh toward each other, and what are the portents for their future relationship?

Moscow's public posture—to cite a statement quoted earlier from *Pravda*—is to treat Bangladesh as a "peace-loving, democratic, independent" Third World state.[39] This characterization is not merely rhetoric. In the Soviet perception, Bangladesh is "independent" to the extent that it has struggled—however ineptly—to launch out on its own course of economic development, without becoming overly dependent on the "capitalist-imperialist" bloc. It is "democratic" in that the government has allowed the Communists and their allies on the radical Left to function in freedom, in pursuit of their strategy to build a united front from above. Finally, it is "peace-loving" since it is not a member of a military bloc hostile to Moscow and its only security-oriented treaty is with the USSR's ally, India. (The Rahman regime no doubt earned a plus in Moscow's eyes when it permitted the convocation of an international peace conference in Dacca in May 1973, in support of the Soviet concept of a collective security system. Attended by delegates from 26 countries as well as from the World Peace Council, the conference received wide publicity in the Soviet news media.[40])

[38] See interview with Kuldip Mayar, *loc. cit.*

[39] *Pravda*, Oct. 23, 1973.

[40] See, *e.g.*, V. Shurygin, "Security in Asia," *Pravda*, May 29, 1973; and Radio Moscow in Russian, FBIS, *op. cit.*, June 4, 1973. The conference was addressed by Mujibur Rahman, who remained noncommittal about the Soviet Asian security proposal. See *Indian Express* (Delhi), May 31, 1973. The pro-Chinese press in Bangladesh perceived the Soviet concept as a military pact against China. See *Holiday* (Dacca), May 27, 1973. In a commentary on May 29, *Pravda* admitted that the conference saw "considerable difficulties" in the way of a collective security system, and put the blame on Peking.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership probably entertains some real reservations about the future of the regime in Dacca. Moscow—no less than other concerned governments—must be sobered by the enormity of Bangladesh's economic problems and the size of its development needs. On the political side, the volatile nature of domestic factionalism, the fragmented character of the Left, and the organizational flabbiness of the Awami League hardly invite confidence in the long-range stability of the government. The Soviet authorities may figure that the very dynamics of nation-building will bring about social and political polarization in Bangladesh faster than in India or Pakistan. In this prognosis, the left wing of the Awami League might break away and forge a united front with some of the leftist revolutionary forces—and, in time, Moscow might be able to help a radical leftist regime with more effective development aid.

On the side of Bengali opinion, it is quite evident that the popularity of the USSR in Bangladesh has waned somewhat over the past two years (as demonstrated, *inter alia*, by reactions to the Soviet minesweeping operation described at the outset of this paper). The decline in Moscow's standing can be traced to two main factors. The first is the already mentioned low level of Soviet economic assistance, which—it might be noted—has trailed behind the aid extended by India, the United States, and Canada. The second is the widespread sentiment against India in Bangladesh—New Delhi has taken the blame (quite unjustifiably) for almost everything that has gone wrong in the initial stages of Bangladesh's nation-building—and this ill feeling has been extended to the USSR as India's big-power ally.

It seems probable that Moscow is not unduly worried about the impact of either of these "popularity" factors, at least in the short run. In the case of aid, if the Soviets have chipped in less than their share, they also know that no massive doses of economic input are likely to be forthcoming from any other power. In the case of anti-Indian attitudes among the Bengalis, Moscow can feel fairly certain that Dacca will think twice before allowing popular sentiment to sway it from its course of alliance with India.

The latter problem does, however, affect another matter of deep concern to Moscow, and that is the future of relations between Bangladesh and China. While the Chinese played a key role in opposing the Bengalis' liberation struggle and in delaying the new republic's admission to the United Nations, a future rapprochement between Dacca and Peking

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is not beyond the realm of possibility. The Chinese have made a point of stressing that their opposition to Bangladesh's nationhood was not an expression of ill will against the Bengali leaders but a "principled" stand against the "aggressive" actions of India and the Soviet Union,[41] and in other cautious ways, Peking has signaled a tentative willingness to move toward friendlier relations with Dacca. In this situation, the current degree of anti-Indian feeling in Bangladesh has created a certain pressure on the government to look toward Peking—a pressure reinforced, if only marginally, by the agitation of disparate but vocal pro-Chinese elements in the struggling new nation.

For the time being, however, it seems highly unlikely that Mujibur Rahman could be pushed into any action that might seriously jeopardize his relations with either India or the USSR. Obviously, too, he must recognize the essential hostility of the pro-Chinese groups in Bangladesh to his regime. Thus, Moscow is probably counting on the wisdom of Mujibur Rahman to remain in the embrace of India—even if it poses embarrassments—rather than risk an embrace with China that could eventually and literally prove crushing.

To sum up, the importance of Bangladesh to the USSR continues to lie—as it has all along—in the new nation's role in Moscow's larger strategic scheme for the South Asian subcontinent. The scheme, as originally conceived, has run into difficulties; clearly, Soviet hopes for the subcontinent have suffered a setback in the last two years. India is no longer in the driver's seat in South Asia, its primacy undermined by its own economic problems and the slow and halting pace of its development, as well as by Pakistan's ability to resist its suasions. To the extent that a "normalization" of relations among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh has been achieved, it has not been primarily attributable to New Delhi's leadership.

Meantime, Iran has emerged in a regional role the future impact of which remains a question. There seems to be the possibility of a joint initiative by Iran and India to bring about closer cooperation among several of the South Asian nations—a move that could reduce the influence of all the big powers in the subcontinent. During the last couple of years, the Shah has extended $1 billion in credits and commitments for collaborative aid projects to India, $750 million to Pakistan, and $10 million to Bangladesh. He has met with Mrs. Gandhi twice in two years, and these conversations have apparently persuaded him that India does not harbor military designs with respect to Pakistan. In interviews with knowledgeable Iranians in February 1975, this author was told that while the Shah wishes to bolster Pakistan's internal stability and external security, he is most of all interested in peace and stability in the subcontinent based on normalization of relations among its four components (including Afghanistan). According to one reliable source, the Shah's long-term objective is to wean Iraq and India away from the Soviet fold and Pakistan away from the Chinese fold and to work toward a South Asian security arrangement excluding all major powers.[42]

While it is too early at this stage to speculate on the likelihood of such developments, one can say that Iran, with its economic power and its friendly relations with both Pakistan and India, can certainly play a stabilizing role in South Asia. Moreover, it may help Bangladesh reach out to the oil-rich governments of the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps most important, the March 1975 agreement between Iran and Iraq that resolved territorial and political disputes of 40 years' duration—an agreement warmly hailed in all the countries of the subcontinent—may have results of wider import. As long as India's relations with the United States and China remain poor and as long as Indians perceive these two powers to be befriending Pakistan, New Delhi will not be inclined to break out of the Soviet embrace—in which case Moscow will find the protection of its strategic interests in Bangladesh relatively easy. However, if Iran, with its close ties with the United States and Iraq, with its peace and friendship treaty with the USSR, jointly seize the initiative to move the countries of the region toward collaboration, the impact on the subcontinent, and in turn on the situation confronting Moscow, could well be profound. No wonder, then, that the Soviets are watching the dynamics of Delhi-Teheran-Baghdad relations with ill-concealed unease.[43]

[41] See, *e.g.*, *Peking Review*, No. 41, 1972. For a documentation of Chinese reaction to the events of 1971, see *China Report* (Delhi), Special Number on China and Bangladesh, November-December 1971.

[42] Amir Tahiri, "The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean: Perceptions of the Non-Arab Littoral States" paper presented at a conference on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, held in Teheran, March 25-27, 1975, under the auspices of the Institute of International Political and Economic Studies (Teheran). The Institute expects to publish this and other papers in book form in the fall of 1975.

[43] *The New York Times*, April 6, 1975.

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Books

Soviet Influence in the Middle East

By Arnold Hottinger

CHARLES B. McLANE: *Soviet Middle East Relations.* London, Central Asian Research Centre, and New York, Columbia University Press, 1973.
OLES M. SMOLANSKY: *The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev.* Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Bucknell University Press, 1974.
GEORGE LENCZOWSKI: *Soviet Advances in the Middle East.* Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February 1972.
JAAN PENNAR: *The USSR and the Arabs—The Ideological Dimension, 1917-72.* New York, Crane Russak & Co., Inc., 1973.
ARYEH YODFAT: *Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror.* New York and Toronto, John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
M. CONFINO and S. SHAMIR, Eds.: *The USSR and the Middle East.* New York and Toronto, John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
MAXIME RODINSON: *Marxisme et Monde Musulman* (Marxism and the Muslim World). Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1972.

HAS THE ATTEMPT of the Soviet Union to gain influence in the Arab world been a success or a failure? The seven books reviewed here provide a diversity of perspectives and considerable information on, if not a definitive answer to, this complex question.

A number of these volumes adopt the "international relations" approach to the topic and demonstrate the limitations of such a research strategy. If attention is focused solely on the relations between two or more states, one is able to accumulate accurate chronicles, but these may, at best, be of only modest use in evaluating present and future trends. As a chronicle, Charles B. McLane's veritable "atlas" of Soviet relations with Middle Eastern countries is exemplary.[1] Its short, concentrated texts, its chronological tables, and its extensive footnotes make this volume a fine working tool, and one would only wish that its coverage went beyond 1970. However, chronicles can be misleading; they provide little explanation for the inevitable twists and turns which occur in state-to-state relations. Oles M. Smolansky, by limiting himself to chronicling the "Khrushchev period" in Soviet-Arab relations (beginning with the Soviet-Egyptian—ostensibly the "Czechoslovak-Egyptian"—arms deal of September 1955 and concluding with the downfall of Khrushchev in 1964), is able to demonstrate the "essential failure" of the late Soviet leader's Middle East policies.[2] Yet, George Lenczowski, by extending his survey of Soviet policy in the region to the spring of 1971, arrives at the more conventional view, suggested by his title, that Soviet policy had indeed registered "advances" in the Middle East.[3] Had the author waited yet another year—to the expulsion of most of the Soviet military specialists from Egypt in July 1972—he might still have spoken of Soviet advances, but he would doubtless have placed more emphasis on factors limiting those advances. Even the collection of essays on relations between Moscow and various Arab states presented in the first part of the volume by Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir—originally presented at a symposium at Tel Aviv University in December 1971—gives little inkling of the surprising Egyptian action of July 1972, let alone of the October 1973 war in the Middle East.

Clearly, the chronicling of international relations does not suffice to answer the central question posed at the outset. To evaluate the success or failure of a particu-

[1] The McLane book constitutes the first volume in the series on "Soviet-Third World Relations," published by the Central Asian Research Centre.

[2] This book is the sixth volume in "The Modern Middle East Series," sponsored by the Middle East Institute of Columbia University.

[3] Lenczowski's work constitutes the second volume in the Foreign Affairs Study series published by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

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lar international policy, one must make numerous assumptions about the strategic goals, the political aims, and the priorities—as conceived by the respective leaders—of both parties to the "international relations" under examination, and one must also take into account shifts in these objectives and priorities. It is likewise necessary to assess what amount of material resources a given party deems a justifiable "investment" in pursuit of a tactical or strategic policy aim, *i.e.*, how far is the candle worth the game in the eyes of the player. (The outside observer, may, of course, draw his own conclusions in this regard.)

When such questions are raised, it becomes apparent that estimation of "success" and "failure" requires a complex analysis, one which must not be limited to an examination of "international relations." One must look deeper, into the interacting political value systems, the goals of the political actors in a given period, and the constraints—both physical and psychological—under which they pursue these goals. Foreign policy, in the final analysis, emerges out of the total political context.

UNFORTUNATELY, we have no "Kremlin tapes" from which to expand our limited knowledge about the character of the Soviet political value system. The best that we can do is to derive some notions of policy from ideologically-inspired statements and deduce global strategy from political actions. It is in terms of the former context that Aryeh Yodfat's study makes interesting reading, dull as the ideological disquisitions in the Soviet press may be in themselves. Yodfat, in effect, describes the yardsticks that Soviet commentators employ in evaluating developments in the Arab world. It is true, of course, that Soviet pleasure or displeasure at one or another Arab political move may not go far to influence Arab actions, but Soviet perceptions of such moves can get reflected concretely in Soviet decisions—such as whether to grant or withhold aid. Ideological appraisals of the Arab world also serve the domestic Soviet purpose of justifying the economic sacrifices entailed in granting economic and military assistance, or the risks taken in becoming involved in a given area.

It is also important to bear in mind that ideology does not tell everything. Apart from ideology there is always present (though not explicitly mentioned) an expansionist drive inherent in the Soviet system. Its presence can be guessed as the main motive force behind the concoction of such "ideological" inventions as "the direct road to socialism," "revolutionary democracy," or "the noncapitalist path of development." It is perhaps most transparent in the suggestion—forming an integral part of many such formulations—that in countries lacking a proletariat worth mentioning (and hence lacking the preconditions laid down by Marx for a socialist revolution), "the leading role of the working class can be realized indirectly by the socialist system" (Yodfat, p. 26), *i.e.*, that the Soviet Union is prepared to substitute itself for the missing proletariat in promoting the transition to socialism in these countries.

One must not, however, lose sight of the fact that as Soviet politicians pursue their goals through foreign policy, they are constrained by the fact that foreign relations involve interaction of the Soviet political value system with other value systems—in the present instance, those of the Arab states. Jaan Pennar's mercifully succinct book reminds us of this complex interaction by focusing on the ideologies opera-

Reviewers in This Issue

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LUIGI VALSALICE—pen name of an Italian diplomat, who writes frequently on current events, particularly on problems of East-West relations; author of *Guerriglia e Politica, L'esempio del Venezuela, 1962-69* (Guerrillas and Politics: The Example of Venezuela, 1962-69), 1973.

MATTHEW P. GALLAGHER—Soviet affairs specialist at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington); coauthor of *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of US Perspectives on the Arms Race*, 1972; and contributor to numerous journals.

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tive at both ends of Soviet-Arab relationships. We do, in fact, know a good deal more about the inner workings of Arab politics than of Soviet politics. In this regard, the essays in the second part of the Confino-Shamir volume offer some useful information and insights. Nevertheless, it is possible to know much more about the motivations of and constraints on Arab politicians than is presented in any of the books reviewed here. This is true because of the garrulous nature of even the most autocratic of the Arab regimes. One need simply make fuller use of available Arab-language materials such as the two recent volumes by Fuad Matar[4] or a host of articles in the better Arab press—all of which afford highly significant insights into the underlying value systems behind the facade of Arab "ideology."

AS SOVIET and Arab politicians seek to promote their respective value systems in mutual relations, the underlying differences in these systems manifest themselves in noncongruent political goals. The Arab leaders clearly recognize the Soviet quest for influence but see this phenomenon as a means for promoting distinct Arab ends. As a result, relations have a strangely tangential nature: what is secondary and often undesirable from Moscow's viewpoint is of primary importance to the Arabs, and what is essential to the Soviet Union is secondary and often unwelcome to the Arabs.

This disparity in policy goals can be demonstrated perhaps most clearly in the case of Soviet-Egyptian relations, where differences in aims were evident even in the early Nasser period. The late Egyptian leader's primary objective was to achieve Arab unity, with the solution of the problem of Israel being accorded second priority. For the Soviet Union, the chief aim in Egypt was probably to gain "influence." For Nasser, the essence of the game consisted in using Soviet power in a way which permitted him to approach the goal of Arab unification under his leadership and at the same time to minimize the expansion of Soviet influence in Egypt. For its part, Moscow concentrated on fostering economic and political developments in Egypt which would be consonant with the Soviet "socialist" model and which would, therefore, hopefully become vehicles for increased Soviet influence, and on minimizing the extent to which its backing of Nasser would help him advance his pan-Arab ambitions. Each of the parties had to make compromises and concessions in order to continue to deal with one other.

The disparate goals of Cairo and Moscow became the focus of critical differences between the two. Egypt found itself engaged in continuous and frequently acrimonious discussion with the Soviet Union over the question of Arab unity. For the USSR, the Egyptian Communists and their status inside Egypt proved a sensitive issue. On this matter, Nasser had to compromise in 1964 when he desired to bring about closer ties with Moscow and considerable increases in Soviet aid; however, while he let the native Communists out of concentration camps, he still kept them under surveillance and did not permit them to obtain positions of real power in Egypt.

Between the extremes of "Arab unity" and "a socialist structure for Egypt" lay the ambiguous realm of "Arab socialism." Nasser realized that there was, strictly speaking, no such thing as "Arab socialism": as he told the students once, there was only socialism for the Arabs.[5] But it was a political necessity to foster the fiction because of its convenient ambiguity. Such an appellation served to keep Moscow hopeful that Egypt continued to advance toward "Arab *socialism,*" while it simultaneously served to rally "progressive" Arabs to Nasser with its promise of "*Arab* socialism." For the more conservatively inclined Arabs, he even cooked up "Islamic socialism."

After 1967, a change occurred in Arab priorities and to some extent in Soviet priorities. The problem of Israel and the need to achieve some redress of the Arab defeat in the six-day war of June 1967 assumed utmost importance for the Arabs. Although the change in the Soviet case was not as dramatic, there was a new emphasis on gaining strategic bases for the expanding Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.

Under these new circumstances, Nasser tried to strike a new bargain: he now sought Soviet military backing for Egypt in its effort to recover military security and ultimately to gain revenge against Israel; in exchange, he offered military positions for the

[4] Matar's volumes (both in Arabic) bore the titles *What Has Become of Nasser in the Republic of Sadat* and *Nasserite Russia and Egyptian Egypt* and were published in Beirut in 1972 by Dar an-Nahar li-n-Nashr.

[5] This happened in August 1966 when Nasser spent several days in discussions at Alexandria with Egyptian students pursuing their studies abroad. See Peter Wald, *Die Vereinigte Arabische Republik* (The United Arab Republic), Hannover, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1969, p. 89.

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Soviet Union in Egypt. Cooperation on this basis reached its zenith in the spring of 1970, when Cairo obtained its missile umbrella against Israel and Moscow acquired naval and air "facilities" in Egypt.

We shall never know how the new arrangement would have evolved under Nasser, for he died shortly thereafter. As it was, Sadat succeeded Nasser, and—as Arab sources make clear—there was friction with the Soviet Union from the beginning of his rule.[6] Far from cementing relations between Moscow and Cairo, the 15-year USSR-UAR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on May 27, 1971, was viewed by Sadat as a manifestation of Soviet diffidence—as Sadat himself has since made frequently clear.[7]

The underlying cause for the tension, as in the past, lay in the disparate aims of the partners. The Egyptians wanted efficient Soviet aid for an eventual attack on Israel forces across the Suez Canal whereas the Soviet Union, having obtained its strategic facilities, was for a time content to sit back and enjoy them. Now the area of ambiguity no longer was "Arab socialism" (which Nasser himself had begun to dismantle as unpopular and inefficient) but "Soviet aid in military equipment and training." For Moscow, the stress was on "Soviet aid" (as a justification for a Soviet presence in Egypt); for Cairo, the emphasis was on "training and equipment." Although the most serious friction occurred between the respective military establishments, Sadat was forced to heed the resentments of his generals, and ultimately the military partnership was largely ended.

Of course, it should be noted that Sadat was concurrently becoming aware of an alternative political strategy too. This involved collaborating with Saudi Arabia and persuading King Faisal to use Saudi Arabia's decisive position in Middle East Oil production to influence the US and others to bring pressure on Israel to give up at least the territories that it had seized in 1967. Cairo's efforts to this end were accelerated by the 1973 war, which acted as a catalyst for strengthening Arab unity and permitted the use of the "oil weapon."

WHILE THE policies of the Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent have been less clearly shaped and much more volatile than those of Egypt, the aims underlying them have likewise failed to coincide with presumable Soviet objectives —*i.e.*, there has been the same "tangentiality" in the relationships of these countries with the USSR, only more confused, more mercurial, than in the case of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Most of the time, the Arab governments have had no clear political strategy and have merely contented themselves with political tactics designed to cope with the needs of the moment. The Soviet desire to gain "influence" has been made to serve these tactical and sometimes emotional goals. Several examples should suffice to demonstrate this fact.

In the late 1950's, after Abdul Karim Kassem had come to power in Iraq through a coup de'état, the USSR paid considerable attention to that country. Indeed, Moscow focused its efforts in the Arab world there, seeing for a brief period a possibility of major inroads. For his part, Kassem, fearing a loss of power to the Nasser-oriented Arab Nationalists in Iraq, turned to the Moscow-oriented Iraqi Communist Party for support. However, after the massacre of Kirkuk in July 1959, he became frightened of the CP and began to undermine it by recognizing a splinter group as the official Iraqi Communist Party.[8] Disillusioned, Moscow turned once again to Nasser as the best medium for expanding its influence in the Arab world. After a long hiatus, the Soviet-Iraqi relationship gained new life in 1972, when a close treaty of alliance was concluded between the two countries on April 9 as a result of an Iraqi initiative. At that time, the idea visibly dominating the thinking of

[6] Official speeches hint at the resentment of Sadat toward the Soviet Union. For instance, see his speech at the opening of the National General Congress of the Arab Socialist Union on July 24, 1972, French edition, Cairo, Ministry of Culture and Information, no date, pp. 80 ff.

[7] The point was made most clearly by Sadat in explanations given to the Executive Committee and later to selected journalists. After the 1967 defeat, Nasser had instructed Murad Ghaled, Egyptian Ambassador to Moscow, to discuss a treaty with the USSR, but Moscow had refused. In 1971, however. after the dismissal of Ali Sabry by Sadat, the Soviet Union sent President N. V. Podgorny to Cairo with an already prepared draft of a treaty in both Arabic and Russian and—to quote Sadat—"made it clear by this that they did not trust me" (see Matar, *Nasserite Russia . . .*, p. 24).

[8] On May 14, 1959, the first anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution, rioting broke out in Kirkuk between the conservative Turkmen townspeople of the old city and the pro-Communist Kurdish People's Resistance Militia of the suburbs. Kurdish troops sent to quell the troubles joined their countrymen, raised red flags over the city, and ruled Kirkuk for two days—July 15-16—after storming the local police station. The mutiny was finally quelled by armored units. Kassem was furious at the attempted insurrection and claimed to have proof that similar risings had been planned all over the country. The Communists were obliged to publish self-criticism, and Kassem moved to reduce their influence in Iraq. See George E. Kirk, *Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 161 ff.

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Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein Takriti (Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Assistant Secretary-General of the Baath Party) was the need for Soviet protection against the "capitalist world" and possible repercussions from that quarter in response to the Iraqi government's forthcoming nationalization of the Kirkuk oil fields (in June 1972) which had been developed by the Iraq Petroleum Co.

Turning to a second example, Syria, we find that Soviet prospects—through the vehicle of the Syrian Communist Party—looked promising prior to that country's unification with Egypt in 1958; however, the merger cut off that possibility. Not until the emergence of the radical Baathist regime in 1966 did new opportunities for Soviet-Syrian collaboration arise. At this juncture, the Syrians requested Soviet aid to pursue specific pan-Arab, anti-Israeli goals. The radical Baathists had adopted the then-new Palestinian ideas publicized by Yasser Arafat, and they wanted to turn Syria into an Arab North Vietnam from which the Fedayeen could operate in Viet Cong fashion against Israel. In April 1966, the Syrian government succeeded in getting a Soviet commitment to construct the Euphrates Dam. The radical Baathists hoped thereby to elicit Soviet political support as a cover under which to pursue guerrilla war against Israel, realizing—as every Arab knows—that establishment of a debt ties the creditor to the debtor. Although the policies of the radical Baathists led Nasser (and, indirectly, Moscow too) into the 1967 debacle, the Syrians persevered in their undertakings until the more prudent Hafez al-Assad came to power in the wake of Syria's failure to prevent King Hussein from cracking down on and expelling the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan in September 1970.

SUCCESS? FAILURE? What can we say about the results of the Soviet effort to expand Moscow's influence in the Middle East? In the realm of interstate politics, the picture is ambiguous. Clearly, Soviet influence has been less permanent and deep-rooted than most treatises written in 1971, at the apparent (though illusory) high point of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, assumed it was. Contrary to most expectations, the Arab governments have been able to invite the Soviet Union in or toss it out pretty much at will.

On the other hand, the USSR has become an important element in the various balances of power in the Middle East—inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli, and Israeli-big power. If Soviet representatives are asked to board their ships by one country, they are likely to be called back by another. Moreover, while Moscow may be at the mercy of successive coups and other changes of government, it can also look to this rapid turnover in leadership to provide opportunities for renewed collaboration.

However, it is important to remember that, as we have seen, collaboration has been a two-way street. Arab regimes have entered into close relations with the Soviet Union because they felt this was the best way to promote their own aims and programs at a given time, and to a surprisingly large extent, it has been the local regimes that have determined the objectives of cooperation and that have called off collaboration when the disparity between their aims and apparent Soviet intentions has grown too great.

The ability and willingness of the Arab states to achieve their own interests as they see them are enhanced by the fact that none of them shares a common frontier with the USSR, as well as by the presence in the Middle East of potentially countervailing US power. As long as these political realities exist and political instability prevails in the Arab world, one can reasonably predict a continuing Soviet presence in the region without the establishment of a permanent Soviet political foothold in any particular country.

But what of the battle for influence on the philosophical level underlying the kaleidoscopic Soviet-Arab interstate relationships? From his intimate exposure to both Marxism and Islam, Maxime Rodinson is able, in his book, to penetrate to the core of the struggle for the future of the Arab world—the intellectual battle over how to renew Arab Islamic civilization in order to restore its ability to dominate, rather than be dominated by, history without sacrificing its essential self. The question is whether Arab leaders and intellectuals think that Marxism holds the key to such a process of renewal. To this involved question, Rodinson provides thoughtful, if inevitably partial, insights. From his analysis, one gains the impression that Marxism is an important intellectual force in the Arab world but may not be the dominant one. Many of the most incisive of the Arab intellectuals incline toward Marxist ideas—some perhaps without realizing the depth and exact nature of their commitment. At the same time, many more identify with Arabism and Islam and tend to be very much aware of this aspect of their engagement.

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From Vision to Hindsight

By Luigi Valsalice

ROBERT G. KAISER: *Cold Winter, Cold War.* New York, Stein and Day, 1974.
CHARLES GATI, Ed.: *Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War.* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1974.
FOY D. KOHLER *et al.: Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence.* Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press, 1973.

ALTHOUGH the question of the origins of the "cold war" continues to hold a strong attraction for numerous authors, the many books published on the topic each year never succeed in settling the irreconcilable conflict between the revisionists (who argue that all blame rests on America's shoulders) and the traditionalists (who see the Soviet thrust for expansion as the real cause). One may, indeed, wonder whether this discrepancy is not rooted in preconceived beliefs and whether the disputants are not looking at historical events in too abstract a perspective. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. so wisely observed in 1967, "if historians cannot solve their problem in retrospect, who are they to blame Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill for not having solved them at the time?"[1]

Certainly, the three volumes under review do not resolve the controversy, but they do provide fresh insights not only into the origins of the cold war but also into the strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine of containment and the question of its relevance in today's East-West relations.

The volume by Robert G. Kaiser —formerly Moscow correspondent for *The Washington Post*—introduces no new elements into the revisionist-traditionalist debate but seeks to provide a fuller explanation of the underlying motivations of the Truman Doctrine, which, he notes, committed the US to enter Europe in order to contain the Soviet Union and thus "effectively began the cold war" (p. 125). In an easygoing but serious style, Kaiser recreates the atmosphere that developed on both sides of the Atlantic in the aftermath of the Allied victory in Europe. Particularly in the United States, there were signs of a rising tide of anti-communism fed by fears of internal Communist subversion and a growing belief in the existence of an international Communist conspiracy. Parallel with this, as Kaiser points out, Soviet international behavior—be it with respect to Germany, the peace negotiations, the fate of Eastern Europe, or the retention of Soviet forces in Iran—gave impetus to American and British perceptions of "a general pattern of Soviet aggressiveness" and of the need for the two powers to "adapt themselves to a new and ominous interpretation of Soviet policy" (pp. 153, 155). The author rightly underlines the impact on American public opinion of the famous Henry Wallace speech of September 12, 1946, which assailed US policy toward the Soviet Union as too uncompromising. The unorthodox Wallace views tended to lend credence to the belief that there *was* a Communist conspiracy and, far from stemming popular anti-Communist sentiment, forced American public opinion to realize "how fundamental the issue was." Meanwhile, George F. Kennan, from his post in the US Embassy in Moscow, was already warning the authorities in Washington (most notably in his later much-publicized "long telegram" to the State Department in February 1946 [2]) of Soviet designs to expand Communist influence in Europe. Kaiser could have quoted other aspects of the situation in Europe—for example, conditions in Italy—to give more force to his conclusion that there were genuine grounds for apprehension concerning Soviet motives.

However, it was one thing to

[1] "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1967, p. 25.

[2] See G. F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950,* Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1967, Annex C, for excerpts from this voluminous dispatch.

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perceive the threat and quite another to take effective measures to counter it. Kaiser reminds us that Great Britain was no longer in a position to act, confronted as she was with both domestic and foreign problems. At home, the country was afflicted by severe economic dislocation, which culminated in the coal crisis of the winter of 1946-47; abroad, it had to cope with the pressures of the independence process in India, the problem of Palestine, and the deepening crisis in Greece. Although the nation's leaders were not amenable to the idea of appeasing an expansionist Soviet Union, Britain—to quote Kaiser—"very quietly, almost clandestinely, . . . relinquished its place in the front rank of nations during 1946-47" (p. 123).

If, in this precarious situation, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and other members of Britain's Labor government hoped that the United States would shoulder major responsibilities in postwar Europe, US conditions were hardly encouraging to such hopes. American society was suffering from the dual impact of severe inflation and a complex process of postwar economic adjustment, and the anti-Communist upsurge itself appeared to be symptomatic of a tendency toward renewed isolationism. Nevertheless, confronted by Britain's direct withdrawal from a leading role in Europe, the US government understood its new responsibilities, and President Harry S. Truman in his speech of March 12, 1947, enunciated the "doctrine" that came to bear his name, committing the United States to economic and military support of countries threatened by communism.

In Kaiser's view, it was the deep crisis in Britain, more than anything else, that enabled President Truman to convince the American public of the need for the United States to throw its weight into the balance in what could justly be represented as a "struggle between the free and the unfree." But while the situation in Britain may well have been a significant factor in Truman's decision, it seems a little excessive to attribute central importance to it, as Kaiser does in his analysis. After all, the climate throughout Europe, not just in Britain, was such that the United States felt impelled to assume the role of *defensor libertatis.*

IN ANY EVENT, it was the doctrine of containment, the rationale for which was set forth by Kennan in his historic Mr. "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1947, that provided the major basis of subsequent American initiatives to counteract the perceived threat of Soviet postwar expansionism. In view of the close relationship of the containment doctrine to the cold war, it is noteworthy that Charles Gati has put together a collection of essays (most but not all of them reprints) by a number of able contributors in order to reassess the doctrine. It is a stimulating collection and is supplemented by a most useful bibliographical note by T. Trister; however, it fails to provide a complete picture. In particular, little or no attention is given to the European side of the story, or indeed to the question of Soviet perceptions and policies (it would have been useful to include, for example, Joseph R. Starobin's July 1969 article in *Foreign Affairs,* which attributed the cold war to the failure of the Communist movement "to master its inner difficulties and choose its alternatives").

It is rather easy today, in retrospect, to criticize the containment doctrine and its impact on postwar politics, particularly in light of Mr. Kennan's own second thoughts on the subject in his interview in the summer of 1972.[3] William Zimmerman attempts to bring a new focus to this old problem in his newly-written essay for the Gati volume. He views the cold war as "a product of the policies and beliefs of individuals whose postures were reinforced by the cumulative impact of the cold war's beginnings," and he contends that "what the United States did after World War II did make a difference" (p. 106). Specifically, Zimmerman suggests that a closer analysis of Soviet behavior might have afforded some better alternatives in the crucial years 1945-47. This would have been possible, he argues, if Western leaders had not uncritically accepted the "essentialist" or the Kennan "mechanistic" approach, but rather had paid more attention to an "organismic or cybernetic approach"—*i.e.,* one concentrating on interactions and possible reciprocal influences (pp. 96-99). The author could be right, yet he himself conceded that it was only after 1962 that one could discern "a general recognition of the limited adversary nature of Soviet-American relations and of the cybernetic and reactive dimensions of Soviet conduct." One might ask Zimmerman whether such a perception would have been understood before Stalin's death.

In another original essay written for the Gati volume, Donald S. Zagoria takes a similarly critical view of the containment doctrine

[3] Interview in *Foreign Policy* (New York), Summer 1972, and reprinted by Gati, pp. 27-39.

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as applied to the Chinese Communists. With his well-known competence, Zagoria convincingly argues that relations between Stalin and Mao were very strained right after World War II, and that Mao's "bid for American support as a counterweight to exclusive dependence on the Soviet Union" should therefore have received more careful consideration by Washington. Had this been done, he suggests, an alternative American policy might have been possible. Can one, however, so easily push aside the domestic factors at work in Washington—notably, the so-called China lobby—or the fact that Mao never broke publicly with Stalin? Does not the obvious impact of these factors on postwar US policy toward China attest once again that the interpretations or perceptions of the situation at a given moment are so real as to become the reality itself? Further evaluation may prove them wrong, but then it is too late.

Though admittedly far more balanced than former Senator William Fulbright's excessively one-sided essay,[4] the analyses discussed above all share a clear-cut revisionist tone. However, the revisionist viewpoint does meet with severe criticism in John Spanier's short and pointed essay, "The Choices We Did Not Have." With a keen sense of political as well as historical realism, Spanier reminds us that "the key issue [in the aftermath of World War II] was the postwar distribution of power" (a point demonstrated in penetrating fashion by Louis J. Halle some years ago in *The Cold War as History*[5]), and he rebukes those who want to rewrite the music in a tune that does not reflect the climate in which the music was composed. The author does seem to accept Zagoria's thesis that the United States failed to take advantage of Mao's early postwar desire for an accommodation with Washington, but in doing so he fails to observe that an American bet on Mao against Stalin might well have fueled the cold war anyway, if not in Europe, at least in Asia.

The final selections in the Gati volume try to look beyond the cold-war era. Marshall Shulman's 1971 essay, "Beyond Containment", makes interesting reading even if some of its conclusions have already been by-passed by events. Zbigniew Brezezinski, in an extended version of his article in *Foreign Affairs* of October 1972, essays a periodization of Soviet-American relations, even providing synoptic tables. Although he fails to put his finger on many aspects of the Soviet postwar search for security and of Moscow's continuing emphasis on ideological struggle, his remarks are as always full of sharp and synthesizing glimpses. It suffices to cite the important distinction he draws between Soviet policy in the 1950's favoring maintenance of the *status quo* and Khrushchev's subsequent effort to overcome the Western world through peaceful competition, relying on the leverage of the Sputnik success.

AFTER SUCH theoretical introspections, it is sobering to turn to the pessimistic joint findings of Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré, and Richard Soll, of the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, concerning current Soviet global strategy. Documenting their case with a voluminous collection of Soviet texts (though perhaps too few from East European sources), this team seeks to demonstrate that peaceful coexistence in Soviet eyes "concerns only formal state-to-state relations and has the primary purpose of forestalling policies and actions by capitalist states which would involve the use of force or which might lead to nuclear war" (p. 4). It is useful to be reminded that while Khrushchev thought that war was not unavoidable and that a peaceful way was possible and preferable for the attainment of socialism, he remained convinced of the basic division of the world into two hostile camps. In the authors' view, the former CPSU First Secretary's strategy of socialist-capitalist competition has evolved under the present Soviet leadership into one of "peaceful coexistence" interpreted as "a special form of the class struggle in the international arena" (pp. 40, 117). They observe that "the current Soviet leaders have used the principles of peaceful coexistence to structure a new strategy for victory" which they believe will enable the Soviet Union "to push forward against the USA and the entire capitalist world with a high degree of assurance of both success in its efforts and relative safety for itself" (p. 51).

One can justifiably ask whether the philosophy of the present Soviet leadership is not more dangerous to the West than either the persuasion of Lenin and Stalin that only war could lead to Communist victory (but that war should be avoided), or Khrushchev's illusion that the "imminent superiority" of the Communist system would ensure victory without recourse to war. For the current Soviet interpretation of peace-

[4] J. William Fulbright, "The Truman Doctrine Reconsidered: From Greece to Vietnam," in Gati, pp. 54-84.

[5] London, Chatto & Windus, 1967.

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ful coexistence, as the authors of *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies* point out, "allows the Soviet Union and its allies to pursue any policy or action short of all-out war between the two systems" (p. 71). One could cite further evidence in support of this thesis, such as Marshal A. A. Grechko's most recent book (*Vooruzhennye sili Sovetskovo gosudarstva*—The Armed Forces of the Soviet State—Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974), and recent Soviet writings on the need for ideological vigilance against the West. Should not the West look to such sources in meditating upon its own security, the more so now that it is threatened with an economic crisis that could strengthen the Soviet belief that capitalism's collapse is nearer than ever?

If these three valuable works on the many facets of the cold war and its sequel lead us to any overall conclusion, it is that it is dangerous to try to reconstruct history from the wisdom of hindsight. The insufficient attention to the European dimension in what we have read (even Kaiser limits himself to description of the mood in Great Britain alone) is a misleading gap. It is important to recall that, in the immediate postwar years, men and women throughout Western Europe, though not yet divided from the East by a wall of mistrust, were sincerely convinced of the need to defend not only their national security but, first and foremost, a way of life. And while this concern may not be so widely and deeply felt in today's world, ample grounds for it still exist, as Messrs. Kohler and associates rightly point out.

Moscow and Détente

By Matthew P. Gallagher

FOY D. KOHLER, LEON GOURÉ, MOSE L. HARVEY: *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Détente.* Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974.
LEON GOURÉ, FOY D. KOHLER, MOSE L. HARVEY: *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy.* Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974.

THESE TWO BOOKS join the series of foreign policy studies which the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami has been bringing out over the past several years. Like previous monographs in the series, they question the premises of US policy toward the Soviet Union from the standpoint of a critical examination of Soviet intentions and behavior. The authors—Mose L. Harvey, former Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Council; Foy D. Kohler, former US Ambassador to Moscow; and Leon Gouré, former Rand researcher and historian—combine a wealth of experience in the analysis of Soviet policy which is perhaps unmatched by any other research team in the country. In their present books, as in their previous studies, they give the conservative point of view in the analysis of Soviet policy an effective and responsible voice in the national dialogue over détente policy.

In their present books, they deal with two of the most critical issues affecting détente policy, Soviet policy in the Middle East and Soviet nuclear strategy. The Middle East study is a sharply written, tightly organized monograph which argues that Soviet policy before, during, and subsequent to the October 1973 war demonstrates that the Soviet Union does not accept the US concept of détente or abide by the rules of conduct it implies. The nuclear strategy study, is a meticulously researched, but loosely conceived work which reaches much the same conclusions on the basis of an examination of Soviet public statements on nuclear war.

Both books use a style of analysis which places great emphasis on the value of Soviet public state-

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ments as indicators of Soviet intentions. This is a valid assumption when the question at issue concerns the *public postures* of the USSR on international issues, as in the case of the Middle East. Here Soviet public statements are, in effect, instrumentalities of Soviet policy: they announce Soviet positions, they rationalize Soviet actions, they present events in such a way as to influence the actions of others, and so on. The link between words and intentions is direct and virtually manifest.

The same conditions do not apply to Soviet statements on nuclear war. Such statements tend to be theoretical in nature and thus lacking in specific policy content. Principles of strategy may be invoked without necessarily implying that they will be applied in this or that way or under these or those conditions. Moreover, long experience has shown that such statements do not always reflect official policy, that the Soviet Union tolerates some debate on issues of military theory, and that sometimes these debates concern issues which are only indirectly related to military policy—détente, for example. Thus, there is much room for interpretation in linking words to intentions in this sphere.

It is this methodological difference which mainly explains why the argument of the Middle East book is persuasive and the argument of the nuclear strategy book is less so. In the one case, the reader can easily accept the argument that Soviet statements are valid indications of Soviet intentions. In the other, the argument seems strained and inconclusive.

STYLISTICALLY, the Middle East book is a model of expository writing. It begins with a clear definition of the issues (whether Soviet actions in the Middle East are to be seen as an aberration or as a consistent expression of Soviet long-range goals), it goes on to marshal the evidence pro and con (favoring the evidence that supports the latter interpretation, but not ignoring contrary indications), and it concludes with some carefully-framed judgments about the significance of the October 1973 war, pointing up implications for US policy. Several chapters at the end deal with aspects of Soviet Middle Eastern policy—such as Soviet incitatory propaganda on the oil issue—which extend beyond the framework of the October war.

As for the thesis, the book sticks pretty closely to what may be described as the consensus view of Soviet policy incident to the October war. It holds that the Soviet Union had some foreknowledge of the Arab intention to attack and may, indeed, have actually encouraged this venture; that it failed to cooperate with US efforts to arrange a settlement until the changing fortunes of war made this an inescapable necessity; and that it actively encouraged, and continues to encourage, Arab policies on the oil issue and related matters which are calculated to damage US interests. While some of these judgments may be questionable, they at least represent reasonable reconstructions of the facts.

The book is less satisfactory in the area of general interpretations and conclusions. Here the authors become too abstract and legalistic. Instead of treating the problem of the Middle East as an admittedly gray area in US-Soviet relations, one in which the policies of both sides are governed more by power factors and, if need be, by prudence than by the formal understandings associated with détente, they treat it as a test case of the Soviet Union's attitude toward détente. They define the issue in black and white terms. Americans, they say—and they quote Kissinger and other sources to support the contention—view détente as applying to all issues affecting US-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union, they find, operates on the assumption that détente is a "divisible" concept, one that can be applied to some issues without necessarily inhibiting the continuation of conflict over others.

Leaving aside the question of whether these characterizations accurately reflect the positions of the two countries, it may be asked whether this way of framing the issue is useful in a practical sense. Whatever the disparities between Soviet words and actions, the Soviet Union is going to confront the United States in the Middle East for some time to come. What needs to be considered, thus, is not whether the Soviet Union remains committed to conflict but whether the resultant strains on US-Soviet relations can be kept at a manageable level, and—even more to the point—whether the détente relationship is useful in this regard. Despite their cautionary advice about the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a détente partner, the authors would probably not deny the possibility of affirmative answers on both counts.

THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY book addresses the question of whether the Soviet Union actually perceives its relationship with the United States in the terms implied by détente. The authors challenge the assumption on the ground that Soviet statements on nuclear policy issues reflect a much harsher perception of the international en-

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vironment. They believe that some softening of these views would have taken place if the Soviet Union's commitment to détente were genuine. They conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Union's détente posture is an expedient tactic which implies no long-term change in the Soviet Union's traditional hostility toward the United States.

The authors support this argument with a great deal of documentary evidence. In fact, the bulk of the book consists mainly of a selection of Soviet statements, connected by an interpretive commentary. The selections do, indeed, illustrate the fact that Soviet views on military policy issues are militant and offensive-minded. The commentary amplifies, reinforces, and supplements this aspect of the statements by relating them to ideological dicta of the same general tenor—a methodological device to which we shall return in a moment.

On the military implications of the evidence, the commentary is well-informed and illuminating. It contains some of the most lucid expositions that the present writer has seen of such points of Soviet doctrine as the relationship between deterrence and war-fighting postures, the mission of the armed forces in resisting the "export of counterrevolution," and the effect on force requirements of the war-fighting and war-survival concepts.

The argument of the book, however, does not really turn on the evidence, but on the conceptual edifice that has been erected above it. Here the authors are subject to criticism, both for the design of the structure and for some of their workmanship.

As for the design, it is by no means clear—to this reader, at least—why the militancy of Soviet statements on nuclear war should reflect on the credibility of Soviet détente policy. Soviet military writings have always been more militant than Soviet declaratory policy—a fact that can easily be explained by the functional purposes of this literature. Soviet military writers, like their American counterparts, tend to be naturally conservative. They deal in principles of war which change slowly, they have to think about "worst cases," they are concerned about questions of morale, and so on. Gouré *et al.* not only fail to consider such factors in their interpretations, but argue stoutly that such factors need not be considered. They hold that all Soviet public statements are cut from the same cloth and can be considered as representing the views of the leadership.

This "seamless-garment" theory of Soviet public utterances is the second major flaw in the conceptual structure of the book. It has led the authors to overlook important differentiations in the value of their sources. They have given no indication, for example, that *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Modern War,* a book which they cite frequently, is a product of a hard-line group of military professors with personal philosophic axes to grind; they treat it as though it were of equal merit to a statement by Marshal Grechko, for example, as a reflection of official views. They have also downgraded the evidence that a debate over the role of military power in the era of détente has been going on in the Soviet Union over the past year or two. They do refer to some of this evidence on pages 58 to 63, but they have generally ignored the theory of internal conflict in their interpretations. They have thus deprived themselves and their readers of an important tool for understanding the relationship between policy and theory in this sphere—one that might provide a richer and more dynamic interpretation, for instance, of such phenomena as the conflict they cite between Soviet foreign policy analyst Georgi Arbatov and Soviet military commentators over the "suicidal" nature of modern war.

Finally, on workmanship, the authors skirt perilously close to a form of circular reasoning in their heavy reliance on ideological dicta in interpreting Soviet statements. While a reemphasis on the importance of ideological considerations in Soviet policy is perhaps long overdue in the United States, it would seem appropriate in a study of this kind to treat the subject as a question to be investigated rather than as a premise to be assumed. Apart from imparting an *a priori* bias to their logic, it seems to have led them to misjudge some of the evidence. They are incorrect in stating, for example, that the Soviets seldom use the word "détente," preferring the ideologically-loaded phrase "peaceful coexistence" instead. In fact, the Soviets use the phrase "relaxation of tensions" for détente, and they do it frequently.

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The Perennial "National Question"

By Walker Connor

EDWARD ALLWORTH: *The Nationality Question In Soviet Central Asia.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.
JÜRGEN ARNOLD: *Die nationalen Gebietseinheiten der Sowjetunion: Staatlichkeit, Souveränität und Autonomie im Sowjetföderalismus* (The National Territorial Entities of the Soviet Union: Statehood, Sovereignty, and Autonomy in Soviet Federalism). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973.
ROBERT R. KING: *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973.
GEORGE V. H. MOSELEY, III: *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.
IVAN S. LUBACHKO: *Belorussia under Soviet Rule, 1917–1957.* Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, 1972.
EUGEN STEINER: *The Slovak Dilemma.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

DESPITE THE large and growing body of literature on the nationality question as it has manifested itself within one or another Communist society, there has been little attempt to place such studies in comparative perspective. The growing number of monographs, articles, and doctoral dissertations dealing with the national question in a Marxist-Leninist milieu have tended to concentrate on the experience of (1) a single state (particularly the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or, to a lesser degree, China), (2) a single region of a state, or (3) a single people.[1] While the linguistic talents, detailed knowledge, and particular insight of the one-group or one-country specialist are essential if analysis is to proceed beyond superficial generalities, treating individual cases of the national question *in vacuo* also imposes serious restrictions upon analysis.

The growing tendency of people to view the world through an ethnonational prism and to agitate for alterations in existing social and political structures that would more favorably reflect the interests of their particular national group has certainly not been limited to Marxist-Leninist states. It has been affecting people in an expanding pattern since the time of the French Revolution and has today achieved nearly universal scope. Increasing unrest among nationalities within Marxist-Leninist states should therefore be viewed as part of this global phenomenon, and the general literature concerned with ethnonationalism's antecedents, causes, catalysts, and nature should be a necessary backdrop for studying the national question in any situation, Marxist and non-Marxist alike. It is rash to assume, for example, that the upsurge in nationalism among the Armenian, Croatian, Lithuanian, Slovak, Slovene, and Ukrainian nations during the past decade was totally unrelated to the concurrent upsurge of nationalism in Basque country, Brittany, Catalonia, Cornwall, Corsica, Flanders, Scotland, and Wales.

Moreover, aside from the general literature, the host of historic and contemporary case studies of national movements within non-Marxist societies contain much of analogical value to the student of nationalism within Marxist societies. Thus, someone interested in assessing the impact that the Soviet or Yugoslav federal structure might in itself exert upon the perceptions of national groups could profitably examine the cases of Burma, India, or Nigeria. Similarly, those interested in national proclivities on the part of the Muslim Central Asian peoples of China and the Soviet Union might examine recent developments among the Muslim national minorities in Chad, Ethiopia, the Philippines,

[1] Two noteworthy exceptions, but both still limited to specific areas as indicated by their titles, are Richard Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1961; and Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*, New York, Doubleday, 1969.

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Singapore, and Thailand. In short, familiarity with the global dimensions of ethnonationalism and with the specifics of its development in a number of non-Marxist environments affords some guides for identifying symptoms, for differentiating trivia from essence, and for determining what in fact is unique to a particular society.

The experiences of other Marxist-Leninist states are, of course, the most germane. All are the legatees of Lenin's pronouncements concerning the strategy by which the national question was to be solved. Reduced to its basic elements, this strategy can be summarized in three injunctions: (1) prior to the assumption of power, promise to all national groups the right of self-determination (explicitly including the right of secession), while proffering national equality to those who wish to remain in the state; (2) following the assumption of power, terminate the fact—though not necessarily the fiction—of a right to secession, and begin the lengthy process of assimilation via the dialectical route of territorial autonomy for all compact national groups; and (3) keep the party centralized and free of all nationalist inclinations.

Given this common plan of action and *the assumptions concerning nationalism that underlie it,* the successes and failures of all Marxist-Leninist states in dealing with the problem are self-evidently interrelated, offering the analyst a far richer reserve of precedents than could be provided by the experience of any single state.[2] Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the pattern followed by the various states in borrowing, altering, or rejecting one another's techniques for implementing *policy on the national question;* for example, failure by a state to follow the Soviet practice of including the right of secession in the state's constitution may be quite informative. Finally, since all but one of the Marxist-Leninist states form part of a contiguous land mass, transborder groups are an extremely important element (and instrument) in interstate relations among those states—a fact which further underlines the deficiencies of looking at the national question within the restricted context of a single state.

As mentioned, no one has yet attempted to pull together in a single study the experiences of the Communist regimes of all the Marxist-Leninist states with respect to the national question. Should someone attempt the task, he will find each of the books reviewed here helpful in filling in some of the numerous gaps.

IN EDITING, molding, and contributing to an anthology on Soviet Central Asia, Edward Allworth has again produced a work of the high quality that has come to be associated with publications of Columbia's Program on Soviet Nationality Problems, which he directs. The 15 contributions, many by graduate students, show great diversity in subject matter, chronology, and methodology. However, the major mileposts of Soviet national policy with regard to the Central Asian region emerge clearly: the early promises of self-determination and their subsequent perversion; the Soviet fear that excessively large and unmanageable groups might evolve in the shape of a Bukharan, Turkic or Muslim national identity, an apprehension that caused a resort to gerrymandering and support for the flourishing of national identities among groups believed potentially more amenable to Moscow's rule; the resettlement of large numbers of Russians and other European people in Asian territories, coupled with reliance upon Slavic cadres in order to insure control; and finally, when—despite and in part because of such techniques—there was an upsurge of national sentiment among the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, a seeming switch by the central authorities from a policy of encouraging national self-identification among these people to one that stressed fraternity with the state's dominant Russian element. Along the way, the reader learns a great deal concerning the role of the indigenous literatures both as expressions and as catalysts of national consciousness, as well as about the particular emotional attachment that the people of Central Asia feel toward their ethnic homelands. In connection with what was said earlier about developing a comparative perspective, it may be noted that the spur to nationalism and xenophobia occasioned by an influx of "aliens" into a group's ethnic homeland is a phenomenon not restricted to Central Asia but one that can readily be detected in such disparate places as the Basque region, Croa-

[2] With the possible exception of Poland, the national question retains momentous implications for all 14 states presently under Marxist-Leninist governments. Most of them contain substantial national minorities within their borders, while those that do not (Albania, East Germany, Hungary, and North Korea) face the obverse problem of irredentism affecting important segments of their respective national groups contained within an adjacent state or states. Though the post-World War II alterations in Poland's borders transformed the country into a highly homogeneous state, the national issue has some significance even for the Polish regime in that the question of the repatriation of the German minority in Poland (approximately one percent of the total population) has significantly influenced Polish relations with West Germany.

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tia, Kurdistan, Latvia, Malaysia, Quebec, Slovakia, the Ukraine, and Wales.

IN CONTRAST TO Allworth's anthological approach, Ivan Lubachko offers a monograph dealing with a single people located in the western sector of the Soviet Union. The title of the work is misleading, for Lubachko has written a short history of the Belorussian people, and this has included rule by Lithuania, Poland, (Nazi) Germany, and Tsarist as well as Soviet Russia.

Throughout much of modern history, Belorussia has been divided between foreign powers. At the end of World War I, an attempt to create a state incorporating all Belorussians was crushed by Polish annexation of the western district. The eastern sector, in line with Soviet promises, enjoyed a short period of independence before being reannexed by Moscow. During the early stages of Soviet control, Belorussian culture and national identity were encouraged, but potential national leaders were purged during the 1930's. The 1939 Nonaggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany gave the USSR control over all Belorussia from September 1939 until the German invasion in June 1941. Lubachko records how the German invaders were at first popularly viewed as liberators, but how Nazi policies quickly transformed the goodwill of the Belorussians into hostility, thereby assisting reconquest of the region by Moscow. Changes wrought by World War II in the political geography of Eastern Europe subsequently came to be reflected in changes in Soviet policy toward Belorussia. Whereas the prewar Belorussian SSR had adjoined capitalist states, postwar Belorussia came to be surrounded by Marxist-Leninist states, and Moscow's new sense of security with respect to the area has been reflected in such things as greater local industrial investment.

More interesting from the standpoint of the national question has been the ambivalence displayed by the Soviet authorities in regard to a Belorussian national identity. The fact that the Belorussians are Slavs endows them with a special importance under current Soviet conditions: as the proportion of Russians within the Soviet Union continues to dwindle, particularly in relation to the Asian peoples, the most logical sources of potentially Russifiable recruits would be the Belorussians and Ukrainians. This consideration has caused the authorities to equivocate, sometimes encouraging the national identification of these two groups and at other times emphasizing that all three Slavic peoples are descended from the Kiev Rus. As the people most commonly charged with harboring bourgeois national sentiments, the Ukrainians have clearly indicated that they consider themselves a nation completely distinct from the Russians. The Belorussians have been more quiescent for various reasons (including the periodic decimation of their national leadership by the Poles, Germans, and Russians). Lubachko is somewhat ambiguous and contradictory as to exactly when a Belorussian national consciousness became a significant force, but he does establish that a separate national consciousness characterizes this people today. In any event, it is certain that a sense of national identity came relatively late to the Belorussians, and that, quite ironically, Soviet nationality policy itself played a large role in its crystallization.

JÜRGEN ARNOLD'S book should prove of greater value to the comparative study of political structures than of the national question, offering as it does a rigorously systematic appraisal of Soviet federalism in theory (ideology), law, and practice.[3] The author notes in particular the substantial discrepancy between the legal and actual powers of all levels of government below the central apparatus and documents the overriding power of the party at each level.

A reading of the book does trigger two somewhat conversely related questions that are relevant to the national question. The first is whether the impulse toward self-determination can settle for form, or—more concretely—whether the grant of a fictional sovereignty to the union republics (pp. 53–57) and of an equally fictional autonomy to lesser units (pp. 130–31) can satisfy, or even blunt, the urge of nationally conscious peoples to possess their own states. The second is whether the very existence of administrative units carrying ethnic designations does not whet the collective appetite of individual ethnic groups for a truer realization of an independent nation-state. Hints that the Soviet authorities may have come to see a linkage between organizational form and popular nationalist aspirations can be found in the 1961 Party Program's assertion that "the boundaries between the union republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance" and in occasional trial-balloon statements that the union republics should be abolished in the interest of greater efficiency. On the other

[3] The reviewer is indebted to his colleague, John Robertson, for assistance in translating segments of this work.

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hand, as Arnold makes clear, the Soviet authorities have from the beginning considered federalism only a transitional step toward a unitary state; so it may be unwise to credit mounting national unrest as the underlying reason for these tendencies. In any event, as noted earlier, it seems clear that, quite aside from the perceptions of the Soviet leadership, the relationship between federalism and the national problem in the USSR can perhaps be most profitably studied in comparison with other states in which administrative divisions closely coincide with the distribution of national groups.

UNLIKE THE Soviet Communists, the Chinese Communists elected not to institute a federal system, and although they did follow Lenin's prescription of regional autonomy for compact minorities, the largest such units they created were five autonomous regions. Drawing his data almost exclusively from the Chinese central and provincial press between 1950 and 1960, George Moseley has traced the officially reported events which led to the establishment of one of these units, the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region, and of a number of lesser autonomous units within adjacent Yunnan Province. The book is thus a narrowly focused chronology of relevant developments in only these two southern provinces, although it still contains much of interest to the serious scholar of Chinese national minority policy.

Moseley's study has other, more serious shortcomings. One is the author's seemingly inadequate background knowledge of both Leninist and Chinese literature on the national question. His statement (p. 4) that "Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question . . . had been originally formulated by the Austrian Social Democrats and then modified by Lenin and Stalin" is hardly compatible with Lenin's attacks on the concept of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner concerning extraterritorial cultural autonomy and—more basically—on their contention that nations are a natural, enduring classification of mankind rather than a phenomenon peculiar to the capitalist epoch. Moseley's contention (p. 5) that the Chinese Communists did not promise self-determination to the minorities after Mao's assumption of the party leadership is also controverted by the facts, as is his contention that they, unlike the Russian Bolsheviks, did not consider the minorities in China an important factor in the struggle for power.[4]

Another shortcoming is Moseley's failure to tie events in the southern area to the broader framework of Chinese national policy, a failure which leads him to some questionable conclusions. For instance, he opines that the decision announced in 1956 to create an autonomous region coextensive with Kwangsi Province, thereby incorporating so many Han Chinese as to make the Chuang a minority, was motivated by a desire to exert greater control over the Han. It would, however, be more consonant with the Chinese Communists' overall minority policies to argue that this action was aimed at exerting greater control over the Chuang minority. Ethnic gerrymandering had previously been resorted to by the authorities in 1954 when Suiyuan Province was merged with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and the resettlement of Chinese in all minority regions has obviously been motivated in part by the desire to dilute any potential threat from a minority. Indeed, Moseley himself notes that the emphasis placed upon Han cadres, and Han people generally, within the autonomous zones has been due to the Hans' greater loyalty (*e.g.*, see pp. 49, 76, 117). Moseley also appears to assign no significance to the fact that the announced decision to create the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region followed by only a few months the creation immediately across the border in North Vietnam of a Viet Bac Autonomous Region—a sequence of events which suggests that the Chinese action may have been prompted by an intent to compete with North Vietnam for the allegiance of the border minorities, just as China has sought to compete for the allegiance of the minorities in the areas adjoining the Chinese borders with Mongolia and the Soviet Union. Yet the author seems to have given no thought to this possibility.

In sum, Moseley's book provides little assistance in relating the data contained in it to general Chinese policy toward national minorities, and it therefore needs to be read in conjunction with other

[4] For details, see Walker Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), October 1969, particularly pp. 58-68. Moseley's statement (p. 5) that a December 1935 Chinese Communist declaration to the people of Inner Mongolia did not hold out the promise of independence is particularly bewildering because a work translated earlier by him (Chang Chih-i, *The Party and the National Question*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1966, pp. 50-51) quoted that announcement as stating that the Mongols could opt to "unite in a federation with other peoples, or to make themselves entirely separate." For a statement by Mao expressing hope that the Mongols would "obtain the freedom and independence enjoyed by peoples such as those of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine and Caucasus," see Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-Tung*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966. As late as 1948, Liu Shao-ch'i noted the CCP's advocacy of "the voluntary association and voluntary separation of all nations" (*Internationalism and Nationalism*, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1948, p. 9).

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studies of the subject that are written against a larger backdrop.[5]

EUGEN STEINER'S study of the Slovak minority in Czechoslovakia develops a number of parallels with Lubachko's earlier-discussed monograph on the Belorussians. Both studies deal with the history of peoples whose fortunes have been dictated by more powerful national groups; moreover, both these peoples achieved national consciousness only in very recent times. Many Slovak leaders considered themselves Czechs at the time of World War I, and the 1920 Constitution of the newly-formed, "self-determined" state declared that there was a single "Czechoslovak nation." Even as late as December 1943, Steiner notes (p. 53), the Czech leader-in-exile, Edward Benes, announced his "firm conviction that the Slovaks are Czechs and the Slovak language is only one of the dialects of the Czech language."

Steiner reviews the history of the Slovaks beginning with the early 1600's: their domination by Vienna and Budapest under the Hapsburgs; their incorporation into Czechoslovakia after World War I; Hitler's creation of an independent Slovak state; the reintegration of the Slovaks into Czechoslovakia following World War II; the subsequent rise of Slovak agitation for federal status; the decision arrived at shortly before the 1968 Soviet intervention to make the state a federation; and the actual implementation of the federation after the intervention. The author's account indicates that the Slovak Communist Party closely followed Moscow's advice, consistently supporting national self-determination before the Communists assumed power in Czechoslovakia, yet rejecting it afterwards. It is difficult to know what form the federation inaugurated in 1968 would have taken had the Soviet intervention not occurred, but Brezhnev, in line with Lenin's injunction and Soviet practice, insisted "on this most fundamental point—a firmly centralist party which would tolerate no experiments in pluralism or federalism" (p. 200).[6] Whether the Russians viewed federal status for the Slovaks in essentially negative terms, *i.e.*, as making the best of a bad situation, or viewed it positively as a means of driving a wedge between Slovaks and Czechs, it is clear that their decision religiously adhered to Lenin's legacy on the national question.

Steiner generally relates his story well. This reviewer's major reservations concern: (1) the author's failure to evaluate the new federal structure during the first five years of its existence; and (2) his tendency to gloss over or too readily excuse such blots on the history of the Slovak people as the Nazi-promoted state and the discrimination practiced against the Magyar (Hungarian) minority within Slovakia.

ROBERT KING'S book, in focusing on the impact that national minorities exert on the relations among Marxist-Leninist states within Eastern Europe, represents an exception to the tendency mentioned earlier to restrict analysis to a single state, district, or people. Among the issues discussed are the conflicts between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia concerning the Macedonians; between Albania and Yugoslavia regarding the latter's Albanian minority; between Romania and the Soviet Union over the Bessarabians; and those between Hungary on the one hand and Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia on the other concerning the Magyar minorities in the latter three states.

There is little question that the Soviet Union appreciates the strategic value to Moscow of these ethnically based rivalries. Thus, as Steiner makes clear, the Soviet leaders attempted during the hectic events of 1968 to play upon Slovak resentments toward the Czechs in order to isolate both and thereby make each more manageable. Moreover, the manipulation of ethnic sentiments among the minorities of other countries has become a common technique of foreign policy among Marxist-Leninist states, the ability to create such unrest serving as a reminder to the targeted state that it is vulnerable from within as well as from without. The barrages of propaganda aimed at each other's minorities by China and the Soviet Union are merely the best-known illustration of this practice. Moscow's use of this technique in Eastern Europe is less publicized, because here the Soviet leadership has more often elected to act through intermediaries— *e.g.*, through Budapest in the case of Romania, and through Sofia (and sometimes Budapest) in the case of Yugoslavia.

But these national rivalries also have a life of their own. As King illustrates, both Budapest and Sofia have often conducted ethnically-oriented propaganda campaigns without any apparent encouragement from Moscow.

Romania offers a particularly interesting case study in that its

[5] *E.g.*, see David Deal, *National Minority Policy in Southwest China, 1911-1965* (an unpublished dissertation submitted to the University of Washington, 1971).

[6] As Steiner notes (p. 200), federalism in government was not to be confused with federalism in the party.

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government has at least tried, within the limitations imposed by a most unfavorable power balance, to illustrate to the Soviet Union that the manipulation of foreign minorities can be a two-way street. Prior to assuming power, the Romanian Communist party had abided by Lenin's prescription to promise self-determination to all ethnic minorities. However, under Moscow's prodding, this slogan was distorted to include support for the annexation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union, on the unsubstantiated ground that the inhabitants considered themselves to be of non-Romanian (Moldavian) ancestry. Following the Communist takeover in the wake of World War II, the Romanian leadership docilely accepted Soviet control of Bessarabia. However, as Romania moved toward a more autonomous stance vis-à-vis Moscow in the 1960's, there were growing references to the national bond joining ethnic Romanians on either side of the Soviet-Romanian border, and numerous indications have appeared in recent years that the propagation of such sentiments by Romania has triggered vibrations among the Bessarabian population, as well as consternation in Moscow.

On balance, however, it is evident that the presence of a sizable Hungarian (Magyar) minority within Romania's borders causes Bucharest to be the more vulnerable in the game of ethnic diplomacy. Somewhat ironically, it was the apparently spontaneous, anti-Moscow response of this minority to events within Hungary during 1956 which, by demonstrating the intensity of the group's ethnic sentiments, made Bucharest cognizant of the fragility of its own control of these people in the face of ethnically-attired appeals from outside the country's borders. During the Hungarian uprising, members of Romania's Magyar population participated in anti-Soviet mass meetings and demonstrations, and some even crossed the border to aid their ethnic brothers. Since then, Bucharest has been more intent upon containing than encouraging nationalist sentiments among the Magyar minority, and in 1968 it dissolved the state's only autonomous region (the Mures-Autonomous Hungarian Region). The tangible impact of this action upon the lives of the Magyars living in the former Autonomous Region has probably been slight, since the Romanian Constitution still contains the usual cultural and linguistic guarantees. But, apropos of the question raised earlier concerning the psychopolitical impact of administrative units bearing ethnic designations, it is interesting to note that the Romanian leadership apparently felt that the Hungarian Autonomous Region had developed into a significant symbol of Magyar national consciousness. Further evidence of such a conviction on the part of the Romanian as well as other governments of the area has been the rather extensive application of gerrymandering to minority regions—a practice which, as pointed out earlier, has also been resorted to by China and the Soviet Union in dealing with their own respective national minorities.

It is true, of course, that the key role currently played by ethnicity in the diplomatic dramas of Eastern Europe is hardly a recent development. In reading the King, Lubachko, and Steiner studies, one is struck by the continuity of specific national problems extending from before World War I, through the Hitler period, all the way to the present. What is new, however, is the absence of a threat of immediate war between neighbors as a means of settling a national minority conflict. It is not the comparative strength of any one East European state or coalition of those states that is apt to decide such an issue. The Soviet Union remains the ultimate arbiter, and since Moscow would frown upon open hostilities between fraternal socialist states, disputes between the governments of the area over ethnic issues often assume such highly subtle forms as indirect allusions, pseudo-historical debates, and the citing of sometimes quite obscure passages from Marx, Engels, or Lenin in support of one's own position. But, as King's book makes clear, the absence of resorts to violence by the European socialist states has not been due to a lessening of interstate frictions involving the national question.

THE COLLECTIVE message of these books is that legatees of Lenin have proven more adroit at allying themselves with nationalism than at suppressing it. When it has suited their purpose of the moment to encourage nationalism, whether at home or abroad, they have generally been remarkably successful; but when they have tried to counter it, again whether at home or abroad, their record is certainly far from impressive. As noted earlier, national movements are today posing challenges to multinational state structures on a nearly universal scale, and it would therefore be unfair to single out the Marxist-Leninist states as alone having failed to solve the national question. And yet, it is pertinent to inquire whether Lenin's formula for eradicating nationalism, later encapsulated in the

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slogan "national in form, socialist in content," did not err in ignoring the possibility that political and cultural forms carry a content of their own. Several references have already been made to the impact that the existence of an administrative unit formed along ethnic lines can exert upon national consciousness. Observing the Flemings, Quebecois, Tamils, Ukrainians, and other peoples who have phrased their urge for national self-preservation largely in terms of preserving their language, one can safely presume that the national tongue is also an enduring reinforcer of a sense of unique group identity. It is not that language, or any other single, tangible national trait or institution is indispensible to the flourishing of ethnonationalism; comparative studies show that they are not. But the overt symbols of group uniqueness perpetuate and reinforce that self-identification with a particular ethnic group, its past and its future, which is nationalism. Lenin was correct in his perception of nationalism as a matter of attitude rather than of overt characteristics. But in perceiving that attitude as simply a collective response to past oppression and discrimination (and therefore exorcisable by a policy of national equality), he confused a catalyst with essence.

The "Dnepropetrovtsy" as Young Men

By John A. Armstrong

KONSTANTIN S. GRUSHEVOI: *Togda, v sorok pervom . . .* (Then, in '41 . . .). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974.

WESTERN SOVIETOLOGISTS have, with the assistance of such research aids as *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* scrutinized with increasing thoroughness the mass of newspaper and other periodical publications coming out of the USSR, and even esoteric references in this literature are rapidly fed into the Kremlinologists' mill. Unfortunately, Soviet books—while generally more readily available than periodicals—are not examined as carefully. No single Western periodical or group of periodicals even purports to review all Soviet books dealing with the politics and society of the Soviet Union. When—more or less haphazardly—books are noticed, they almost always go to a reviewer whose specialty appears to some editor to coincide with the book's overall subject, as indicated by the title. For many works this rule of thumb is, no doubt, adequate: for example, in the case of Soviet books on such topics as the economy and demography of the USSR, the few that are reviewed in the West at all generally receive expert appraisals. A small but extremely important group of books, however, contains information cutting across several specialties, with the most significant items usually not suggested by the titles.

The wartime memoir of Col. Gen. Konstantin S. Grushevoi is a good case in point. One of a series of "Military Memoirs," this volume could easily have gone for review to Sovietologists specializing on World War II. Military experts, finding little new on wartime operations in this book, would likely have dismissed it as inconsequential, although as Arnold Horelick has recently emphasized, all war memoirs ought to be scrutinized carefully for the information they contain on Soviet decision-making processes.[1] The fact is that Grushevoi's memoir is extraordinarily revealing of important, if quite different, aspects of Soviet affairs.

Since V. V. Shcherbitsky replaced P. Ye. Shelest as head of the Ukrainian Communist Party in May 1972, all observers of Soviet politics have recognized the crucial importance of the Dnepropetrovsk provincial party *apparat* as the origin of key members of many branches of the Soviet power elite today. Indeed, even before Shelest's fall, close observers like

[1] Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson, and John D. Steinbruner, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches,* R-1334, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, December 1973, p. 55.

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Werner G. Hahn had stressed the significance of this *apparat* because of its intimate relationship to Leonid Brezhnev. Hahn specifically noted Grushevoi's leading role in advancing the Brezhnev "cult."[2] Consequently, although Grushevoi's formal association with the Dnepropetrovsk organization ended during World War II, his memoir can be expected to illuminate some of the factors which make that regional *apparat* a distinctive element of the Soviet elite. At several points Grushevoi does, in fact, stress the solidarity of the *Dnepropetrovtsy* (literally, "those from Dnepropetrovsk").

The book presents a fascinating collection of pre-1941 portraits of a number of the Dnepropetrovsk *apparatchiki,* both in words and in photographs of these individuals, who were then mostly in their thirties. Among those pictured is Ya. I. Brezhnev, obviously (from the patronymic initial and family resemblance) Leonid's brother, although he is not mentioned in the text. As is to be expected, L. I. Brezhnev's photograph leads all the rest, and the treatment accorded him in the text accords with the panegyrics traditionally due the top leader in the USSR. (In fact, Brezhnev, then a minor secretary in the provincial party organization with responsibility for aspects of industrial production, was a subordinate of Grushevoi, who, as second secretary, was in charge of the provincial party organization at the outbreak of war, and a careful reading of this volume makes it clear that Brezhnev's participation in war measures was—despite Grushevoi's glowing descriptions —actually relatively unimportant.) Grushevoi obviously considered it essential also to introduce Shcherbitsky, singling him out for mention when he refers to the thousands of ordinary party members dispatched to military service in 1941 (at the age of 23, Shcherbitsky had just graduated from the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical Institute).

More significant than these conventional bows is the light that Grushevoi casts on the organizational connections of the Dnepropetrovsk *apparat,* both internal and with higher authorities, for the ties established three decades ago have continued to shape channels of personal and group influence. One set of connections which Grushevoi discusses at great length is that between the *apparat* and the military commissar system. A high proportion of all officials of the Ukrainian CP entered the political officer corps temporarily, but the Dnepropetrovsk group appears to have contributed more than its share. Moreover, a number of these party figures retained or renewed their links with the military after the war. Grushevoi remained in the commissar system and is currently Chief of the Political Directorate and member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District.[3] Brezhnev spent a period after Stalin's death in 1953 as a deputy to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Grushevoi, who stresses the fact that he insisted on keeping a field assignment during the war, seems to be obliquely criticizing *apparatchiki* (could he have present Politburo member A. P. Kirilenko in mind?) who opted for industrial supervision in the Urals. In describing the work of the party's political officers, Grushevoi notes that they had to stand up to line military demands more than once—a rare public acknowledgment of conflict in Soviet decision-making.

Even more significant is the information Grushevoi provides on the wartime importance of party personnel direction and its relationship with police control. Ukrainian Party Cadres Secretary Moisei S. Spivak (apparently purged as a Jew during Stalin's last years) occupies a prominent place in the narrative, which indeed he deserves according to unofficial wartime reports.[4] It was Spivak who issued orders to destroy the regional party archives if they could not be evacuated; Spivak who directed all party officials to start wearing uniforms; Spivak who monopolized clandestine contacts with the Dnepropetrovsk party underground in occupied territory; and apparently Spivak who selected the head (a cadres official) of this underground. The cadres sections in general, and Spivak in particular, are known to have worked intimately with the police;[5] and Grushevoi emphasizes his own close association with the provincial director of the NKVD (*Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del*—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in directing evacuation. These ties have more than "historical" significance, for, as Hahn has noted, the Dnepropetrovsk apparatus was the career starting point for several contem-

[2] *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1972, pp. 219, 264-65.

[3] *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), Jan. 14, 1975.

[4] See John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus,* New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 84, fn. 4.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

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porary police directors, including USSR Minister of the Interior N. A. Shchelokov, whose work as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dnepropetrovsk City Soviet in 1941 Grushevoi praises.

The history of partisan and underground activity in Dnepropetrovsk, as elsewhere, has contained many clues for subsequent Soviet political development. Grushevoi's account provides a modest contribution to this history. He discusses at length the formation of the "destruction battalions" which constituted the backbone of the early partisan movement, but (in contrast to some recent accounts [6]) does not admit that they were directed by the NKVD. Unfortunately, Grushevoi does not describe the tragic fate of these units, which we know in a one-sided fashion from German reports.[7] His account of the Pavlograd-Novomoskovsk partisans is somewhat fuller (confirming German reports about their lavish, though ultimately futile provisioning). Grushevoi's discussion of specifically underground operations is still more detailed, although it is not as complete (partly because it terminates in early 1942) as the treatment of the Pavlograd underground by its surviving director, A. P. Karavanchenko.[8]

The most difficult aspect of any Soviet memoir to evaluate relates to its intimations concerning the personalities of *apparat* officials. It would appear that Grushevoi—in contrast to many earlier memoirists—made a studied effort to stress the human qualities of the wartime *apparatchik*. In his account, officials openly avow concern for the well-being of their families. Grushevoi and his associates can barely force themselves to burn the unharvested grain rather than let it fall into German hands. He recounts the complaints by a crowd of women that the authorities were abandoning them and tells how he was sympathetic, if firm, in refuting their allegation.

There is also passing reference to the complex ethnic composition of the province. No direct mention of the large, vulnerable Jewish population appears (German reports allege that Jews were prominent in the partisans), but Grushevoi praises a few officials with obviously Jewish surnames. He also hints, in one passage, at the Ukrainian ethnic background of heavily Russified officials like himself: shocked by Grushevoi's telephoned warnings of a German approach, the Kirovograd provincial first secretary, P. S. Gorenkov (listed in at least one prewar newspaper story in the Ukrainian form "Horenko"), reverts momentarily to Ukrainian speech. The incident may have no general significance. On the other hand, it suggests that the veneer of Russification, impenetrable as it appears on contemporary officials like Ukrainian Party First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitsky, can crack just a little bit in moments of extreme emotional strain. We know that during the Civil War, there were numerous examples of even more Russified Tsarist army officers who asserted their Ukrainian identity by allying with Ukrainian independence forces. It is not wholly fantastic to envisage a future parallel development within a Soviet apparatus undergoing severe internal strain.

One must be very cautious in drawing inferences from works like Grushevoi's. Any publication dealing with the apparatus—far more than specialized sociological and historical works—is evidently still cautiously vetted by the party indoctrination sections. The period which Grushevoi covers, moreover, is remote from the present. Yet this past may be of particular relevance for specialists in Soviet affairs, who, for want of better information, have increasingly looked at the life cycles of Soviet officials to locate critical experiences which may have affected age cohorts differentially. The intense preoccupation of a whole Soviet generation with the World War II experience exemplified in this memoir—like innumerable other works dealing with partisan and regular military operations—suggests to the Sovietologist that this particular critical experience will remain salient as long as the present generation of party leaders remains in power. When a book covers the background of what has turned out to be a crucial segment of the Soviet apparatus, members of the Dnepropetrovsk provincial party organization at the outbreak of the war, it particularly merits rescue from the oblivion which has overtaken too many significant Soviet books.

[6] See, for example, S. B. Bilenko, *Istrebitelnye batalony v velikoi otechestvennoi voine* (Destruction Battalions in the Great Patriotic War) Moscow, Voenizdat, 1969, p. 16.

[7] See my "Partisan Warfare in the Dnepr Bend Area of the Ukraine," War Documentation Project, Technical Research Report No. 24, Vol. 1, Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Research and Development Command, Human Resources Research Institute, January 1954, and the citations to German documents, pp. 9-20; this section was omitted in the condensed version which I edited for *Soviet Partisans in World War II*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.

[8] *Nepokorionnyi Pavlograd* (Unsubdued Pavlograd), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1965.

TO OUR READERS: A notice of errata in the January-February 1975 issue appears on p. 41.

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